Plato
EUTHYPHRO
translated
by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the
Dialogue :
SOCRATES ; EUTHYPHRO
Scene : The Porch of
the King Archon
Euthyphro. Why have you left
the Lyceum, Socrates ? and what are you doing in the Porch of the King
Archon ? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before the King, like
myself ?
Socrates. Not in a suit,
Euthyphro ; impeachment is the word which the Athenians
use.
Euth. What ! I
suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you
are the prosecutor of another.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Euth. Then some one else
has been prosecuting you ?
Soc.
Yes.
Euth. And who is
he ?
Soc. A young man who is
little known, Euthyphro ; and I hardly know him : his name is Meletus,
and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance ;
he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill
grown.
Euth. No, I do not
remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against
you ?
Soc. What is the
charge ? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character
in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he
knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he
must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found
me out, and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this
our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only
one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in
youth ; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care,
and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first
step ; he will afterwards attend to the elder branches ; and if he
goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public
benefactor.
Euth. I hope that he
may ; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite will turn out to be
the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the
foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the
young ?
Soc. He brings a
wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise :
he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny
the existence of old ones ; this is the ground of his
indictment.
Euth. I understand,
Socrates ; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which
occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and
he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a
charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well ; for
when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the future to
them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true.
But they are jealous of us all ; and we must be brave and go at
them.
Soc. Their laughter,
friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought
wise ; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about
him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or
other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.
Euth. I am never likely
to try their temper in this way.
Soc. I dare say not,
for you are reserved in your behaviour, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I
have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay
for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative.
Now if, as I was saying, they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh
at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court ; but perhaps they
may be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can
predict.
Euth. I dare say that
the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your
cause ; and I think that I shall win my own.
Soc. And what is your
suit, Euthyphro ? are you the pursuer or the
defendant ?
Euth. I am the
pursuer.
Soc. Of
whom ?
Euth. You will think me
mad when I tell you.
Soc. Why, has the
fugitive wings ?
Euth. Nay, he is not
very volatile at his time of life.
Soc. Who is
he ?
Euth. My
father.
Soc. Your father !
my good man ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. And of what is he
accused ?
Euth. Of murder,
Socrates.
Soc. By the powers,
Euthyphro ! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and
truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in
wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an
action.
Euth. Indeed, Socrates,
he must.
Soc. I suppose that the
man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives — clearly he was ;
for if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting
him.
Euth. I am amused,
Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who
is not a relation ; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if
you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and
him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the murdered man has
been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone ;
but if unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you
and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the man who is dead was a
poor dependent of mine who worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in
Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of
our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw
him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do
with him. Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about him, for he
regarded him as a murderer ; and thought that no great harm would be done
even if he did die. Now this was just what happened. For such was the effect of
cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from the
diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the
part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill
him, and that if he did, dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take
any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows,
Socrates, how little they know what the gods think about piety and
impiety.
Soc. Good heavens,
Euthyphro ! and is your knowledge of religion and of things pious and
impious so very exact, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state
them, you are not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing
an action against your father ?
Euth. The best of
Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his
exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without
it ?
Soc. Rare friend !
I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple. Then before the trial
with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a
great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash
imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You,
Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian,
and sound in his opinions ; and if you approve of him you ought to approve
of me, and not have me into court ; but if you disapprove, you should begin
by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young,
but of the old ; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his
old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to
me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot
do better than repeat this challenge in the court.
Euth. Yes, indeed,
Socrates ; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a
flaw in him ; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to
me.
Soc. And I, my dear
friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that
no one appears to notice you — not
even this Meletus ; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he
has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature
of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and
of other offences against the gods. What are they ? Is not piety in every
action always the same ? and impiety, again — is it not always the opposite of piety,
and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes
whatever is impious ?
Euth. To be sure,
Socrates.
Soc. And what is piety,
and what is impiety ?
Euth. Piety is doing as
I am doing ; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder,
sacrilege, or of any similar crime — whether he be your father or mother, or
whoever he may be — that makes no difference ; and not to prosecute them is
impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you
of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others : —
of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go
unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the
gods ? — and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he
wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus)
for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my
father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking
when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.
Soc. May not this be
the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety — that I cannot away with
these stories about the gods ? and therefore I suppose that people think me
wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do
better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I
do, that I know nothing about them ? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether
you really believe that they are true.
Euth. Yes,
Socrates ; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in
ignorance.
Soc. And do you really
believe that the gods, fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles,
and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of
great artists ? The temples are full of them ; and notably the robe of
Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is
embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true,
Euthyphro ?
Euth. Yes,
Socrates ; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear
them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze
you.
Soc. I dare say ;
and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at
present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not
as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is “piety” ? When asked, you
only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with
murder.
Euth. And what I said
was true, Socrates.
Soc. No doubt,
Euthyphro ; but you would admit that there are many other pious
acts ?
Euth. There
are.
Soc. Remember that I
did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the
general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that
there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious
pious ?
Euth. I
remember.
Soc. Tell me what is
the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look,
and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and
then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another
impious.
Euth. I will tell you,
if you like.
Soc. I should very much
like.
Euth. Piety, then, is
that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to
them.
Soc. Very good,
Euthyphro ; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But
whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no
doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.
Euth. Of
course.
Soc. Come, then, and
let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the
gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious,
these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that
said ?
Euth. It
was.
Soc. And well
said ?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, I
thought so ; it was certainly said.
Soc. And further,
Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and
differences ?
Euth. Yes, that was also
said.
Soc. And what sort of
difference creates enmity and anger ? Suppose for example that you and I,
my good friend, differ about a number ; do differences of this sort make us
enemies and set us at variance with one another ? Do we not go at once to
arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum ?
Euth.
True.
Soc. Or suppose that we
differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by
measuring ?
Euth. Very
true.
Soc. And we end a
controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing
machine ?
Euth. To be
sure.
Soc. But what
differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us
angry and set us at enmity with one another ? I dare say the answer does
not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities
arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil,
honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ,
and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you
and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel ?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, the
nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you
describe.
Soc. And the quarrels
of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like
nature ?
Euth. Certainly they
are.
Soc. They have
differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust,
honourable and dishonourable : there would have been no quarrels among
them, if there had been no such differences — would there
now ?
Euth. You are quite
right.
Soc. Does not every man
love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of
them ?
Euth. Very
true.
Soc. But, as you say,
people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust, — about these
they dispute ; and so there arise wars and fightings among
them.
Euth. Very
true.
Soc. Then the same
things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and
dear to them ?
Euth.
True.
Soc. And upon this view
the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also
impious ?
Euth. So I should
suppose.
Soc. Then, my friend, I
remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For
I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and
impious : but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also
hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may
very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or
Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there
may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
Euth. But I believe,
Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a
murderer : there would be no difference of opinion about
that.
Soc. Well, but speaking
of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort
of evil-doer ought to be let off ?
Euth. I should rather
say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in
courts of law : they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which
they will not do or say in their own defence.
Soc. But do they admit
their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be
punished ?
Euth. No ; they do
not.
Soc. Then there are
some things which they do not venture to say and do : for they do not
venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their
guilt, do they not ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. Then they do not
argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact
of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when ?
Euth.
True.
Soc. And the gods are
in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some
of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely
neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not
to be punished ?
Euth. That is true,
Socrates, in the main.
Soc. But they join
issue about the particulars — gods and men alike ; and, if they dispute at
all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some
is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that
true ?
Euth. Quite
true.
Soc. Well then, my dear
friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what
proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of
murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he
is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the
gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly ; and that on behalf of
such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder.
How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his
act ? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I
live.
Euth. It will be a
difficult task ; but I could make the matter very dear indeed to
you.
Soc. I
understand ; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the
judges : for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and
hateful to the gods.
Euth. Yes indeed,
Socrates ; at least if they will listen to me.
Soc. But they will be
sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that
came into my mind while you were speaking ; I said to myself : “Well,
and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of
the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and
impiety ? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still
piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that
which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to
them.” And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this ; I will
suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action.
But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is
impious, and what they love pious or holy ; and what some of them love and
others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and
impiety ?
Euth. Why not,
Socrates ?
Soc. Why not !
certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But
whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as
you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
Euth. Yes, I should say
that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all
hate, impious.
Soc. Ought we to
enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere
statement on our own authority and that of others ? What do you
say ?
Euth. We should
enquire ; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of
enquiry.
Soc. We shall know
better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish
to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is
holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
Euth. I do not
understand your meaning, Socrates.
Soc. I will endeavour
to explain : we, speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of
leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases
there is a difference, and you know also in what the difference
lies ?
Euth. I think that I
understand.
Soc. And is not that
which is beloved distinct from that which loves ?
Euth.
Certainly.
Soc. Well ; and
now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is
carried, or for some other reason ?
Euth. No ; that is
the reason.
Soc. And the same is
true of what is led and of what is seen ?
Euth.
True.
Soc. And a thing is not
seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen ;
nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because
it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think,
Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible ; and my meaning is, that
any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not
become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it
becomes ; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but
it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not
agree ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. Is not that which
is loved in some state either of becoming or
suffering ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. And the same holds
as in the previous instances ; the state of being loved follows the act of
being loved, and not the act the state.
Euth.
Certainly.
Soc. And what do you
say of piety, Euthyphro : is not piety, according to your definition, loved
by all the gods ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. Because it is
pious or holy, or for some other reason ?
Euth. No, that is the
reason.
Soc. It is loved
because it is holy, not holy because it is loved ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. And that which is
dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because
it is loved of them ?
Euth.
Certainly.
Soc. Then that which is
dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of
God, as you affirm ; but they are two different
things.
Euth. How do you mean,
Socrates ?
Soc. I mean to say that
the holy has been acknowledge by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not
to be holy because it is loved.
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. But that which is
dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them
because it is dear to them.
Euth.
True.
Soc. But, friend
Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and
is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been
loved as being dear to God ; but if that which dear to God is dear to him
because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved
by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite
different from one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause
it is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved.
Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of
holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence — the attribute of
being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of
holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your
treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether
dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel)
and what is impiety ?
Euth. I really do not
know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments,
on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from
us.
Soc. Your words,
Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus ; and if I were
the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that my arguments walk away and
will not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a descendant of his.
But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for
they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the
move.
Euth. Nay, Socrates, I
shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion ;
not I, certainly, but you make them move or go round, for they would never have
stirred, as far as I am concerned.
Soc. Then I must be a
greater than Daedalus : for whereas he only made his own inventions to
move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I
would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of
Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As
I perceive that you are lazy, I will myself endeavor to show you how you might
instruct me in the nature of piety ; and I hope that you will not grudge
your labour. Tell me, then — Is not that which is pious necessarily
just ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. And is, then, all
which is just pious ? or, is that which is pious all just, but that which
is just, only in part and not all, pious ?
Euth. I do not
understand you, Socrates.
Soc. And yet I know
that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying,
revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert
yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may
explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings —
Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these
things,
You will not tell : for where
there is fear there is also reverence.
Now I disagree with
this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect ?
Euth. By all
means.
Soc. I should not say
that where there is fear there is also reverence ; for I am sure that many
persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that
they reverence the objects of their fear.
Euth. Very
true.
Soc. But where
reverence is, there is fear ; for he who has a feeling of reverence and
shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill
reputation.
Euth. No
doubt.
Soc. Then we are wrong
in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence ; and we should
say, where there is reverence there is also fear. But there is not always
reverence where there is fear ; for fear is a more extended notion, and
reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is
a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me
now ?
Euth. Quite
well.
Soc. That was the sort
of question which I meant to raise when I asked whether the just is always the
pious, or the pious always the just ; and whether there may not be justice
where there is not piety ; for justice is the more extended notion of which
piety is only a part. Do you dissent ?
Euth. No, I think that
you are quite right.
Soc. Then, if piety is
a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part ? If you had
pursued the enquiry in the previous cases ; for instance, if you had asked
me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have
had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two
equal sides. Do you not agree ?
Euth. Yes, I quite
agree.
Soc. In like manner, I
want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be
able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am
now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their
opposites.
Euth. Piety or holiness,
Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as
there is the other part of justice which attends to men.
Soc. That is good,
Euthyphro ; yet still there is a little point about which I should like to
have further information, What is the meaning of “attention” ? For
attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when
applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and
not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in
horsemanship. Is it not so ?
Euth.
Certainly.
Soc. I should suppose
that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to
horses ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. Nor is every one
qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman ?
Euth.
True.
Soc. And I should also
conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to
dogs ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. As the art of the
ox herd is the art of attending to oxen ?
Euth. Very
true.
Soc. In like manner
holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods ? — that would be
your meaning, Euthyphro ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. And is not
attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention
is given ? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to
by the horseman’s art they are benefited and improved, are they
not ?
Euth.
True.
Soc. As the dogs are
benefited by the huntsman’s art, and the oxen by the art of the ox herd, and all
other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their
hurt ?
Euth. Certainly, not for
their hurt.
Soc. But for their
good ?
Euth. Of
course.
Soc. And does piety or
holiness, which has been defined to be the art of attending to the gods, benefit
or improve them ? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of
the gods better ?
Euth. No, no ; that
was certainly not what I meant.
Soc. And I, Euthyphro,
never supposed that you did. I asked you the question about the nature of the
attention, because I thought that you did not.
Euth. You do me justice,
Socrates ; that is not the sort of attention which I
mean.
Soc. Good : but I
must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called
piety ?
Euth. It is such,
Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
Soc. I understand — a
sort of ministration to the gods.
Euth.
Exactly.
Soc. Medicine is also a
sort of ministration or service, having in view the attainment of some object —
would you not say of health ?
Euth. I
should.
Soc. Again, there is an
art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some
result ?
Euth. Yes, Socrates,
with a view to the building of a ship.
Soc. As there is an art
which ministers to the housebuilder with a view to the building of a
house ?
Euth.
Yes.
Soc. And now tell me,
my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods : what work does
that help to accomplish ? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are
of all men living the one who is best instructed in
religion.
Euth. And I speak the
truth, Socrates.
Soc. Tell me then, oh
tell me — what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of our
ministrations ?
Euth. Many and fair,
Socrates, are the works which they do. Soc. Why, my friend, and so are
those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that
victory in war is the chief of them ?
Euth.
Certainly.
Soc. Many and fair,
too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken ; but his chief
work is the production of food from the earth ?
Euth.
Exactly.
Soc. And of the many
and fair things done by the gods, which is the chief or principal
one ?
Euth. I have told you
already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very
tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or holiness is learning, how to please
the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such piety, is the
salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to
the gods, is their ruin and destruction.
Soc. I think that you
could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked,
Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to
instruct me — dearly not : else why, when we reached the point, did you
turn, aside ? Had you only answered me I should have truly learned of you
by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily
dependent on the answerer, whither he leads — I must follow ; and can only
ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety ? Do you mean that they are
a, sort of science of praying and sacrificing ?
Euth. Yes, I
do.
Soc. And sacrificing is
giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the
gods ?
Euth. Yes,
Socrates.
Soc. Upon this view,
then piety is a science of asking and giving ?
Euth. You understand me
capitally, Socrates.
Soc. Yes, my
friend ; the. reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my
mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me.
Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods ? Do
you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to
them ?
Euth. Yes, I
do.
Soc. Is not the right
way of asking to ask of them what we want ?
Euth.
Certainly.
Soc. And the right way
of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no,
in an art which gives to any one that which he does not
want.
Euth. Very true,
Socrates.
Soc. Then piety,
Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one
another ?
Euth. That is an
expression which you may use, if you like.
Soc. But I have no
particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would
tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about
what they give to us ; for there is no good thing which they do not
give ; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from
being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be
an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of
them.
Euth. And do you
imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from our
gifts ?
Soc. But if not,
Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are conferred by us upon the
gods ?
Euth. What else, but
tributes of honour ; and, as I was just now saying, what pleases
them ?
Soc. Piety, then, is
pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to
them ?
Euth. I should say that
nothing could be dearer.
Soc. Then once more the
assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the
gods ?
Euth.
Certainly.
Soc. And when you say
this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away ?
Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not
perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes
them go round in a circle, and he is yourself ; for the argument, as you
will perceive, comes round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy
or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the gods ? Have you
forgotten ?
Euth. I quite
remember.
Soc. And are you not
saying that what is loved of the gods is holy ; and is not this the same as
what is dear to them — do you see ?
Euth.
True.
Soc. Then either we
were wrong in former assertion ; or, if we were right then, we are wrong
now.
Euth. One of the two
must be true.
Soc. Then we must begin
again and ask, What is piety ? That is an enquiry which I shall never be
weary of pursuing as far as in me lies ; and I entreat you not to scorn me,
but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man
knows, you are he ; and therefore I must detain you, like Proteus, until
you tell. If you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am
confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged your aged
father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong in the
sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of
men. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak
out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your
knowledge.
Euth. Another time,
Socrates ; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
Soc. Alas ! my
companion, and will you leave me in despair ? I was hoping that you would
instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety ; and then I might have
cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him that I had
been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and
speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am
about to lead a better life.