Plato
CRATYLUS
translated
by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the
Dialogue :
SOCRATES ; HERMOGENES ;
CRATYLUS
Hermogenes. Suppose that we
make Socrates a party to the argument ?
Cratylus. If you
please.
Her. I should explain
to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has been arguing about names ;
he says that they are natural and not conventional ; not a portion of the
human voice which men agree to use ; but that there is a truth or
correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon
I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he
answers “Yes.” And Socrates ? “Yes.” Then every man’s name, as I tell him,
is that which he is called. To this he replies — “If all the world were to call
you Hermogenes, that would not be your name.” And when I am anxious to have a
further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he
has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would only tell, and could
entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what
this oracle means ; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your
own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner
hear.
Socrates. Son of Hipponicus,
there is an ancient saying, that “hard is the knowledge of the good.” And the
knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might
have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete
education in grammar and language — these are his own words — and then I should
have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names.
But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do
not know the truth about such matters ; I will, however, gladly assist you
and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is
not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you ; — he
means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking
after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of
difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the
question open until we have heard both sides.
Her. I have often
talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince
myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention
and agreement ; any name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one,
and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old —
we frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as
good as the old : for there is no name given to anything by nature ;
all is convention and habit of the users ; — such is my view. But if I am
mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one
else.
Soc. I dare say that
you be right, Hermogenes : let us see ; — Your meaning is, that the
name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call
it ?
Her. That is my
notion.
Soc. Whether the giver
of the name be an individual or a city ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. Well, now, let me
take an instance ; — suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man,
you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually,
and rightly called a man by the rest of the world ; and a horse again would
be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world : — that is your
meaning ?
Her. He would,
according to my view.
Soc. But how about
truth, then ? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a
false ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And there are true
and false propositions ?
Her. To be
sure.
Soc. And a true
proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is
not ?
Her. Yes ; what
other answer is possible ?
Soc. Then in a
proposition there is a true and false ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. But is a
proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts
untrue ?
Her. No ; the
parts are true as well as the whole.
Soc. Would you say the
large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part ?
Her. I should say that
every part is true.
Soc. Is a proposition
resolvable into any part smaller than a name ?
Her. No ; that is
the smallest.
Soc. Then the name is a
part of the true proposition ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. Yes, and a true
part, as you say.
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And is not the
part of a falsehood also a falsehood ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. Then, if
propositions may be true and false, names may be true and
false ?
Her. So we must
infer.
Soc. And the name of
anything is that which any one affirms to be the
name ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And will there be
so many names of each thing as everybody says that there are ? and will
they be true names at the time of uttering them ?
Her. Yes, Socrates, I
can conceive no correctness of names other than this ; you give one name,
and I another ; and in different cities and countries there are different
names for the same things ; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of
names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another.
Soc. But would you say,
Hermogenes, that the things differ as the names differ ? and are they
relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us ? For he says that man is
the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and
that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you
say that things have a permanent essence of their
own ?
Her. There have been
times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with
Protagoras ; not that I agree with him at all.
Soc. What ! have
you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad
man ?
Her. No, indeed ;
but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good
many of them.
Soc. Well, and have you
ever found any very good ones ?
Her. Not
many.
Soc. Still you have
found them ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And would you hold
that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish ?
Would that be your view ?
Her. It
would.
Soc. But if Protagoras
is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can
some of us be wise and some of us foolish ?
Her.
Impossible.
Soc. And if, on the
other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I
think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what
appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than
another.
Her. He
cannot.
Soc. Nor will you be
disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at
the same moment and always ; for neither on his view can there be some good
and other bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to
all.
Her. There
cannot.
Soc. But if neither is
right, and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally
belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their
own proper and permanent essence : they are not in relation to us, or
influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but they are independent,
and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by
nature.
Her. I think, Socrates,
that you have said the truth.
Soc. Does what I am
saying apply only to the things themselves, or equally to the actions which
proceed from them ? Are not actions also a class of
being ?
Her. Yes, the actions
are real as well as the things.
Soc. Then the actions
also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion
of them ? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any
chance instrument ; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and
according to the natural process of cutting ; and the natural process is
right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at
all.
Her. I should say that
the natural way is the right way.
Soc. Again, in burning,
not every way is the right way ; but the right way is the natural way, and
the right instrument the natural instrument.
Her.
True.
Soc. And this holds
good of all actions ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And speech is a
kind of action ?
Her.
True.
Soc. And will a man
speak correctly who speaks as he pleases ? Will not the successful speaker
rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to
be spoken, and with the natural instrument ? Any other mode of speaking
will result in error and failure.
Her. I quite agree with
you.
Soc. And is not naming
a part of speaking ? for in giving names men speak.
Her. That is
true.
Soc. And if speaking is
a sort of action and has a relation to acts, is not naming also a sort of
action ?
Her.
True.
Soc. And we saw that
actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their
own ?
Her.
Precisely.
Soc. Then the argument
would lead us to infer that names ought to be given according to a natural
process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure : in this
and no other way shall we name with success.
Her. I
agree.
Soc. But again, that
which has to be cut has to be cut with something ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And that which has
to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with
something ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And that which has
to be named has to be named with something ?
Her.
True.
Soc. What is that with
which we pierce ?
Her. An
awl.
Soc. And with which we
weave ?
Her. A
shuttle.
Soc. And with which we
name ?
Her. A
name.
Soc. Very good :
then a name is an instrument ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. Suppose that I
ask, “What sort of instrument is a shuttle ?” And you answer, “A weaving
instrument.”
Her.
Well.
Soc. And I ask again,
“What do we do when we weave ?” — The answer is, that we separate or
disengage the warp from the woof.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And may not a
similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in
general ?
Her. To be
sure.
Soc. And now suppose
that I ask a similar question about names : will you answer me ?
Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we
name ?
Her. I cannot
say.
Soc. Do we not give
information to one another, and distinguish things according to their
natures ?
Her. Certainly we
do.
Soc. Then a name is an
instrument of teaching and of distinguishing natures, as the shuttle is of
distinguishing the threads of the web.
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And the shuttle is
the instrument of the weaver ?
Her.
Assuredly.
Soc. Then the weaver
will use the shuttle well — and well means like a weaver ? and the teacher
will use the name well — and well means like a
teacher ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And when the
weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using
well ?
Her. That of the
carpenter.
Soc. And is every man a
carpenter, or the skilled only ?
Her. Only the
skilled.
Soc. And when the
piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using
well ?
Her. That of the
smith.
Soc. And is every man a
smith, or only the skilled ?
Her. The skilled
only.
Soc. And when the
teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using ?
Her. There again I am
puzzled.
Soc. Cannot you at
least say who gives us the names which we use ?
Her. Indeed I
cannot.
Soc. Does not the law
seem to you to give us them ?
Her. Yes, I suppose
so.
Soc. Then the teacher,
when he gives us a name, uses the work of the
legislator ?
Her. I
agree.
Soc. And is every man a
legislator, or the skilled only ?
Her. The skilled
only.
Soc. Then, Hermogenes,
not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names ; and this
is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the
rarest.
Her.
True.
Soc. And how does the
legislator make names ? and to what does he look ? Consider this in
the light of the previous instances : to what does the carpenter look in
making the shuttle ? Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to
act as a shuttle ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And suppose the
shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken
one ? or will he look to the form according to which he made the
other ?
Her. To the latter, I
should imagine.
Soc. Might not that be
justly called the true or ideal shuttle ?
Her. I think
so.
Soc. And whatever
shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of flaxen,
woollen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the
shuttle ; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work,
that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each
case.
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And the same holds
of other instruments : when a man has discovered the instrument which is
naturally adapted to each work, he must express this natural form, and not
others which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which he
employs ; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of
awls adapted by nature to their several uses ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And how to put
into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to their
uses ?
Her.
True.
Soc. For the several
forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs ; and this
is true of instruments in general.
Her.
Yes.
Soc. Then, as to
names : ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural
names of each thing into sounds and syllables and to make and give all names
with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense ?
And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables.
For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for
the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but
the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever
iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country ; — there is no
difference.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And the
legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by
you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name
in whatever syllables ; this or that country makes no
matter.
Her. Quite
true.
Soc. But who then is to
determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever sort of wood
may be used ? the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use
them ?
Her. I should say, he
who is to use them, Socrates.
Soc. And who uses the
work of the lyremaker ? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what
is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or
not ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And who is
he ?
Her. The player of the
lyre.
Soc. And who will
direct the shipwright ?
Her. The
pilot.
Soc. And who will be
best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work
is well done, in this or any other country ? Will not the user be the
man ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And this is he who
knows how to ask questions ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And how to answer
them ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And him who knows
how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician ?
Her. Yes ; that
would be his name.
Soc. Then the work of
the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has to direct him, if the
rudder is to be well made.
Her.
True.
Soc. And the work of
the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if
the names are to be rightly given ?
Her. That is
true.
Soc. Then, Hermogenes,
I should say that this giving of names can be no such light matter as you fancy,
or the work of light or chance persons ; and Cratylus is right in saying
that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of
names, but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has, and is
able to express the true forms of things in letters and
syllables.
Her. I cannot answer
you, Socrates ; but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a
moment, and I think that I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show
me what this is which you term the natural fitness of
names.
Soc. My good
Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now (but you have
forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the enquiry with
you ? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step has been
gained ; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that
not every man knows how to give a thing a name.
Her. Very
good.
Soc. And what is the
nature of this truth or correctness of names ? That, if you care to know,
is the next question.
Her. Certainly, I care
to know.
Soc. Then
reflect.
Her. How shall I
reflect ?
Soc. The true way is to
have the assistance of those who know, and you must pay them well both in money
and in thanks ; these are the Sophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has
— rather dearly — bought the reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come
into your inheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and
entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of
names.
Her. But how
inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras and his Truth, I
were to attach any value to what he and his book
affirm !
Soc. Then if you
despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.
Her. And where does
Homer say anything about names, and what does he
say ?
Soc. He often speaks of
them ; notably and nobly in the places where he distinguishes the different
names which Gods and men give to the same things. Does he not in these passages
make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names ? For the Gods
must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names ;
do you not think so ?
Her. Why, of course
they call them rightly, if they call them at all. But to what are you
referring ?
Soc. Do you not know
what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with
Hephaestus ?
Whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men
call Scamander.
Her. I
remember.
Soc. Well, and about
this river — to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander — is
not that a solemn lesson ? Or about the bird which, as he
says,
The Gods call
Chalcis, and men Cymindis : to be taught how much more correct the name
Chalcis is than the name Cymindis — do you deem that a light matter ? Or
about Batieia and Myrina ? And there are many other observations of the
same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the
understanding of you and me ; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax,
which he affirms to have been the names of Hector’s son, are more within the
range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think ; and what the poet
means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance : you
will remember I dare say the lines to which I refer ?
Her. I
do.
Soc. Let me ask you,
then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector’s son
— Astyanax or Scamandrius ?
Her. I do not
know.
Soc. How would you
answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give
correct names ?
Her. I should say the
wise, of course.
Soc. And are the men or
the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser ?
Her. I should say, the
men.
Soc. And Homer, as you
know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax (king of the city) ; but
if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have
been given to him by the women.
Her. That may be
inferred.
Soc. And must not Homer
have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their
wives ?
Her. To be
sure.
Soc. Then he must have
thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for the boy than
Scamandrius ?
Her.
Clearly.
Soc. And what is the
reason of this ? Let us consider : — does he not himself suggest a
very good reason, when he says,
For he alone defended their city and
long walls ?
This appears to be
a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the city which his
father was saving, as Homer observes.
Her. I
see.
Soc. Why, Hermogenes, I
do not as yet see myself ; and do you ?
Her. No, indeed ;
not I.
Soc. But tell me,
friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his
name ?
Her. What of
that ?
Soc. The name appears
to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax — both are
Hellenic ; and a king (anax) and a holder (ektor) have nearly the same
meaning, and are both descriptive of a king ; for a man is clearly the
holder of that of which he is king ; he rules, and owns, and holds it. But,
perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense ; and indeed I believe
that I myself did not know what I meant when I imagined that I had found some
indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of
names.
Her. I assure you that
I think otherwise, and I believe you to be on the right
track.
Soc. There is reason, I
think, in calling the lion’s whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse a
horse ; I am speaking only of the ordinary course of nature, when an animal
produces after his kind, and not of extraordinary births ; — if contrary to
nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call that a foal but a calf ;
nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth. And the same
may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree with
me ?
Her. Yes, I
agree.
Soc. Very good. But you
had better watch me and see that I do not play tricks with you. For on the same
principle the son of a king is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of
the name are the same or not the same, makes no difference, provided the meaning
is retained ; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any
difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name
and appears in it.
Her. What do you
mean ?
Soc. A very simple
matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of letters, which you know are
not the same as the letters themselves with the exception of the four e, u, o
(short), o (long) ; the names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants,
are made up of other letters which we add to them ; but so long as we
introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is
quite correct. Take, for example, the letter beta — the addition of e, t, a,
gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from having the value
which the legislator intended — so well did he know how to give the letters
names.
Her. I believe you are
right.
Soc. And may not the
same be said of a king ? a king will often be the son of a king, the good
son or the noble son of a good or noble sire ; and similarly the off spring
of every kind, in the regular course of nature, is like the parent, and
therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised until they
appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize them, although
they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs
under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who
regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the
addition ; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the
addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed by the
change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was
just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike,
which is t, and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with
the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city) — and yet the
meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean “king.”
Again, there are several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and
Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior) ; and others which
denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of
mortals) ; and there are many others which might be cited, differing in
their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not say
so ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. The same names,
then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of
nature ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And what of those
who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies ? for example,
when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name
not of his father, but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the case
which was before supposed of a horse foaling a calf.
Her. Quite
true.
Soc. Then the
irreligious son of a religious father should be called
irreligious ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. He should not be
called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of
these names : if names are correctly given, his should have an opposite
meaning.
Her. Certainly,
Socrates.
Soc. Again, Hermogenes,
there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who appears to be rightly
called ; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to
express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of his hero’s
nature.
Her. That is very
likely, Socrates.
Soc. And his father’s
name is also according to nature.
Her.
Clearly.
Soc. Yes, for as his
name, so also is his nature ; Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one
who is patient and persevering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by his
virtue crowns them ; and his continuance at Troy with all the vast army is
a proof of that admirable endurance in him which is signified by the name
Agamemnon. I also think that Atreus is rightly called ; for his murder of
Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to
his reputation — the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be
intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in
seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ateires the stubborn, or as
atrestos the fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the name is perfectly
correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also named
appropriately ; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops who
sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron).
Her. How
so ?
Soc. Because, according
to the tradition, he had no forethought or foresight of all the evil which the
murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his whole race in remote ages ; he saw
only what was at hand and immediate, — Or in other words, pelas (near), in his
eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree
that the name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the
traditions about him are true.
Her. And what are the
traditions ?
Soc. Many terrible
misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life — last of all, came the
utter ruin of his country ; and after his death he had the stone suspended
(talanteia) over his head in the world below — all this agrees wonderfully well
with his name. You might imagine that some person who wanted to call him
Talantatos (the most weighted down by misfortune), disguised the name by
altering it into Tantalus ; and into this form, by some accident of
tradition, it has actually been transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged
father, has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because
really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him Zena,
and use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia ; the
two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we
were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is more the author
of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right
in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the
God through whom all creatures always have life (di on zen aei pasi tois zosin
uparchei). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos
(who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the
child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact ; for this is the meaning of
his father’s name : Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), not in the sense
of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou nou, the pure and
garnished mind (sc. apo tou chorein). He, as we are informed by tradition, was
begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo tou oran ta ano) from looking
upwards ; which, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind,
and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of
Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the
remoter ancestors of the Gods, — then I might have seen whether this wisdom,
which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold
good to the end.
Her. You seem to me,
Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering
oracles.
Soc. Yes, Hermogenes,
and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the
Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn : he
talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only
filled my ears but taken possession of my soul,and to-day I shall let his
superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names — that will be the
way ; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and
make a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is
skilled in purifications of this sort.
Her. With all my
heart ; for am very curious to hear the rest of the enquiry about
names.
Soc. Then let us
proceed ; and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of
outline of the enquiry ? Are there any names which witness of themselves
that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness ? The names
of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are often
called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have no
business ; or they are the expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of
good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and
others. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more
chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences ; — there
ought to have been more care taken about them when they were named, and perhaps
there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving
them names.
Her. I think so,
Socrates.
Soc. Ought we not to
begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly named
Gods ?
Her. Yes, that will be
well.
Soc. My notion would be
something of this sort : — I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, stars, and
heaven, which are still the Gods of many barbarians, were the only Gods known to
the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and running, from
their running nature they were called Gods or runners (Theous, Theontas) ;
and when men became acquainted with the other Gods, they proceeded to apply the
same name to them all. Do you think that likely ?
Her. I think it very
likely indeed.
Soc. What shall follow
the Gods ?
Her. Must not demons
and heroes and men come next ?
Soc. Demons ! And
what do you consider to be the meaning of this word ? Tell me if my view is
right.
Her. Let me
hear.
Soc. You know how
Hesiod uses the word ?
Her. I do
not.
Soc. Do you not
remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came
first ?
Her. Yes, I
do.
Soc. He says of them —
But now that fate has closed over this
race
They are holy demons upon the
earth,
Beneficent, averters of ills,
guardians of mortal men.
Her. What is the
inference ?
Soc. What is the
inference ! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden men, not men
literally made of gold, but good and noble ; and I am convinced of this,
because he further says that we are the iron race.
Her. That is
true.
Soc. And do you not
suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of golden
race ?
Her. Very
likely.
Soc. And are not the
good wise ?
Her. Yes, they are
wise.
Soc. And therefore I
have the most entire conviction that he called them demons, because they were
daemones (knowing or wise), and in our older Attic dialect the word itself
occurs. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a good man dies he has
honour and a mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a demon ; which is
a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who
happens to be a good man is more than human (daimonion) both in life and death,
and is rightly called a demon.
Her. Then I rather
think that I am of one mind with you ; but what is the meaning of the word
“hero” ? (eros)
Soc. I think that there
is no difficulty in explaining, for the name is not much altered, and signifies
that they were born of love.
Her. What do you
mean ?
Soc. Do you not know
that the heroes are demigods ?
Her. What
then ?
Soc. All of them sprang
either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for a
Goddess ; think of the word in the old Attic, and you will see better that
the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes
sprang : either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they must have
been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question
(erotan), for eirein is equivalent to legein. And therefore, as I was saying, in
the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All
this is easy enough ; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and
rhetors. But can you tell me why men are called anthropoi ? — that is more
difficult.
Her. No, I
cannot ; and I would not try even if I could, because I think that you are
the more likely to succeed.
Soc. That is to say,
you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.
Her. Of
course.
Soc. Your faith is not
vain ; for at this very moment a new and ingenious thought strikes me, and,
if I am not careful, before tomorrow’s dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be.
Now, attend to me ; and first, remember that we of put in and pull out
letters in words, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for
example, the word Dii Philos ; in order to convert this from a sentence
into a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave
instead of acute ; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in
words instead of being omitted, and the acute takes the place of the
grave.
Her. That is
true.
Soc. The name
anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears to be a case
just of this sort, for one letter, which is the a, has been omitted, and the
acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave.
Her. What do you
mean ?
Soc. I mean to say that
the word “man” implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up
at what they see, but that man not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up
at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly anthropos,
meaning anathron a opopen.
Her. May I ask you to
examine another word about which I am curious ?
Soc.
Certainly.
Her. I will take that
which appears to me to follow next in order. You know the distinction of soul
and body ?
Soc. Of
course.
Her. Let us endeavour
to analyze them like the previous words.
Soc. You want me first
of all to examine the natural fitness of the word psnche (soul), and then of the
word soma (body) ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. If I am to say
what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine that those who first use the
name psnche meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of
life, and gives the power of breath and revival (anapsuchon), and when this
reviving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not
mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a moment ; I fancy that I can
discover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro,
for I am afraid that they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to
another ?
Her. Let me
hear.
Soc. What is that which
holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the
body ? What else but the soul ?
Her. Just
that.
Soc. And do you not
believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing
principle of all things ?
Her. Yes ; I
do.
Soc. Then you may well
call that power phuseche which carries and holds nature (e phusin okei, kai
ekei), and this may be refined away into psuche. Her. Certainly ;
and this derivation is, I think, more scientific than the
otHer.
Soc. It is so ;
but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this was the true meaning of
the name.
Her. But what shall we
say of the next word ?
Soc. You mean soma (the
body).
Her.
Yes.
Soc. That may be
variously interpreted ; and yet more variously if a little permutation is
allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (sema) of the soul which may be
thought to be buried in our present life ; or again the index of the soul,
because the soul gives indications to (semainei) the body ; probably the
Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression
that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an
enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma,
sozetai), as the name ooma implies, until the penalty is paid ; according
to this view, not even a letter of the word need be
changed.
Her. I think, Socrates,
that we have said enough of this class of words. But have we any more
explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of
Zeus ? I should like to know whether any similar principle of correctness
is to be applied to them.
Soc. Yes, indeed,
Hermogenes ; and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense,
we must acknowledge, — that of the Gods we know nothing, either of their natures
or of the names which they give themselves ; but we are sure that the names
by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the
best of all principles ; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that
we will call them by any sort of kind names or patronymics which they like,
because we do not know of any otHer. That also, I think, is a very good
custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you
please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about
them ; we do not presume that we are able to do so ; but we are
enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these names, — in this there
can be small blame.
Her. I think, Socrates,
that you are quite right, and I would like to do as you
say.
Soc. Shall we begin,
then, with Hestia, according to custom ?
Her. Yes, that will be
very proper.
Soc. What may we
suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia ?
Her. That is another
and certainly a most difficult question.
Soc. My dear
Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable
persons ; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to
say.
Her. Well, and what of
them ?
Soc. They are the men
to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. Even in foreign names, if
you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For example, that which we
term ousia is by some called esia, and by others again osia. Now that the
essence of things should be called estia, which is akin to the first of these
(esia = estia), is rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling
that estia which participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to have
said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who
appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to estia, which was natural
enough if they meant that estia was the essence of things. Those again who read
osia seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus, that all things flow
and nothing stands ; with them the pushing principle (othoun) is the cause
and ruling power of all things, and is therefore rightly called osia. Enough of
this, which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after
Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has
been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking great
nonsense.
Her. Why,
Socrates ?
Soc. My good friend, I
have discovered a hive of wisdom.
Her. Of what
nature ?
Soc. Well, rather
ridiculous, and yet plausible.
Her. How
plausible ?
Soc. I fancy to myself
Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old as the days of Cronos
and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke.
Her. How do you
mean ?
Soc. Heracleitus is
supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest ; he
compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the
same water twice.
Her. That is
true.
Soc. Well, then, how
can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of Cronos and Rhea to the
ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much in the doctrine of Heracleitus ?
Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental ?
Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells
of
Ocean, the origin of Gods, and
mother Tethys.
And again, Orpheus
says, that
The fair river of Ocean was the
first to marry, and he espoused his sister Tethys, who was his mother’s
daughter.
You see that this
is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of
Heracleitus.
Her. I think that there
is something in what you say, Socrates ; but I do not understand the
meaning of the name Tethys.
Soc. Well, that is
almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, a little
disguised ; for that which is strained and filtered (diattomenon,
ethoumenon) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these
two words.
Her. The idea is
ingenious, Socrates.
Soc. To be sure. But
what comes next ? — of Zeus we have spoken.
Her.
Yes.
Soc. Then let us next
take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether the latter is called by that
or by his other name.
Her. By all
means.
Soc. Poseidon is
Posidesmos, the chain of the feet ; the original inventor of the name had
been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not allowed to go on, and
therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon ; the e was probably
inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so ; but the name may have been
originally written with a double l and not with an s, meaning that the God knew
many things (Polla eidos). And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth,
has been named from shaking (seiein), and then p and d have been added. Pluto
gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out
of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term Hades is
connected with the invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their fears to call
the God Pluto instead.
Her. And what is the
true derivation ?
Soc. In spite of the
mistakes which are made about the power of this deity, and the foolish fears
which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death,
and of the soul denuded of the body going to him, my belief is that all is quite
consistent, and that the office and name of the God really
correspond.
Her. Why, how is
that ?
Soc. I will tell you my
own opinion ; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any
animal feel to be the stronger ? and which confines him more to the same
spot, — desire or necessity ?
Her. Desire, Socrates,
is stronger far.
Soc. And do you not
think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who
depart to him by the strongest of chains ?
Her. Assuredly they
would.
Soc. And if by the
greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by
necessity ?
Her. That is
clear.
Soc. And there are many
desires ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And therefore by
the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the
greatest ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. And is any desire
stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with
another ?
Her. Certainly
not.
Soc. And is not that
the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back
to us ? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid
under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his
words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist,
and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world ; and even
to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has
much more than he wants down there ; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the
rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the
body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the
body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and reflection in that ; for
in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while
they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself
would suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed
chains.
Her. There is a deal of
truth in what you say.
Soc. Yes, Hermogenes,
and the legislator called him Hades, not from the unseen (aeides) — far
otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all noble
things.
Her. Very good ;
and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus,
and Ares, and the other deities ?
Soc. Demeter is e
didousa meter, who gives food like a mother ; Here is the lovely one
(erate) — for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married her ;
possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of
the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (aer), putting the end in the
place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if you repeat the
letters of Here several times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they
dread the name of Apollo — and with as little reason ; the fear, if I am
not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But they
go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this ;
whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (sophe) ; for
seeing that all things in the world are in motion (pheromenon), that principle
which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore
the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), or some name like it,
because she touches that which is (tou pheromenon ephaptomene), herein showing
her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They
alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation care
for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was
saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible signification. Have you
remarked this fact ?
Her. To be sure I have,
and what you say is true.
Soc. But the name, in
my opinion, is really most expressive of the power of the
God.
Her. How
so ?
Soc. I will endeavour
to explain, for I do not believe that any single name could have been better
adapted to express the attributes of the God, embracing and in a manner
signifying all four of them, — music, and prophecy, and medicine, and
archery.
Her. That must be a
strange name, and I should like to hear the explanation.
Soc. Say rather an
harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the first place, the
purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their
fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and
lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man
pure both in body and soul.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And is not Apollo
the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all
impurities ?
Her. Very
true.
Soc. Then in reference
to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the physician who orders them, he may
be rightly called Apolouon (purifier) ; or in respect of his powers of
divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be
most fitly called Aplos, from aplous (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect,
for all the Thessalians call him Aplos ; also he is Ballon (always
shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses ; or again, the
name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and
akoitis, and in many other words the a is supposed to mean “together,” so the
meaning of the name Apollo will be “moving together,” whether in the poles of
heaven as they are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord,
because he moves all together by an harmonious power, as astronomers and
musicians ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and
makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in the
words akolouthos and akoitis the a is substituted for an o, so the name Apollon
is equivalent to omopolon ; only the second l is added in order to avoid
the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon). Now the suspicion of this
destructive power still haunts the minds of some who do not consider the true
value of the name, which, as I was saying just now, has reference to all the
powers of the God, who is the single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the
mover together (aplous, aei Ballon, apolouon, omopolon). The name of the Muses
and of music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical enquiries
(mosthai) ; and Leto is called by this name, because she is such a gentle
Goddess, and so willing (ethelemon) to grant our requests ; or her name may
be Letho, as she is often called by strangers — they seem to imply by it her
amiability, and her smooth and easy-going way of behaving. Artemis is named from
her healthy (artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of
virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (arete), and perhaps
also as hating intercourse of the sexes (ton aroton miseasa). He who gave the
Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.
Her. What is the
meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite ?
Soc. Son of Hipponicus,
you ask a solemn question ; there is a serious and also a facetious
explanation of both these names ; the serious explanation is not to be had
from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one ; for
the Gods too love a joke. Dionusos is simply didous oinon (giver of wine), as he
might be called in fun, — and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes
those who drink, think (oiesthai) that they have a mind (noun) when they have
none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (aphoros), may be fairly
accepted on the authority of Hesiod.
Her. Still there
remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, will surely not
forget ; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.
Soc. I am not likely to
forget them.
Her. No,
indeed.
Soc. There is no
difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene.
Her. What other
appellation ?
Soc. We call her
Pallas.
Her. To be
sure.
Soc. And we cannot be
wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances. For the elevation of
oneself or anything else above the earth, or by the use of the hands, we call
shaking (pallein), or dancing.
Her. That is quite
true.
Soc. Then that is the
explanation of the name Pallas ?
Her. Yes ; but
what do you say of the other name ?
Soc.
Athene ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. That is a graver
matter, and there, my friend, the modern interpreters of Homer may, I think,
assist in explaining the view of the ancients. For most of these in their
explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athene “mind” (nous) and
“intelligence” (dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular
notion about her ; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, “divine
intelligence” (Thou noesis), as though he would say : This is she who has
the mind of God (Theonoa) ; — using a as a dialectical variety e, and
taking away i and s. Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may mean “she who knows
divine things” (Theia noousa) better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in
supposing that the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral
intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her the name ethonoe ;
which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought
a nicer form, and called her Athene.
Her. But what do you
say of Hephaestus ?
Soc. Speak you of the
princely lord of light (Phaeos istora) ?
Her.
Surely.
Soc. Ephaistos is
Phaistos, and has added the e by attraction ; that is obvious to
anybody.
Her. That is very
probable, until some more probable notion gets into your
head.
Soc. To prevent that,
you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares.
Her. What is
Ares ?
Soc. Ares may be
called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and manliness, or if you please,
from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is the meaning of arratos :
the latter is a derivation in every way appropriate to the God of
war.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And now, by the
Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am afraid of them ; ask about
anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds of Euthyphro can
prance.
Her. Only one more
God ! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a
true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether there is any
meaning in what Cratylus says.
Soc. I should imagine
that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the
interpreter (ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer ; all
that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language ; as I was telling
you the word eirein is expressive of the use of speech, and there is an
often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means “he contrived” — out of these
two words, eirein and mesasthai, the legislator formed the name of the God who
invented language and speech ; and we may imagine him dictating to us the
use of this name : “O my friends,” says he to us, “seeing that he is the
contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him Eirhemes.” And this has
been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been
called from the verb “to tell” (eirein), because she was a
messenger.
Her. Then I am very
sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I was no true son of Hermes
(Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at speeches.
Soc. There is also
reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son of
Hermes.
Her. How do you make
that out ?
Soc. You are aware that
speech signifies all things (pan), and is always turning them round and round,
and has two forms, true and false ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. Is not the truth
that is in him the smooth or sacred form which dwells above among the Gods,
whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat of
tragedy ; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or
goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them ?
Her. Very
true.
Soc. Then surely Pan,
who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the perpetual mover (aei polon) of
all things, is rightly called aipolos (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son
of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower
regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and
that brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear
Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.
Her. From these sort of
Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods
— the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the
year ?
Soc. You impose a great
many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not refuse.
Her. You will oblige
me.
Soc. How would you have
me begin ? Shall I take first of all him whom you mentioned first — the
sun ?
Her. Very
good.
Soc. The origin of the
sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form, for the Dorians call him alios,
and this name is given to him because when he rises he gathers (alizoi) men
together or because he is always rolling in his course (aei eilein ion) about
the earth ; or from aiolein, of which meaning is the same as poikillein (to
variegate), because he variegates the productions of the
earth.
Her. But what is selene
(the moon) ?
Soc. That name is
rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.
Her. How
so ?
Soc. The word seems to
forestall his recent discovery, that the moon receives her light from the
sun.
Her. Why do you say
so ?
Soc. The two words
selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the same
meaning ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. This light about
the moon is always new (neon) and always old (enon), if the disciples of
Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always adds new light, and
there is the old light of the previous month.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. The moon is not
unfrequently called selanaia.
Her.
True.
Soc. And as she has a
light which is always old and always new (enon neon aei) she may very properly
have the name selaenoneoaeia ; and this when hammered into shape becomes
selanaia.
Her. A real dithyrambic
sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say of the month and the
stars ?
Soc. Meis (month) is
called from meiousthai (to lessen), because suffering diminution ; the name
of astra (stars) seems to be derived from astrape, which is an improvement on
anastphope, signifying the upsetting of the eyes (anastrephein
opa).
Her. What do you say of
pur (fire) and udor (water) ?
Soc. I am at a loss how
to explain pur ; either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is
some very great difficulty in the word. Please, however, to note the contrivance
which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.
Her. What is
it ?
Soc. I will tell
you ; but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the
meaning of the pur ?
Her. Indeed I
cannot.
Soc. Shall I tell you
what I suspect to be the true explanation of this and several other words ?
— My belief is that they are of foreign origin. For the Hellenes, especially
those who were under the dominion of the barbarians, often borrowed from
them.
Her. What is the
inference ?
Soc. Why, you know that
any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of these names according to the
Hellenic language, and not according to the language from which the words are
derived, is rather likely to be at fault.
Her. Yes,
certainly.
Soc. Well then,
consider whether this pur is not foreign ; for the word is not easily
brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians may be
observed to have the same word slightly changed, just as they have udor (water)
and kunes (dogs), and many other words.
Her. That is
true.
Soc. Any violent
interpretations of the words should be avoided ; for something to say about
them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of pur and udor. Aer (air),
Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises (airei) things from the
earth, or as ever flowing (aei pei), or because the flux of the air is wind, and
the poets call the winds “air-blasts,” (aetai) ; he who uses the term may
mean, so to speak, air-flux (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux
(pneumatorroun) ; and because this moving wind may be expressed by either
term he employs the word air (aer = aetes rheo). Aither (aether) I should
interpret as aeitheer ; this may be correctly said, because this element is
always running in a flux about the air (aei thei peri tou aera ron). The meaning
of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of gaia, for the earth
may be truly called “mother” (gaia, genneteira), as in the language of Homer
(Od. ix. 118 ; xiii. 160) gegaasi means gegennesthai.
Her.
Good.
Soc. What shall we take
next ? Her. There are orai (the seasons), and the two names of the
year, eniautos and etos.
Soc. The orai should be
spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to know the probable truth about
them ; they are rightly called the orai because they divide (orizousin) the
summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the earth. The words eniautos
and etos appear to be the same, — “that which brings to light the plants and
growths of the earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (en
eauto exetazei)” : this is broken up into two words, eniautos from en
eauto, and etos from etazei, just as the original name of Zeus was divided into
Zena and Dia ; and the whole proposition means that his power of reviewing
from within is one, but has two names, two words etos and eniautos being thus
formed out of a single proposition.
Her. Indeed, Socrates,
you make surprising progress.
Soc. I am run away
with.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. But am not yet at
my utmost speed.
Her. I should like very
much to know, in the next place, how you would explain the virtues. What
principle of correctness is there in those charming words — wisdom,
understanding, justice, and the rest of them ?
Soc. That is a
tremendous class of names which you are disinterring ; still, as I have put
on the lion’s skin, I must not be faint of heart ; and I suppose that I
must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and understanding (sunesis), and
judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), and all those other charming words,
as you call them ?
Her. Surely, we must
not leave off until we find out their meaning.
Soc. By the dog of
Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into my head only this moment : I
believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like too many of our
modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature of things, are always
getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that
the world is going round and round and moving in all directions ; and this
appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they suppose to be
a reality of nature ; they think that there is nothing stable or permanent,
but only flux and motion, and that the world is always full of every sort of
motion and change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me
into making this reflection.
Her. How is that,
Socrates ?
Soc. Perhaps you did
not observe that in the names which have been just cited, the motion or flux or
generation of things is most surely indicated.
Her. No, indeed, I
never thought of it.
Soc. Take the first of
those which you mentioned ; clearly that is a name indicative of
motion.
Her. What was the
name ?
Soc. Phronesis
(wisdom), which may signify Phoras kai rhou noesis (perception of motion and
flux), or perhaps Phoras onesis (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate
connected with Pheresthai (motion) ; gnome (judgment), again, certainly
implies the ponderation or consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to ponder
is the same as to consider ; or, if you would rather, here is noesis, the
very word just now mentioned, which is neou esis (the desire of the new) ;
the word neos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver
of the name wanted to express his longing of the soul, for the original name was
neoesis, and not noesis. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that
wisdom (phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme (knowledge) is
akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows
(epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind
them ; wherefor the word should rather be read as epistemene, inserting en.
Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of
conclusion ; the word is derived from sunienai (to go along with), and,
like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company with
the nature of things. Sophia (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of
native growth ; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things.
You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any
rapid motion, often use the word esuthe (he rushed) ; and there was a
famous Lacedaemonian who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the
Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (epaphe) of motion is
expressed by sophia, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (agathon)
is the name which is given to the admirable (agasto) in nature ; for,
although all things move, still there are degrees of motion ; some are
swifter, some slower ; but there are some things which are admirable for
their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called agathon. Dikaiosune
(justice) is clearly dikaiou sunesis (understanding of the just) ; but the
actual word dikaion is more difficult : men are only agreed to a certain
extent about justice, and then they begin to disagree.
For those who
suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a
mere receptacle ; and they say that there is a penetrating power which
passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and is the
subtlest and swiftest element ; for if it were not the subtlest, and a
power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as
if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through the moving universe.
And this element, which superintends all things and pieces (diaion) all, is
rightly called dikaion ; the letter k is only added for the sake of
euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a general agreement about the
nature of justice ; but I, Hermogenes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have
been told in a mystery that the justice of which I am speaking is also the cause
of the world : now a cause is that because of which anything is
created ; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that justice is rightly
so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after
hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently : “Well, my excellent
friend,” say I, “but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.”
Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the
barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy
me with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of
them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing (diaionta)
and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of nature. And when I
joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the satirical remark,
“What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is down ?” And when I
earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, “Fire in
the abstract” ; but this is not very intelligible. Another says, “No, not
fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.” Another man
professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is
mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and
orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find
myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I
began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into
this digression, was given to justice for the reasons which I have
mentioned.
Her. I think, Socrates,
that you are not improvising now ; you must have heard this from some one
else.
Soc. And not the
rest ?
Her.
Hardly.
Soc. Well, then, let me
go on in the hope of making you believe in the originality of the rest. What
remains after justice ? I do not think that we have as yet discussed
courage (andreia), — injustice (adikia), which is obviously nothing more than a
hindrance to the penetrating principle (diaiontos), need not be considered.
Well, then, the name of andreia seems to imply a battle ; — this battle is
in the world of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the
counterflux (enantia rhon) : if you extract the d from andreia, the name at
once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that andreia is not the
stream opposed to every stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice,
for otherwise courage would not have been praised. The words arren (male) and
aner (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward
flux (te ano rhon). Gune (woman) I suspect to be the same word as goun
(birth) : thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the
teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish
(tethelenai).
Her. That is surely
probable.
Soc. Yes ; and the
very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure the growth of youth, which is
swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the legislator in the name,
which is a compound of thein (running), and allesthai (leaping). Pray observe
how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names
generally thought to be of importance, which have still to be
explained.
Her.
True.
Soc. There is the
meaning of the word techne (art), for example.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. That may be
identified with echonoe, and expresses the possession of mind : you have
only to take away the t and insert two o’s, one between the ch and n, and
another between the n and e.
Her. That is a very
shabby etymology.
Soc. Yes, my dear
friend ; but then you know that the original names have been long ago
buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off letters for the
sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts of ways :
and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, for example, the word
katoptron ; why is the letter r inserted ? This must surely be the
addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of
putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no
human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another
example is the word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be phigx, phiggos,
and there are other examples.
Her. That is quite
true, Socrates.
Soc. And yet, if you
are permitted to put in and pull out any letters which you please, names will be
too easily made, and any name may be adapted to any
object.
Her.
True.
Soc. Yes, that is true.
And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself, should observe the laws of
moderation and probability.
Her. Such is my
desire.
Soc. And mine, too,
Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or “you will unnerve me of my
strength.” When you have allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art)
I shall be at the top of my bent, for I conceive mechane to be a sign of great
accomplishment — anein ; for mekos the meaning of greatness, and these two,
mekos and anein, make up the word mechane. But, as I was saying, being now at
the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words arete
(virtue) and kakia (vice) arete I do not as yet understand, but kakia is
transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things being
in a flux (ionton), kakia is kakos ion (going badly) ; and this evil motion
when existing in the soul has the general name of kakia or vice, specially
appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may be further illustrated by the
use of deilia (cowardice), which ought to have come after andreia, but was
forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over.
Deilia signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (desmos), for lian
means strength, and therefore deilia expresses the greatest and strongest bond
of the soul ; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from a
not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion
and movement. Then the word kakia appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly,
or limping and halting ; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes
filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort of thing, arete will be
the opposite of it, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the
stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever
flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called arete, or, more
correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had another form,
airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more eligible than virtue, and
this has been hammered into arete. I daresay that you will deem this to be
another invention of mine, but I think that if the previous word kakia was
right, then arete is also right.
Her. But what is the
meaning of kakon, which has played so great a part in your previous
discourse ?
Soc. That is a very
singular word about which I can hardly form an opinion, and therefore I must
have recourse to my ingenious device.
Her. What
device ?
Soc. The device of a
foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also.
Her. Very likely you
are right ; but suppose that we leave these words and endeavour to see the
rationale of kalon and aischron.
Soc. The meaning of
aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes (always preventing from
flowing), and this is in accordance with our former derivations. For the
name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the
name aeischoroun to that which hindered the flux (aei ischon roun), and that is
now beaten together into aischron.
Her. But what do you
say of kalon ?
Soc. That is more
obscure ; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and has been changed by
altering ou into o.
Her. What do you
mean ?
Soc. This name appears
to denote mind.
Her. How
so ?
Soc. Let me ask you
what is the cause why anything has a name ; is not the principle which
imposes the name the cause ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And must not this
be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. Is not mind that
which called (kalesan) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful
(kalon) ?
Her. That is
evident.
Soc. And are not the
works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy
of blame ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. Physic does the
work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a
carpenter ?
Her.
Exactly.
Soc. And the principle
of beauty does the works of beauty ?
Her. Of
course.
Soc. And that principle
we affirm to be mind ?
Her. Very
true.
Soc. Then mind is
rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of
as the beautiful ?
Her. That is
evident.
Soc. What more names
remain to us ?
Her. There are the
words which are connected with agathon and kalon, such as sumpheron and
lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and their opposites.
Soc. The meaning of
sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may discover for yourself by the light of
the previous examples, — for it is a sister word to episteme, meaning just the
motion (pora) of the soul accompanying the world, and things which are done upon
this principle are called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried
round with the world.
Her. That is
probable.
Soc. Again, cherdaleon
(gainful) is called from cherdos (gain), but you must alter the d into n if you
want to get at the meaning ; for this word also signifies good, but in
another way ; he who gave the name intended to express the power of
admixture (kerannumenon) and universal penetration in the good ; in forming
the word, however, he inserted a d instead of an n, and so made
kerdos.
Her. Well, but what is
lusiteloun (profitable) ?
Soc. I suppose,
Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the gainful or that which
pays (luei) the retailer, but they use the word in the sense of swift. You
regard the profitable (lusitelou), as that which being the swiftest thing in
existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but
always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (luei), and makes
motion immortal and unceasing : and in this point of view, as appears to
me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun — being that which looses (luon)
the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from
ophellein, meaning that which creates and increases ; this latter is a
common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.
Her. And what do you
say of their opposites ?
Soc. Of such as mere
negatives I hardly think that I need speak.
Her. Which are
they ?
Soc. The words
axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable), alusiteles (unadvantageous),
akerdes (ungainful).
Her.
True.
Soc. I would rather
take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes (hurtful).
Her.
Good.
Soc. The word blaberon
is that which is said to hinder or harm (blaptein) the stream (roun) ;
blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking to hold or bind) ; for aptein is the
same as dein, and dein is always a term of censure ; boulomenon aptein roun
(wanting to bind the stream) would properly be boulapteroun, and this, as I
imagine, is improved into blaberon.
Her. You bring out
curious results, Socrates, in the use of names ; and when I hear the word
boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are making your mouth into a
flute, and puffing away at some prelude to Athene.
Soc. That is the fault
of the makers of the name, Hermogenes ; not mine.
Her. Very true ;
but what is the derivation of zemiodes ?
Soc. What is the
meaning of zemiodes ? — let me remark, Hermogenes, how right I was in
saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by putting in and
pulling out letters ; even a very slight permutation will sometimes give an
entirely opposite sense ; I may instance the word deon, which occurs to me
at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine
fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely
altered the original meaning both of deon, and also of zemiodes, which in the
old language is clearly indicated.
Her. What do you
mean ?
Soc. I will try to
explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the sounds i and d, especially
the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, but now they
change i into e (long) or e (short), and d into z ; this is supposed to
increase the grandeur of the sound.
Her. How do you
mean ?
Soc. For example, in
very ancient times they called the day either imera or emera (short e), which is
called by us emera (long e).
Her. That is
true.
Soc. Do you observe
that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name ?
of which the reason is, that men long for (imeirousi) and love the light which
comes after the darkness, and is therefore called imera, from imeros,
desire.
Her.
Clearly.
Soc. But now the name
is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning, although there are some who
imagine the day to be called emuera because it makes things gentle
(emera).
Her. Such is my
view.
Soc. And do you know
that the ancients said dougon and not zugon ?
Her. They did
so.
Soc. And zugon (yoke)
has no meaning, — it ought to be duogon, which word expresses the binding of two
together (duein agoge) for the purpose of drawing ; — this has been changed
into zugon, and there are many other examples of similar
changes.
Her. There
are.
Soc. Proceeding in the
same train of thought I may remark that the word deon (obligation) has a meaning
which is the opposite of all the other appellations of good ; for deon is
here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, the chain (desmos) or hinderer of
motion, and therefore own brother of blaberon.
Her. Yes,
Socrates ; that is quite plain.
Soc. Not if you restore
the ancient form, which is more likely to be the correct one, and read dion
instead of deon ; if you convert the e into an i after the old fashion,
this word will then agree with other words meaning good ; for dion, not
deon, signifies the good, and is a term of praise ; and the author of names
has not contradicted himself, but in all these various appellations, deon
(obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon
(gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same
conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which is
praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is censured. And this
is further illustrated by the word zemiodes (hurtful), which if the z is only
changed into d as in the ancient language, becomes demiodes ; and this
name, as you will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti
ion).
Her. What do you say of
edone (pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia (desire), and the like,
Socrates ?
Soc. I do not think,
Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about them — edone is e onesis,
the action which tends to advantage ; and the original form may be supposed
to have been eone, but this has been altered by the insertion of the d. Lupe
appears to be derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in
sorrow ; ania (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (a and ienai) ;
algedon (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived
from aleinos (grievous) ; odune (grief) is called from the putting on
(endusis) sorrow ; in achthedon (vexation) “the word too labours,” as any
one may see ; chara (joy) is the very expression of the fluency and
diffusion of the soul (cheo) ; terpsis (delight) is so called from the
pleasure creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may be likened to a breath
(pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but has been altered by time into terpnon ;
eupherosune (cheerfulness) and epithumia explain themselves ; the former,
which ought to be eupherosune and has been changed euphrosune, is named, as
every one may see, from the soul moving (pheresthai) in harmony with
nature ; epithumia is really e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis, the power
which enters into the soul ; thumos (passion) is called from the rushing
(thuseos) and boiling of the soul ; imeros (desire) denotes the stream
(rous) which most draws the soul dia ten esin tes roes — because flowing with
desire (iemenos), and expresses a longing after things and violent attraction of
the soul to them, and is termed imeros from possessing this power ; pothos
(longing) is expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent,
and in another place (pou) ; this is the reason why the name pothos is
applied to things absent, as imeros is to things present ; eros (love) is
so called because flowing in (esron) from without ; the stream is not
inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in
was called esros (influx) in the old time when they used o (short) for o (long),
and is called eros, now that o (long) is substituted for o (short). But why do
you not give me another word ?
Her. What do you think
of doxa (opinion), and that class of words ?
Soc. Doxa is either
derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the march of the soul in the
pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (toxon) ; the latter is
more likely, and is confirmed by oiesis (thinking), which is only oisis
(moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of each
thing — just as boule (counsel) has to do with shooting (bole) ; and
boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating — all these
words seem to follow doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as
aboulia, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or
mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.
Her. You are quickening
your pace now, Socrates.
Soc. Why yes, the end I
now dedicate to God, not, however, until I have explained anagke (necessity),
which ought to come next, and ekousion (the voluntary). Ekousion is certainly
the yielding (eikon) and unresisting — the notion implied is yielding and not
opposing, yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in
accordance with our will ; but the necessary and resistant being contrary
to our will, implies error and ignorance ; the idea is taken from walking
through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes
motion — and this is the derivation of the word anagkaion (necessary) an agke
ion, going through a ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I
hope that you will persevere with your questions.
Her. Well, then, let me
ask about the greatest and noblest, such as aletheia (truth) and pseudos
(falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to enquire why the word onoma (name),
which is the theme of our discussion, has this name of
onoma.
Soc. You know the word
maiesthai (to seek) ?
Her. Yes ; —
meaning the same as zetein (to enquire).
Soc. The word onoma
seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying on ou zetema (being for which
there is a search) ; as is still more obvious in onomaston (notable), which
states in so many words that real existence is that for which there is a seeking
(on ou masma) ; aletheia is also an agglomeration of theia ale (divine
wandering), implying the divine motion of existence ; pseudos (falsehood)
is the opposite of motion ; here is another ill name given by the
legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep
(eudein) ; but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the
addition of ps ; on and ousia are ion with an i broken off ; this
agrees with the true principle, for being (on) is also moving (ion), and the
same may be said of not being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or
ouki on = ouk ion).
Her. You have hammered
away at them manfully ; but suppose that some one were to say to you, what
is the word ion, and what are reon and doun ? — show me their
fitness.
Soc. You mean to say,
how should I answer him ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. One way of giving
the appearance of an answer has been already suggested.
Her. What
way ?
Soc. To say that names
which we do not understand are of foreign origin ; and this is very likely
the right answer, and something of this kind may be true of them ; but also
the original forms of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages ; names
have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if
the old language when compared with that now in use would appear to us to be a
barbarous tongue.
Her. Very
likely.
Soc. Yes, very likely.
But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention and we must not flinch. For
we should remember, that if a person go on analysing names into words, and
enquiring also into the elements out of which the words are formed, and keeps on
always repeating this process, he who has to answer him must at last give up the
enquiry in despair.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And at what point
ought he to lose heart and give up the enquiry ? Must he not stop when he
comes to the names which are the elements of all other names and
sentences ; for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other
names ? The word agathon (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a
compound of agastos (admirable) and thoos (swift). And probably thoos is made up
of other elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is
incapable of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have
at last reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any
furtHer.
Her. I believe you to
be in the right.
Soc. And suppose the
names about which you are now asking should turn out to be primary elements,
must not their truth or law be examined according to some new
method ?
Her. Very
likely.
Soc. Quite so,
Hermogenes ; all that has preceded would lead to this conclusion. And if,
as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say to you, come and help
me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of primary
names.
Her. Let me hear, and I
will do my best to assist you.
Soc. I think that you
will acknowledge with me, that one principle is applicable to all names, primary
as well as secondary — when they are regarded simply as names, there is no
difference in them.
Her. Certainly
not.
Soc. All the names that
we have been explaining were intended to indicate the nature of
things.
Her. Of
course.
Soc. And that this is
true of the primary quite as much as of the secondary names, is implied in their
being names.
Her.
Surely.
Soc. But the secondary,
as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary.
Her. That is
evident.
Soc. Very good ;
but then how do the primary names which precede analysis show the natures of
things, as far as they can be shown ; which they must do, if they are to be
real names ? And here I will ask you a question : Suppose that we had
no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we not,
like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the
body ?
Her. There would be no
choice, Socrates.
Soc. We should imitate
the nature of the thing ; the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean
lightness and upwardness ; heaviness and downwardness would be expressed by
letting them drop to the ground ; if we were describing the running of a
horse, or any other animal, we should make our bodies and their gestures as like
as we could to them.
Her. I do not see that
we could do anything else.
Soc. We could
not ; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express
anything.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And when we want
to express ourselves, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression
is simply their imitation of that which we want to
express.
Her. It must be so, I
think.
Soc. Then a name is a
vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or
imitates ?
Her. I think
so.
Soc. Nay, my friend, I
am disposed to think that we have not reached the truth as
yet.
Her. Why
not ?
Soc. Because if we have
we shall be obliged to admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or
other animals, name that which they imitate.
Her. Quite
true.
Soc. Then could I have
been right in what I was saying ?
Her. In my opinion, no.
But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a
name ?
Soc. In the first
place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also
vocal ; nor, again, an imitation of what music imitates ; these, in my
judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter as follows : All
objects have sound and figure, and many have colour ?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. But the art of
naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of this kind ; the arts
which have to do with them are music and drawing ?
Her.
True.
Soc. Again, is there
not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour, or sound ? And is
there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may
be said to have an essence ?
Her. I should think
so.
Soc. Well, and if any
one could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he
not express the nature of each thing ?
Her. Quite
so.
Soc. The musician and
the painter were the two names which you gave to the two other imitators. What
will this imitator be called ?
Her. I imagine,
Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of whom we are in
search.
Soc. If this is true,
then I think that we are in a condition to consider the names ron (stream),
ienai (to go), schesis (retention), about which you were asking ; and we
may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in letters and
syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or
not.
Her. Very
good.
Soc. But are these the
only primary names, or are there others ?
Her. There must be
others.
Soc. So I should
expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and where does the imitator
begin ? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and letters ;
ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those who are
beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of elementary, and then of
compound sounds, and when they have done so, but not before, they proceed to the
consideration of rhythms ?
Her.
Yes.
Soc. Must we not begin
in the same way with letters ; first separating the vowels, and then the
consonants and mutes, into classes, according to the received distinctions of
the learned ; also the semivowels, which are neither vowels, nor yet
mutes ; and distinguishing into classes the vowels themselves ? And
when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give their names,
and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to which they
may be all referred ; hence we shall see their natures, and see, too,
whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters ; and when we
have well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them to what they
resemble — whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is
to be an admixture of several of them ; just, as in painting, the painter
who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour,
and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint
flesh colour or anything of that kind — he uses his colours as his figures
appear to require them ; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the
expression of objects, either single letters when required, or several
letters ; and so we shall form syllables, as they are called, and from
syllables make nouns and verbs ; and thus, at last, from the combinations
of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole ; and as
the painter made a figure, even so shall we make speech by the art of the namer
or the rhetorician, or by some other art. Not that I am literally speaking of
ourselves, but I was carried away — meaning to say that this was the way in
which (not we but) the ancients formed language, and what they put together we
must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the
whole subject, and we must see whether the primary, and also whether the
secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the
composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in
the wrong direction.
Her. That, Socrates, I
can quite believe.
Soc. Well, but do you
suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way ? for I am
certain that I should not.
Her. Much less am I
likely to be able.
Soc. Shall we leave
them, then ? or shall we seek to discover, if we can, something about them,
according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said
before of the Gods, that of the truth about them we know nothing, and do but
entertain human notions of them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to
ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or
others who would analyse language to any good purpose must follow ; but
under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you
think ?
Her. I very much
approve.
Soc. That objects
should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear
ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it cannot be avoided — there is no better principle
to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must
have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have
their Gods waiting in the air ; and must get out of our difficulty in like
fashion, by saying that “the Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are
right.” This will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be
even better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the
barbarians are older than we are ; or we may say that antiquity has cast a
veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the last ; for all
these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons
concerning the truth of words. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or
primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words ; for they can
only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should
be able to give a very lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured
he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be
true ?
Her. Certainly,
Socrates.
Soc. My first notions
of original names are truly wild and ridiculous, though I have no objection to
impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in
return anything better which you may have.
Her. Fear not ; I
will do my best.
Soc. In the first
place, the letter r ; appears to me to be the general instrument expressing
all motion (kinesis). But I have not yet explained the meaning of this latter
word, which is just iesis (going) ; for the letter e (long) was not in use
among the ancients, who only employed e (short) ; and the root is kiein,
which is a foreign form, the same as ienai. And the old word kinesis will be
correctly given as iesis in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign
root kiein, and allowing for the change of the e and the insertion of the n, we
have kinesis, which should have been kieinsis or eisis ; and stasis is the
negative of ienai (or eisis), and has been improved into stasis. Now the letter
r, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for
the expression of motion ; and he frequently uses the letter for this
purpose : for example, in the actual words rein and roe he represents
motion by r ; also in the words tromos (trembling), trachus (rugged) ;
and again, in words such as krouein (strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein
(bruise), thruptein (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl) : of
all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter r,
because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and
least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in
order to express motion, just as by the letter i he expresses the subtle
elements which pass through all things. This is why he uses the letter i as
imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class of letters, ph,
ps, s, and x, of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of
breath ; these are used in the imitation of such notions as psuchron
(shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos (shock), and
are always introduced by the giver of names when he wants to imitate what is
phusodes (windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the
tongue in the utterance of d and t was expressive of binding and rest in a
place : he further observed the liquid movement of l, in the pronunciation
of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as
in leios (level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon (sleek),
in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like : the heavier sound of g
detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a
glutinous clammy nature, as in glischros, glukus, gloiodes. The n he observed to
be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness ;
hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos : a he assigned to the
expression of size, and n of length, because they are great letters : o was
the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of o mixed up in the word
goggulon (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and
syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation
compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of
names ; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to
say.
Her. But, Socrates, as
I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me ; he says that there is a
fitness of names, but he never explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot
tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in
the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying about
names, or have you something better of your own ? and if you have, tell me
what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I
will learn of you.
Crat. Well, but surely,
Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, or I explain, any subject of
importance all in a moment ; at any rate, not such a subject as language,
which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all.
Her. No, indeed ;
but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, “to add little to little” is worth
while. And, therefore, if you think that you can add anything at all, however
small, to our knowledge, take a little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too,
who certainly have a claim upon you.
Soc. I am by no means
positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and myself have worked
out ; and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, which if it be
better than my own view shall gladly accept. And I should not be at all
surprised to find that you have found some better notion. For you have evidently
reflected on these matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a
better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your
disciples.
Crat. You are right,
Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these matters, and I might
possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the opposite is more
probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in the
“Prayers” says to Ajax —
Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the
people,
You appear to have spoken in all
things much to my mind.
And you, Socrates,
appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much to my whether you are
inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of
your breast, unconsciously to yourself.
Soc. Excellent
Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom ; I cannot trust
myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying ?
for there is nothing worse than self-deception — when the deceiver is always at
home and always with you — it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to
retrace my steps and endeavour to “look fore and aft,” in the words of the
aforesaid Homer. And now let me see ; where are we ? Have we not been
saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing : — has this
proposition been sufficiently proven ?
Crat. Yes, Socrates,
what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite true.
Soc. Names, then, are
given in order to instruct ?
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And naming is an
art, and has artificers ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And who are
they ?
Crat. The legislators,
of whom you spoke at first.
Soc. And does this art
grow up among men like other arts ? Let me explain what I mean : of
painters, some are better and some worse ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. The better
painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse
execute them worse ; and of builders also, the better sort build fairer
houses, and the worse build them worse.
Crat.
True.
Soc. And among
legislators, there are some who do their work better and some
worse ?
Crat. No ; there I
do not agree with you.
Soc. Then you do not
think that some laws are better and others worse ?
Crat. No,
indeed.
Soc. Or that one name
is better than another ?
Crat. Certainly
not.
Soc. Then all names are
rightly imposed ?
Crat. Yes, if they are
names at all.
Soc. Well, what do you
say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before : —
assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that
this is a wrong name, or not his name at all ?
Crat. I should reply
that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is
really the name of somebody else, who has the nature which corresponds to
it.
Soc. And if a man were
to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely ? For there
may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is
not.
Crat. What do you
mean ?
Soc. Are you
maintaining that falsehood is impossible ? For if this is your meaning I
should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all
ages.
Crat. Why, Socrates, how
can a man say that which is not ? — say something and yet say
nothing ? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is
not ?
Soc. Your argument,
friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I should like to know whether you
are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not
said ?
Crat. Neither spoken nor
said.
Soc. Nor uttered nor
addressed ? For example : If a person, saluting you in a foreign
country, were to take your hand and say : “Hail, Athenian stranger,
Hermogenes, son of Smicrion” — these words, whether spoken, said, uttered, or
addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes,
or perhaps to nobody at all ?
Crat. In my opinion,
Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense.
Soc. Well, but that
will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be
true or false, or partly true and partly false : — which is all that I want
to know.
Crat. I should say that
he would be putting himself in motion to no purpose ; and that his words
would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen
pot.
Soc. But let us see,
Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting-point, for you would admit that the
name is not the same with the thing named ?
Crat. I
should.
Soc. And would you
further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the
thing ?
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And you would say
that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another
way ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. I believe you may
be right, but I do not rightly understand you. Please to say, then, whether both
sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or words) are not equally attributable
and applicable to the things of which they are the
imitation.
Crat. They
are.
Soc. First look at the
matter thus : you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of
the woman to the woman ; and so on ?
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And conversely you
may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the
man ?
Crat. Very
true.
Soc. And are both modes
of assigning them right, or only the first ?
Crat. Only the
first.
Soc. That is to say,
the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and
is like them ?
Crat. That is my
view.
Soc. Now then, as I am
desirous that we being friends should have a good understanding about the
argument, let me state my view to you : the first mode of assignment,
whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names
only, true as well as right ; and the other mode of giving and assigning
the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well
as wrong.
Crat. That may be true,
Socrates, in the case of pictures ; they may be wrongly assigned ; but
not in the case of names — they must be always right.
Soc. Why, what is the
difference ? May I not go to a man and say to him, “This is your picture,”
showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a woman ; and when
I say “show,” I mean bring before the sense of sight.
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And may I not go
to him again, and say, “This is your name” ? — for the name, like the
picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him — “This is your name” ? and
may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I
say, “This is a man” ; or of a female of the human species, when I say,
“This is a woman,” as the case may be ? Is not all that quite
possible ?
Crat. I would fain agree
with you, Socrates ; and therefore I say, Granted.
Soc. That is very good
of you, if I am right, which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can
assign names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of them we may
call truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a
wrong assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment
of verbs ; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made
up of them. What do you say, Cratylus ?
Crat. I agree ; and
think that what you say is very true.
Soc. And further,
primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give
all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not give them all — some may
be wanting ; or there may be too many or too much of them — may there
not ?
Crat. Very
true.
Soc. And he who gives
all gives a perfect picture or figure ; and he who takes away or adds also
gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. In like manner, he
who by syllables and letters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that
is appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words a name ; but if
he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image but not a good
one ; whence I infer that some names are well and others ill
made.
Crat. That is
true.
Soc. Then the artist of
names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And this artist of
names is called the legislator ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. Then like other
artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad ; it must surely be so
if our former admissions hold good ?
Crat. Very true,
Socrates ; but the case of language, you see, is different ; for when
by the help of grammar we assign the letters a or b, or any other letters to a
certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which
is written is not only written wrongly, but not written at all ; and in any
of these cases becomes other than a name.
Soc. But I doubt
whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.
Crat. How
so ?
Soc. I believe that
what you say may be true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not
be at all ; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a
unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number : but this does not
apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an
image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the
entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two
objects : one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of
Cratylus ; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a
representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but
also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and
softness ; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you
have, in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another
form ; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or
that there were two Cratyluses ?
Crat. I should say that
there were two Cratyluses.
Soc. Then you see, my
friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in
names ; and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something
is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having
qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they
represent ?
Crat. Yes, I
see.
Soc. But then how
ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same
with them ! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able
to determine which were the names and which were the
realities.
Crat. Quite
true.
Soc. Then fear not, but
have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly
given ; and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same with the
thing ; but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of
a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a
sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing
may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the thing which
you are describing is retained ; and this, as you will remember, was
remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the
letters.
Crat. Yes, I
remember.
Soc. Good ; and
when the general character is preserved, even if some of the proper letters are
wanting, still the thing is signified ; — well, if all the letters are
given ; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had
better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in Aegina who wander
about the street late at night : and be likewise told by truth herself that
we have arrived too late ; or if not, you must find out some new notion of
correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a
thing in letters or syllables ; for if you say both, you will be
inconsistent with yourself.
Crat. I quite
acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable.
Soc. Then as we are
agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not
to have the proper letters.
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And the proper
letters are those which are like the things ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. Enough then of
names which are rightly given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the
greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or
there would be no likeness ; but there will be likewise a part which is
improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word : you would admit
that ?
Crat. There would be no
use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a
name which is incorrectly given is a name at all.
Soc. Do you admit a
name to be the representation of a thing ?
Crat. Yes, I
do.
Soc. But do you not
allow that some nouns are primitive, and some
derived ?
Crat. Yes, I
do.
Soc. Then if you admit
that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better
way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much
as you can ; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others,
who say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed
about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and
that convention is the only principle ; and whether you abide by our
present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call
small great and great small — that, they would say, makes no difference, if you
are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you
prefer ?
Crat. Representation by
likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than representation by any chance
sign.
Soc. Very good :
but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first
names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the
picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture which would be
like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the
things imitated, and out of which the picture is
composed ?
Crat.
Impossible.
Soc. No more could
names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless the original elements of
which they are compounded bore some degree of resemblance to the objects of
which the names are the imitation : And the original elements are
letters ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. Let me now invite
you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree
with me that the letter r is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness ?
Were we right or wrong in saying so ?
Crat. I should say that
you were right.
Soc. And that l was
expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the
like ?
Crat. There again you
were right.
Soc. And yet, as you
are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes, is by the Eretrians called
skleroter.
Crat. Very
true.
Soc. But are the
letters r and s, equivalents ; and is there the same significance to them
in the termination r, which there is to us in s, or is there no significance to
one of us ?
Crat. Nay, surely there
is a significance to both of us.
Soc. In as far as they
are like, or in as far as they are unlike ?
Crat. In as far as they
are like.
Soc. Are they
altogether alike ?
Crat. Yes ; for the
purpose of expressing motion.
Soc. And what do you
say of the insertion of the l ? for that is expressive not of hardness but
of softness.
Crat. Why, perhaps the
letter l is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and should be altered into r, as you
were saying to Hermogenes and in my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding
and subtracting letters upon occasion.
Soc. Good. But still
the word is intelligible to both of us ; when I say skleros (hard), you
know what I mean.
Crat. Yes, my dear
friend, and the explanation of that is custom.
Soc. And what is custom
but convention ? I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I
understand the meaning of the sound : this is what you are
saying ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And if when I
speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given by me to
you ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. This indication of
my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from like, for example in the l of
sklerotes. But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself,
and the correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which
are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are
sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish
custom from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification
of words is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the
unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I
shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and convention must
be supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts ; for suppose
we take the instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that
you will find names resembling every individual number, unless you allow that
which you term convention and agreement to have authority in determining the
correctness of names ? I quite agree with you that words should as far as
possible resemble things ; but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance,
as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the
mechanical aid of convention with a view to correctness ; for I believe
that if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly
appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language ; as the
opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names,
and what is the use of them ?
Crat. The use of names,
Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform : the simple truth is, that he
who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by
them.
Soc. I suppose you mean
to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is the thing ; and that he
who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similars, and all
similars fall under the same art or science ; and therefore you would say
that he who knows names will also know things.
Crat. That is precisely
what I mean.
Soc. But let us
consider what is the nature of this information about things which, according to
you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information ? or is there
any other ? What do you say ?
Crat. I believe that to
be both the only and the best sort of information about them ; there can be
no otHer.
Soc. But do you believe
that in the discovery of them, he who discovers the names discovers also the
things ; or is this only the method of instruction, and is there some other
method of enquiry and discovery.
Crat. I certainly
believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery are of the same nature as
instruction.
Soc. Well, but do you
not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and
analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being
deceived ?
Crat. How
so ?
Soc. Why clearly he who
first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they
signified — did he not ?
Crat.
True.
Soc. And if his
conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, in what
position shall we who are his followers find ourselves ? Shall we not be
deceived by him ?
Crat. But, Socrates, am
I not right in thinking that he must surely have known ; or else, as I was
saying, his names would not be names at all ? And you have a clear proof
that he has not missed the truth, and the proof is — that he is perfectly
consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter
have a common character and purpose ?
Soc. But that, friend
Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the
remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself ; there
would be nothing strange in this, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which
have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are
consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the
reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the
consideration of his first principles : — are they or are they not rightly
laid down ? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. Now
I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And here let us
revert to our former discussion : Were we not saying that all things are in
motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by
names ? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of
them ?
Crat. Yes ; that is
assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.
Soc. Let us revert to
episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to
signify stopping the soul at things than going round with them ; and
therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the e, but
make an insertion of an instead of an i (not pioteme, but epiisteme). Take
another example : bebaion (sure) is clearly the expression of station and
position, and not of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears upon the
face of it the stopping (istanai) of the stream ; and the word piston
(faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion ; then, again, mneme
(memory), as any one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion.
Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which have a bad sense, viewed in
the light of their etymologies will be the same as sunesis and episteme and
other words which have a good sense (i.e., omartein, sunienai, epesthai,
sumphersthai) and much the same may be said of amathia and akolaia, for amathia
may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia, and akolasia as e akolouthia tois
pragmasin. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the worst
sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which have the
best. And any one I believe who would take the trouble might find many other
examples in which the giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or
progress, but that they are at rest ; which is the opposite of
motion.
Crat. Yes, Socrates, but
observe ; the greater number express motion.
Soc. What of that,
Cratylus ? Are we to count them like votes ? and is correctness of
names the voice of the majority ? Are we to say of whichever sort there are
most, those are the true ones ?
Crat. No ; that is
not reasonable.
Soc. Certainly not. But
let us have done with this question and proceed to another, about which I should
like to know whether you think with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that
the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the
legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the
legislator ?
Crat. Quite
true.
Soc. Tell me, then, did
the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names, know or not know
the things which they named ?
Crat. They must have
known, Socrates.
Soc. Why, yes, friend
Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant.
Crat. I should say
not.
Soc. Let us return to
the point from which we digressed. You were saying, if you remember, that he who
gave names must have known the things which he named ; are you still of
that opinion ?
Crat. I
am.
Soc. And would you say
that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he
named ?
Crat. I
should.
Soc. But how could he
have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet
given ? For, if we are correct in our view, the only way of learning and
discovering things, is either to discover names for ourselves or to learn them
from others.
Crat. I think that there
is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.
Soc. But if things are
only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had
knowledge, or were legislators before there were names at all, and therefore
before they could have known them ?
Crat. I believe,
Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a power more than human
gave things their first names, and that the names which are thus given are
necessarily their true names.
Soc. Then how came the
giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict
himself ? For were we not saying just now that he made some names
expressive of rest and others of motion ? Were we
mistaken ?
Crat. But I suppose one
of the two not to be names at all.
Soc. And which, then,
did he make, my good friend ; those which are expressive of rest, or those
which are expressive of motion ? This is a point which, as I said before,
cannot be determined by counting them.
Crat. No ; not in
that way, Socrates.
Soc. But if this is a
battle of names, some of them asserting that they are like the truth, others
contending that they are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between
them ? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but
obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing
names, will make clear which of the two are right ; and this must be a
standard which shows the truth of things.
Crat. I
agree.
Soc. But if that is
true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without
names ?
Crat.
Clearly.
Soc. But how would you
expect to know them ? What other way can there be of knowing them, except
the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each
other, and through themselves ? For that which is other and different from
them must signify something other and different from them.
Crat. What you are
saying is, I think, true.
Soc. Well, but
reflect ; have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given
are the likenesses and images of the things which they
name ?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. Let us suppose
that to any extent you please you can learn things through the medium of names,
and suppose also that you can learn them from the things themselves — which is
likely to be the nobler and clearer way to learn of the image, whether the image
and the truth of which the image is the expression have been rightly conceived,
or to learn of the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been duly
executed ?
Crat. I should say that
we must learn of the truth.
Soc. How real existence
is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may
admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names.
No ; they must be studied and investigated in
themselves.
Crat. Clearly,
Socrates.
Soc. There is another
point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by the appearance of such a
multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. I myself do not deny that
the givers of names did really give them under the idea that all things were in
motion and flux ; which was their sincere but, I think, mistaken opinion.
And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round,
and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about
which I often dream, and should like to ask your opinion : Tell me, whether
there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute
existence ?
Crat. Certainly,
Socrates, I think so.
Soc. Then let us seek
the true beauty : not asking whether a face is fair, or anything of that
sort, for all such things appear to be in a flux ; but let us ask whether
the true beauty is not always beautiful.
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And can we rightly
speak of a beauty which is always passing away, and is first this and then
that ; must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word
is in our mouths ?
Crat.
Undoubtedly.
Soc. Then how can that
be a real thing which is never in the same state ? I for obviously things
which are the same cannot change while they remain the same ; and if they
are always the same and in the same state, and never depart from their original
form, they can never change or be moved.
Crat. Certainly they
cannot.
Soc. Nor yet can they
be known by any one ; for at the moment that the observer approaches, then
they become other and of another nature, so that you cannot get any further in
knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no
state.
Crat.
True.
Soc. Nor can we
reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a
state of transition and there is nothing abiding ; for knowledge too cannot
continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide and exist. But if the
very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will
be no knowledge ; and if the transition is always going on, there will
always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to
know and nothing to be known : but if that which knows and that which is
known exist ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also
exist, then I do not think that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were
just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether
the truth is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say, is a
question hard to determine ; and no man of sense will like to put himself
or the education of his mind in the power of names : neither will he so far
trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which
condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality ;
he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or imagine that the world
is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also
very likely to be untrue ; and therefore I would not have you be too easily
persuaded of it. Reflect well and like a man, and do not easily accept such a
doctrine ; for you are young and of an age to learn. And when you have
found the truth, come and tell me.
Crat. I will do as you
say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have been considering the matter
already, and the result of a great deal of trouble and consideration is that I
incline to Heracleitus.
Soc. Then, another day,
my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a lesson ; but at present,
go into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your
way.
Crat. Very good,
Socrates ; I hope, however, that you will continue to think about these
things yourself.