Plato
PHILEBUS
translated
by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the
Dialogue :
SOCRATES ; PROTARCHUS ;
PHILEBUS.
Socrates. Observe,
Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are now going to take from
Philebus, and what the other position is which I maintain, and which, if you do
not approve of it, is to be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two
sides ?
Protarchus. By all
means.
Soc. Philebus was
saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and the class of feelings akin
to them, are a good to every living being, whereas I contend, that not these,
but wisdom and intelligence and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and
true reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able
to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the
most advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of
the two sides of the argument ?
Philebus. Nothing could be
fairer, Socrates.
Soc. And do you, the
position which is assigned to you ?
Pro. I cannot do
otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left the
field.
Soc. Surely the truth
about these matters ought, by all means, to be
ascertained.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Shall we further
agree
Pro. To
what ?
Soc. That you and I
must now try to indicate some state and disposition of the soul, which has the
property of making all men happy.
Pro. Yes, by all
means.
Soc. And you say that
pleasure and I say that wisdom, is such a state ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And what if there
be a third state, which is better than either ? Then both of us are
vanquished are we not ? But if this life, which really has the power of
making men happy, turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life
of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of
wisdom.
Pro.
True.
Soc. Or suppose that
the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and
pleasure is defeated ; do you agree ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And what do you
say, Philebus ?
Phi. I say ; and
shall always say, that pleasure is easily the conqueror ; but you must
decide for yourself, Protarchus.
Pro. You, Philebus,
have handed over the argument to me, and have no longer a voice in the
matter ?
Phi. True enough.
Nevertheless I would dear myself and deliver my soul of you ; and I call
the goddess herself to witness that I now do so.
Pro. You may appeal to
us ; we too be the witnesses of your words. And now, Socrates, whether
Philebus is pleased or displeased, we will proceed with the
argument.
Soc. Then let us begin
with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite,
but that her real name is Pleasure.
Pro. Very
good.
Soc. The awe which I
always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human it
exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her
amiss ; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be
manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider
what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she
is one ; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms.
For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has
pleasure in his very temperance that the fool is pleased when he is full of
foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his
wisdom ? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these
opposite pleasures are severally alike !
Pro. Why, Socrates,
they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources, but they are
not in themselves opposite. For must not pleasure be of all things most
absolutely like pleasure that is, like himself ?
Soc. Yes, my good
friend, just as colour is like colour ; in so far as colours are colours,
there is no difference between them ; and yet we all know that black is not
only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white : or again, as figure is
like figure, for all figures are comprehended under one class ; and yet
particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an
infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other
things ; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove
the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a
similar opposition among pleasures.
Pro. Very likely ;
but how will this invalidate the argument ?
Soc. Why, I shall
reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a now predicate, for you
say that all pleasant things are good ; now although no one can argue that
pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing, that pleasures are
oftener bad than good ; but you call them all good, and at the same time
are compelled, if you are pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so
you must tell us what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad
pleasures, which makes. you designate all of them as good.
Pro. What do you mean,
Socrates ? Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good,
will tolerate the notion that some Pleasures are good and others
bad ?
Soc. And yet you will
acknowledge that they are different from one another, and sometimes
opposed ?
Pro. Not in so far as
they are pleasures.
Soc. That is a return
to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are to say (are we ?) that there
is no difference in pleasures, but that they are all alike ; and the
examples which have just been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but we go on
arguing all the same, like the weakest and most inexperienced
reasoners ?
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. Why, I mean to
say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, follow your example, and assert
boldly that the two things most unlike are most absolutely alike ; and the
result will be that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art
of disputing ; and the argument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that
we put back, and return to the old position ; then perhaps we may come to
an understanding with one another.
Pro. How do you
mean ?
Soc. Shall I,
Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you ?
Pro. What
question ?
Soc. Ask me whether
wisdom and science and mind, and those other qualities which I, when asked by
you at first what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the
same case with the pleasures of which you spoke.
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. The sciences are a
numerous class, and will be found to present great differences. But even
admitting that, like the pleasures, they are opposite as well as different,
should I be worthy of the name of dialectician if, in order to avoid this
difficulty, I were to say (as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no
difference between one science and another ; would not the argument
founder and disappear like an idle tale, although we might ourselves escape
drowning by clinging to a fallacy ?
Pro. May none of this
befall us, except the deliverance ! Yet I like the even-handed justice
which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then, that there are many
and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences.
Soc. And let us have no
concealment, Protarchus, of the differences between my good and yours ; but
let us bring them to the light in the hope that, in the process of testing them,
they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some
third quality ; for surely we are not now simply contending in order that
my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be
fighting for the truth.
Pro. Certainly we
ought.
Soc. Then let us have a
more definite understanding and establish the principle on which the argument
rests.
Pro. What
principle ?
Soc. A principle about
which all men are always in a difficulty, and some men sometimes against their
will.
Pro. Speak
plainer.
Soc. The principle
which has just turned up, which is a marvel of nature ; for that one should
be many or many one, are wonderful propositions ; and he who affirms either
is very open to attack.
Pro. Do you mean, when
a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the
single me into many mens, and even opposing them as great and small, light
and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways ?
Soc. Those, Protarchus,
are the common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may
say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious
and detrimental to the true course of thought ; and no more favour is shown
to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of anything
to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in
disproof of his own words : Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and
infinite, and the many are only one.
Pro. But what,
Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this subject which, as you
imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged ?
Soc. When, my boy, the
one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the
instances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this
concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that no
refutation is needed ; but when the assertion is made that man is one, or
ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to
these and similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives
birth to a controversy.
Pro. Of what
nature ?
Soc. In the first
place, as to whether these unities have a real existence ; and then how
each individual unity, being always the same, and incapable either of generation
of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either
as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as
still entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the
greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same
time in one and in many things ? These, Protarchus, are the real
difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate ; they are
the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of
them is very helpful.
Pro. Then, Socrates,
let us begin by clearing up these questions.
Soc. That is what I
should wish.
Pro. And I am sure that
all my other friends will be glad to hear them discussed ; Philebus,
fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and we had better not stir him up
with questions.
Soc. Good ; and
where shall we begin this great and multifarious battle, in which such various
points are at issue ? Shall begin thus ?
Pro.
How ?
Soc. We say that the
one and many become identified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they
run about together, in and out of every word which is uttered, and that this
union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe,
an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man,
when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has
found a treasure of wisdom ; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves
no stone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one,
and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them ; he puzzles
himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours,
whether they are older or younger, or of his own age that makes no
difference ; neither father nor mother does he spare ; no human being
who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have
no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be
found.
Pro. Considering,
Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a
danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, if you abuse us ? We
understand what you mean ; but is there no charm by which we may dispel all
this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving at the truth ? If there
is, we hope that you will guide us into that way, and we will do our best to
follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not
unimportant.
Soc. The reverse of
unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever will
be a better than my own favourite way, which has nevertheless already often
deserted me and left me helpless in the hour of need.
Pro. Tell us what that
is.
Soc. One which may be
easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of application ; it is the
parent of all the discoveries in the arts.
Pro. Tell us what it
is.
Soc. A gift of heaven,
which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among men by the hands of a new
Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light ; and the ancients, who were our
betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that
whatever things are said to be are composed of one and many, and have the
finite, and infinite implanted in them : seeing, then, that such is the
order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one
idea of that which is the subject of enquiry ; this unity we shall find in
everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be
two, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these
units, until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one
and many and infinite, but also a definite number ; the infinite must not
be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species
intermediate between unity and infinity has been discovered then, and not till
then, we may, rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves about
the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was
saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which
the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too
quick or too slow, in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make
their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity ; the
intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the
difference between the mere art of disputation and true
dialectic.
Pro. I think that I
partly understand you Socrates, but I should like to have a clearer notion of
what you are saying.
Soc. I may illustrate
my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, Protarchus, which you were made to
learn as a child.
Pro. How do they afford
an illustration ?
Soc. The sound which
passes through the lips whether of an individual or of all men is one and yet
infinite.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And yet not by
knowing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite are we perfect in the
art of speech, but the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what
makes a man a grammarian.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And the knowledge
which makes a man a musician is of the same kind.
Pro. How
so ?
Soc. Sound is one in
music as well as in grammar ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And there is a
higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal pitch : may we affirm
so much ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. But you would not
be a real musician if this was all that you knew ; though if you did not
know this you would know almost nothing of music.
Pro.
Nothing.
Soc. But when you have
learned what sounds are high and what low, and the number and nature of the
intervals and their limits or proportions, and the systems compounded out of
them, which our fathers discovered, and have handed down to us who are their
descendants under the name of harmonies ; and the affections corresponding
to them in the movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers
ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures ; and they tell us
that the same principle should be applied to every one and many ; when, I
say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect ; and
you may be said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar grasp
of it. But the, infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is
in each of them, when not classified, creates in every one of us a state of
infinite ignorance ; and he who never looks for number in anything, will
not himself be looked for in the number of famous men.
Pro. I think that what
Socrates is now saying is excellent, Philebus.
Phi. I think so too,
but how do his words bear upon us and upon the
argument ?
Soc. Philebus is right
in asking that question of us, Protarchus.
Pro. Indeed he is, and
you must answer him.
Soc. I will ; but
you must let me make one little remark first about these matters ; I was
saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, should proceed from that,
not to infinity, but to a definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who
has to begin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about
for some number, representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in
one. And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of
letters.
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. Some god or divine
man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to have been Theuth, observing that the
human voice was infinite, first distinguished in this infinity a certain number
of vowels, and then other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels
(i.e., the semivowels) ; these too exist in a definite number ; and
lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes,
without voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the two other
classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, told the number of
them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters ; and observing
that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in
consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he assigned to
them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or
letters.
Phi. The illustration,
Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement, but I still
feel the defect of which I just now complained.
Soc. Are you going to
ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the
argument ?
Phi. Yes, that is a
question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.
Soc. Assuredly you have
already arrived at the answer to the question which, as you say, you have been
so long asking ?
Phi. How
so ?
Soc. Did we not begin
by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and
wisdom ?
Phi.
Certainly.
Soc. And we maintain
that they are each of them one ?
Phi.
True.
Soc. And the precise
question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one
and also many [i.e., how they have one genus and many species], and are not at
once infinite, and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them
before they pass into infinity.
Pro. That is a very
serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates has ingeniously brought us round,
and please to consider which of us shall answer him ; there may be
something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and therefore imposing the
task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if
neither of us were able to answer, the result methinks would be still more
ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do : Socrates, if I
understood him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and
what is the number and nature of them, and the same of
wisdom.
Soc. Most true, O son
of Callias ; and the previous argument showed that if we are not able to
tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or their
opposites, none of us will be of the smallest use in any
enquiry.
Pro. That seems to be
very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the wise man be if he knew all
things, and the next best thing for him is that he should know himself. Why do I
say so at this moment ? I will tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us
this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in
determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that
pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you
answered No, not those, but another class of goods ; and we are
constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in order
that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in
your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true
objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art and the
like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened
that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled ;
and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say,
what has been fairly given cannot be taken back ; cease then to fight
against us in this way.
Soc. In what
way ?
Phi. Do not perplex us,
and keep asking questions of us to which we have not as yet any sufficient
answer to give ; let us not imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to
be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as
you have promised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and
knowledge according to their kinds ; or you may let the matter drop, if you
are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our
controversy.
Soc. If you say that, I
have nothing to apprehend, for the words if you are willing dispel all my
fear ; and, moreover, a god seems to have recalled something to my
mind.
Phi. What is
that ?
Soc. I remember to have
heard long ago certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or
in a dream I cannot tell ; they were to the effect that neither the one nor
the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which was different from
them, and better than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will
lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her : Am
I not right ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And there will
cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined
to think, but this will appear more clearly as we proceed.
Pro. Capital,
Socrates ; pray go on as you propose.
Soc. But, let us first
agree on some little points.
Pro. What are
they ?
Soc. Is the good
perfect or imperfect ?
Pro. The most perfect,
Socrates, of all things.
Soc. And is the good
sufficient ?
Pro. Yes, certainly,
and in a degree surpassing all other things.
Soc. And no one can
deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to
catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything
which its not accompanied by good.
Pro. That is
undeniable.
Soc. Now let us part
off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in
review.
Pro. How do you
mean ?
Soc. Let there be no
wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if
either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if
either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief
good.
Pro.
Impossible.
Soc. And will you help
us to test these two lives ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Then
answer.
Pro.
Ask.
Soc. Would you choose,
Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest
pleasures ?
Pro. Certainly I
should.
Soc. Would you consider
that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect
pleasure ?
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. Reflect ;
would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar
qualities ? would you not at any rate want
sight ?
Pro. Why should
I ? Having pleasure I should have all things.
Soc. Living thus, you
would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest
pleasures ?
Pro. I
should.
Soc. But if you had
neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the
first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you
would be entirely devoid of intelligence.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And similarly, if
you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor
would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment
remain with you ; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that
you were pleased when you were ; and if you had no power of calculation you
would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the
life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be
otherwise ?
Pro.
No.
Soc. But is such a life
eligible ?
Pro. I cannot answer
you, Socrates ; the argument has taken away from me the power of
speech.
Soc. We must keep up
our spirits ; let us now take the life of mind and examine it in
turn.
Pro. And what is this
life of mind ?
Soc. I want to know
whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and
knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and
wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings ?
Pro. Neither life,
Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely, as I should imagine, to be
chosen by any one else.
Soc. What would you
say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the
union of the two ?
Pro. Out of the union,
that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom ?
Soc. Yes, that is the
life which I mean.
Pro. There can be no
difference of opinion ; not some but all would surely choose this third
rather than either of the other two, and in addition to
them.
Soc. But do you see the
consequence ?
Pro. To be sure I do.
The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are
neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal.
Soc. Then now there can
be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would
certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living
creature or thing that was able to live such a life ; and if any of us had
chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly
eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from
some unhappy necessity.
Pro. Certainly that
seems to be true.
Soc. And now have I not
sufficiently shown that Philebus, goddess is not to be regarded as identical
with the good ?
Phi. Neither is your
mind the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same
objections.
Soc. Perhaps, Philebus,
you may be right in saying so of my mind ; but of the true, which is also
the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first
place for mind as against the mixed life ; but we must come to some
understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind
to be the cause of the mixed life ; and in that case although neither of
them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the
good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Phoebus, that the
element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more
similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly
said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust
my own mind, attain even to the third.
Pro. Truly, Socrates,
pleasure appears to me to have had a fall ; in fighting for the palm, she
has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would
have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting
forward a similar claim. And if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but
of the second place, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers,
for not even to them would she still appear as fair as
before.
Soc. Well, but had we
not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and
finally detecting her ?
Pro. Nonsense,
Socrates.
Soc. Why ? because
I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an
impossibility ?
Pro. Yes, and more than
that, because you do not seem to be aware that none of us will let you go home
until you have finished the argument.
Soc. Heavens !
Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just at present not at all an
easy one. For in going to war in the cause of mind, who is aspiring to the
second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from those which I used
before ; some, however, of the old ones may do again. And must I then
finish the argument ?
Pro. Of course you
must.
Soc. Let us be very
careful in laying the foundation.
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. Let us divide all
existing things into two, or rather, if you do not object, into three
classes.
Pro. Upon what
principle would you make the division ?
Soc. Let us take some
of our newly-found notions.
Pro. Which of
them ?
Soc. Were we not saying
that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an
infinite ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Let us assume
these two principles, and also a third, which is compounded out of them ;
but I fear that am ridiculously clumsy at these processes of division and
enumeration.
Pro. What do you mean,
my good friend ?
Soc. I say that a
fourth class is still wanted.
Pro. What will that
be ?
Soc. Find the cause of
the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three
others.
Pro. And would you like
to have a fifth dass or cause of resolution as well as a cause of
composition ?
Soc. Not, I think, at
present ; but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to
have it.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Let us begin with
the first three ; and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and
dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and see how in each of them there
is a one and many.
Pro. If you would
explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I might be able to follow
you.
Soc. Well, the two
classes are the same which I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the
infinite ; I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many,
and the finite may be hereafter discussed.
Pro. I
agree.
Soc. And now consider
well ; for the question to which I invite your attention is difficult and
controverted. When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in
those qualities ? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very
nature, prevent their having any end ? for if they had an end, the more and
less would themselves have an end.
Pro. That is most
true.
Soc. Ever, as we say,
into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a
less.
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. Then, says the
argument, there is never any end of them, and being endless they must also be
infinite.
Pro. Yes, Socrates,
that is exceedingly true.
Soc. Yes, my dear
Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an expression as exceedingly,
which you have just uttered, and also the term gently, have the same
significance as more or less ; for whenever they occur they do not allow of
the existence of quantity they are always introducing degrees into actions,
instituting a comparison of a more or a less excessive or a more or a less
gentle, and at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was
just now saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to
intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last
would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once
admitted, there can be no longer a hotter or a colder (for these are always
progressing, and are never in one stay) ; but definite quantity is at rest,
and has ceased to progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter,
and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the
infinite.
Pro. Your remark
certainly, has the look of truth, Socrates ; but these subjects, as you
were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I think however, that if I could
hear the argument repeated by you once or twice, there would be a substantial
agreement between us.
Soc. Yes, and I will
try to meet your wish ; but, as I would rather not waste time in the
enumeration of endless particulars, let me know whether I may not assume as a
note of the infinite
Pro.
What ?
Soc. I want to know
whether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by
the words exceedingly, gently, extremely, and the like, may not be
referred to the class of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was
asserted in the previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed
should be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if
possible, set upon them do you remember ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And all things
which do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say,
first of all, equality, and the equal, or again, the double, or any other ratio
of number and measure all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the
class of the limited or finite ; what do you
say ?
Pro. Excellent,
Socrates.
Soc. And now what
nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound
kind ?
Pro. You, I think, will
have to tell me that.
Soc. Rather God will
tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my
prayers.
Pro. Offer up a prayer,
then, and think.
Soc. I am thinking,
Protarchus, and I believe that some God has befriended us.
Pro. What do you mean,
and what proof have you to offer of what you are
saying ?
Soc. I will tell you,
and do you listen to my words.
Pro.
Proceed.
Soc. Were we not
speaking just now of hotter and colder ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. Add to them drier,
wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, smaller, and all that in the
preceding argument we placed under the unity of more and
less.
Pro. In the class of
the infinite, you mean ?
Soc. Yes ; and now
mingle this with the other.
Pro. What is the
other.
Soc. The class of the
finite which we ought to have brought together as we did the infinite ;
but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we do so now ; when the
two are combined, a third will appear.
Pro. What do you mean
by the class of the finite ?
Soc. The class of the
equal and the double, and any class which puts an end to difference and
opposition, and by introducing number creates harmony and proportion among the
different elements.
Pro. I
understand ; you seem to me to mean that the various opposites, when you
mingle with them the class of the finite, takes certain
forms.
Soc. Yes, that is my
meaning.
Pro.
Proceed.
Soc. Does not the right
participation in the finite give health in disease, for
instance ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And whereas the
high and low, the swift and the slow are infinite or unlimited, does not the
addition of the principles aforesaid introduce a limit, and perfect the whole
frame of music ?
Pro. Yes,
certainly.
Soc. Or, again, when
cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction of them take away excess and
indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and harmony ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And from a like
admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of
life ?
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. I omit ten
thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many
beauties and high perfections of the soul : O my beautiful Philebus, the
goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things,
and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised
the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I
maintain, delivers the soul What think you,
Protarchus ?
Pro. Her ways are much
to my mind, Socrates.
Soc. You will observe
that I have spoken of three classes ?
Pro. Yes, I think that
I understand you : you mean to say that the infinite is one class, and that
the finite is a second class of existences ; but what you would make the
third I am not so certain.
Soc. That is because
the amazing variety of the third class is too much for you, my dear
friend ; but there was not this difficulty with the infinite, which also
comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed with the note of more and
less, and therefore appeared one.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And the finite or
limit had not many divisions, and we ready acknowledged it to be by nature
one ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. Yes, indeed ;
and when I speak of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of
these, being a birth into true being, effected by the measure which the limit
introduces.
Pro. I
understand.
Soc. Still there was,
as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, and you must assist in the
investigation ; for does not everything which comes into being, of
necessity come into being through a cause ?
Pro. Yes,
certainly ; for how can there be anything which has no
cause ?
Soc. And is not the
agent the same as the cause in all except name ; the agent and the cause
may be rightly called one ?
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And the same may
be said of the patient, or effect ; we shall find that they too differ, as
I was saying, only in name shall we not ?
Pro. We
shall.
Soc. The agent or cause
always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows
it ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Then the cause and
what is subordinate to it in generation are not the same, but
different ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. Did not the things
which were generated, and the things out of which they were generated, furnish
all the three classes ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And the creator or
cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them and may
therefore be called a fourth principle ?
Pro. So let us call
it.
Soc. Quite right ;
but now, having distinguished the four, I think that we had better refresh our
memories by recapitulating each of them in order.
Pro. By all
means.
Soc. Then the first I
will call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limited ;
then follows the third, an essence compound and generated ; and I do not
think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and
generation as the fourth.
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. And now what is
the next question, and how came we hither ? Were we not enquiring whether
the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom ?
Pro. We
were.
Soc. And now, having
determined these points, shall we not be better able to decide about the first
and second place, which was the original subject of
dispute ?
Pro. I dare
say.
Soc. We said, if you
remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror did we
not ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And we see what is
the place and nature of this life and to what class it is to be
assigned ?
Pro. Beyond a
doubt.
Soc. This is evidently
comprehended in the third or mixed class ; which is not composed of any two
particular ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound down by the
finite, and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror
life.
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. And what shall we
say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness ; and in which of the
aforesaid classes is that to be placed ? Perhaps you will allow me to ask
you a question before you answer ?
Phi. Let me
hear.
Soc. Have pleasure and
pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and
less ?
Phi. They belong to the
class which admits of more, Socrates ; for pleasure would not be perfectly
good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.
Soc. Nor would pain,
Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element
which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now admitting, if you like,
that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite in which of the aforesaid
classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and
knowledge and mind ? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger
will be very serious if we err on this point.
Phi. You magnify,
Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.
Soc. And you, my
friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess ; but still I must beg
you to answer the question.
Pro. Socrates is quite
right, Philebus, and we must submit to him.
Phi. And did not you,
Protarchus, propose to answer in my place ?
Pro. Certainly I
did ; but I am now in a great strait, and I must entreat you, Socrates, to
be our spokesman, and then we shall not say anything wrong or disrespectful of
your favourite.
Soc. I must obey you,
Protarchus ; nor is the task which you impose a difficult one ; but
did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with my playful solemnity,
when I asked the question to what class mind and knowledge
belong ?
Pro. You did, indeed,
Socrates.
Soc. Yet the answer is
easy, since all philosophers assert with one voice that mind is the king of
heaven and earth in reality they are magnifying themselves. And perhaps they
are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not
object, a little more fully.
Phi. Take your own
course, Socrates, and never mind length ; we shall not tire of
you.
Soc. Very good ;
let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question.
Pro. What
question ?
Soc. Whether all this
which they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance
medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed
by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom.
Pro. Wide asunder are
the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that which you were just now
saying to me appears to be blasphemy ; but the other assertion, that mind
orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of
the moon, and of the stars and of the whole circle of the heavens ; and
never will I say or think otherwise.
Soc. Shall we then
agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine not merely
reasserting the notions of others, without risk to ourselves, but shall we
share in the danger, and take our part of the reproach which will await us, when
an ingenious individual declares that all is
disorder ?
Pro. That would
certainly be my wish.
Soc. Then now please to
consider the next stage of the argument.
Pro. Let me
hear.
Soc. We see that the
elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water,
air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, land [i.e., earth], reappear in
the constitution of the world.
Pro. The proverb may be
applied to us ; for truly the storm gathers over us, and we are at our
wits end.
Soc. There is something
to be remarked about each of these elements.
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. Only a small
fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that of a mean sort, and not in
any way pure, or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove
this of all of them ; there is fire within us, and in the
universe.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And is not our
fire small and weak and mean ? But the fire in the universe is wonderful in
quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has.
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. And is the fire in
the universe nourished and generated and ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire
in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal
fire ?
Pro. That is a question
which does not deserve an answer.
Soc. Right ; and
you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals
and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about
all the other elements ?
Pro. Why, how could any
man who gave any other be deemed in his senses ?
Soc. I do not think
that he could but now go on to the next step. When we saw those elements of
which we have been speaking gathered up in one, did we not call them a
body ?
Pro. We
did.
Soc. And the same may
be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered to be a body,
because made up of the same elements.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. But is our body
nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence
deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now
speaking ?
Pro. That again,
Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be
asked.
Soc. Well, tell me, is
this question worth asking ?
Pro. What
question ?
Soc. May our body be
said to have a soul ?
Pro.
Clearly.
Soc. And whence comes
that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains
elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a
soul ? Can there be another source ?
Pro. Clearly, Socrates,
that is the only source.
Soc. Why, yes,
Protarchus ; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the
finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth,
which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of
self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and
organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom ; we cannot, I say,
imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and
in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not
also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest
things ?
Pro. Such a supposition
is quite unreasonable.
Soc. Then if this be
denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that
there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we
have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders
and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and
mind ?
Pro. Most
justly.
Soc. And wisdom and
mind cannot exist without soul ?
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. And in the divine
nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king,
because there is in him the power of the cause ? And other gods have other
attributes, by which they are pleased to be called.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. Do not then
suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in
harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the
universe.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And they furnish
an answer to my enquiry ; for they imply that mind is the parent of that
class of the four which we called the cause of all ; and I think that you
now have my answer.
Pro. I have indeed, and
yet I did not observe that you had answered.
Soc. A jest is
sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts
earnest.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. I think, friend,
that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and
what is the power of mind.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And the class to
which pleasure belongs has also been long ago
discovered ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And let us
remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was akin to the cause and of this
family ; and (2) that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which
neither has, nor ever will have in itself, a beginning, middle, or end of its
own.
Pro. I shall be sure to
remember.
Soc. We must next
examine what is their place and under what conditions they are generated. And we
will begin with pleasure, since her class was first examined ; and yet
pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart from pain ever
Pro. If this is the
road, let us take it.
Soc. I wonder whether
you would agree with me about the origin of pleasure and
pain.
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. I mean to say that
their natural seat is in the mixed class.
Pro. And would you tell
me again, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed
one ?
Soc. I will my fine
fellow, to the best of my ability.
Pro. Very
good.
Soc. Let us then
understand the mixed class to be that which we placed third in the list of
four.
Pro. That which
followed the infinite and the finite ; and in which you ranked health, and,
if I am not mistaken, harmony.
Soc. Capital ; and
now will you please to give me your best attention ?
Pro. Proceed ; I
am attending.
Soc. I say that when
the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a
generation of pain.
Pro. That is very
probable.
Soc. And the
restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may
be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the
greatest moment.
Pro. I believe that you
are right, Socrates ; but will you try to be a little
plainer ?
Soc. Do not obvious and
every-day phenomena furnish the simplest
illustration ?
Pro. What phenomena do
you mean ?
Soc. Hunger, for
example, is a dissolution and a pain.
Pro.
True.
Soc. Whereas eating is
a replenishment and a pleasure ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. Thirst again is a
destruction and a pain, but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry Place is
a pleasure : once more, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by
heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is
pleasant.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And the unnatural
freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, and the natural process of
resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And
would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of
the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before,
make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return of
all things to their own nature is pleasure ?
Pro. Granted ;
what you say has a general truth.
Soc. Here then is one
kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we
have described ?
Pro.
Good.
Soc. Let us next assume
that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet
and refreshing, and an expectation of pain, fearful and
anxious.
Pro. Yes ; this is
another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, apart from the
body, and is produced by expectation.
Soc. Right ; for
in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to be, the pleasures being
unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, methinks that we shall see
clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this
quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the
classes which have been mentioned ; and whether pleasure and pain, like
heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be
desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but
only sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of
good.
Pro. You say most truly
that this is the track which the investigation should
pursue.
Soc. Well, then,
assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and pleasure on the restoration of
the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who
are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you
say : I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have
any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small ?
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. Then here we have
a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of
pain ?
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And do not forget
that there is such a state ; it will make a great difference in our
judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or not. And I should like to say
a few words about it.
Pro. What have you to
say ?
Soc. Why, you know that
if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live
in this neutral state.
Pro. You mean that he
may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing ?
Soc. Yes ; and if
I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether
great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought
and wisdom.
Pro. Yes, certainly, we
said so.
Soc. Then he will live
without pleasure ; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of
all lives ?
Pro. If so, the gods,
at any rate, cannot be supposed to have either joy or
sorrow.
Soc. Certainly not
there would be a great impropriety in the assumption of either alternative. But
whether the gods are or are not indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be
considered hereafter if in any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the
conclusion we will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second
place, should she have to resign the first.
Pro. Just
so.
Soc. The other class of
pleasures, which as we were saying is purely mental, is entirely derived from
memory.
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. I must first of
all analyse memory, or rather perception which is prior to, memory, if the
subject of our discussion is ever to be properly cleared
up.
Pro. How will you
proceed ?
Soc. Let us imagine
affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and
leave her unaffected ; and again, other affections which vibrate through
both soul and body, and impart a shock to both and to each of
them.
Pro.
Granted.
Soc. And the soul may
be truly said to be oblivious of the first but not of the
second ?
Pro. Quite
true.
Soc. When I say
oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense ;
for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet
entered ; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence,
and never has been, is a contradiction ; do you
see ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. Then just be so
good as to change the terms.
Pro. How shall I change
them ?
Soc. Instead of the
oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is
unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness.
Pro. I
see.
Soc. And the union or
communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion would be properly called
consciousness ?
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. Then now we know
the meaning of the word ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And memory may, I
think, be rightly described as the preservation of
consciousness ?
Pro.
Right.
Soc. But do we not
distinguish memory from recollection ?
Pro. I think
so.
Soc. And do we not mean
by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself,
some feeling which she experienced when in company with the
body ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And when she
recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge,
the recovery is termed recollection and
reminiscence ?
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. There is a reason
why I say all this.
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. I want to attain
the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind
only, apart from the body ; and the previous analysis helps to show the
nature of both.
Pro. Then now,
Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.
Soc. There are
certainly many things to be considered in discussing the generation and whole
complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must determine the nature and seat of
desire.
Pro. Ay ; let us
enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.
Soc. Nay, Protarchus,
we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.
Pro. A fair
retort ; but let us proceed.
Soc. Did we not place
hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of
desires ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And yet they are
very different ; what common nature have we in view when we call them by a
single name ?
Pro. By heavens,
Socrates, that is a question which is, not easily answered ; but it must be
answered.
Soc. Then let us go
back to our examples.
Pro. Where shall we
begin ?
Soc. Do we mean
anything when we say a man thirsts ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. We mean to say
that he is empty ?
Pro. Of
course.
Soc. And is not thirst
desire ?
Pro. Yes, of
drink.
Soc. Would you say of
drink, or of replenishment with drink ?
Pro. I should say, of
replenishment with drink.
Soc. Then he who is
empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences ; for
he is empty and desires to be full ?
Pro. Clearly
so.
Soc. But how can a man
who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory to any
apprehension of replenishment, of which he has no present or past
experience ?
Pro.
Impossible.
Soc. And yet he who
desires, surely desires something ?
Pro. Of
course.
Soc. He does not desire
that which he experiences, for he experiences thirst, and thirst is
emptiness ; but he desires replenishment ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. Then there must be
something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends
replenishment ?
Pro. There
must.
Soc. And that cannot be
the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. The only remaining
alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of
memory ; as is obvious, for what other way can there
be ?
Pro. I cannot imagine
any other.
Soc. But do you see the
consequence ?
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. That there is no
such thing as desire of the body.
Pro. Why
so ?
Soc. Why, because the
argument shows that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his
bodily state.
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And the impulse
which leads him to the opposite of what he is experiencing proves that he has a
memory of the opposite state.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And the argument,
having proved that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also
that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being
have their origin in the soul.
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. The argument will
not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar
experience.
Pro. Quite
right.
Soc. Let me make a
further observation ; the argument appears to me to imply that there is a
kind of life which consists in these affections.
Pro. Of what
affections, and of what kind of life, are you
speaking ?
Soc. I am speaking of
being emptied and replenished, and of all that relates to the preservation and
destruction of living beings, as well as of the pain which is felt in one of
these states and of the pleasure which succeeds to it.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And what would you
say of the intermediate state ?
Pro. What do you mean
by intermediate ?
Soc. I mean when a
person is in actual suffering and yet remembers past pleasures which, if they
would only return, would relieve him ; but as yet he has them not. May we
not say of him, that he is in an intermediate state ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Would you say that
he was wholly pained or wholly pleased ?
Pro. Nay, I should say
that he has two pains ; in his body there is the actual experience of pain,
and in his soul longing and expectation.
Soc. What do you mean,
Protarchus, by the two pains ? May not a man who is empty have at one time
a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in
despair ?
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And has he not the
pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty
is he not at the same time in pain ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Then man and the
other animals have at the same time both pleasure and
pain ?
Pro. I suppose
so.
Soc. But when a man is
empty and has no hope of being filled, there will be the double experience of
pain. You observed this and inferred that the double experience was the single
case possible.
Pro. Quite true,
Socrates.
Soc. Shall the enquiry
into these states of feeling be made the occasion of raising a
question ?
Pro. What
question ?
Soc. Whether we ought
to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or
false ? or some true and some false ?
Pro. But how, Socrates,
can there be false pleasures and pains ?
Soc. And how,
Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations,
or true and false opinions ?
Pro. I grant that
opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.
Soc. What do you
mean ? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious
enquiry.
Pro. There I
agree.
Soc. And yet, my boy,
for you are one of Philebus boys, the point to be considered, is, whether the
enquiry is relevant to the argument.
Pro.
Surely.
Soc. No tedious and
irrelevant discussion can be allowed ; what is said should be
pertinent.
Pro.
Right.
Soc. I am always
wondering at the question which has now been raised.
Pro. How
so ?
Soc. Do you deny that
some pleasures are false, and others true ?
Pro. To be sure I
do.
Soc. Would you say that
no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain
and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or
lunatic ?
Pro. So we have always
held, Socrates.
Soc. But were you
right ? Shall we enquire into the truth of your
opinion ?
Pro. I think that we
should.
Soc. Let us then put
into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and
opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And such a thing
as pleasure ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And an opinion
must of something ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And a man must be
pleased by something ?
Pro. Quite
correct.
Soc. And whether the
opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference ; it will still be an
opinion ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And he who is
pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not will always have a real feeling of
pleasure ?
Pro. Yes ; that is
also quite true.
Soc. Then, how can
opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and
opinion are both equally real ?
Pro. Yes ; that is
the question.
Soc. You mean that
opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but
opinion of a certain quality ; and this is what you think should be
examined ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And further, even
if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and
pain be simple and devoid of quality ?
Pro.
Clearly.
Soc. But there is no
difficulty in seeing that Pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities,
for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity ; as was
indeed said long ago by us.
Pro. Quite
true.
Soc. And if badness
attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of
a bad pleasure ?
Pro. Quite true,
Socrates.
Soc. And if rightness
attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right
pleasure ; and in like manner of the reverse of
rightness ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And if the thing
opined be erroneous, might we not say that opinion, being erroneous, is not
right or rightly opined ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And if we see a
pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right
or good, or by any honourable name ?
Pro. Not if the
pleasure is mistaken ; how could we ?
Soc. And surely
pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but
false ?
Pro. Certainly it
does ; and in that case, Socrates, as we were saying, the opinion is false,
but no one could call the actual pleasure false.
Soc. How eagerly,
Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure !
Pro. Nay, Socrates, I
only repeat what I hear.
Soc. And is there no
difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right
opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in all of us associated
with falsehood and ignorance ?
Pro. There must be a
very great difference, between them.
Soc. Then, now let us
proceed to contemplate this difference.
Pro. Lead, and I will
follow.
Soc. Well, then, my
view is
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. We agree do we
not ? that there is such a thing as false, and also such a thing as true
opinion ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And pleasure and
pain, as I was just now saying, are often consequent upon these upon true and
false opinion, I mean.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And do not opinion
and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and
perception ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Might we imagine
the process to be something of this nature ?
Pro. Of what
nature ?
Soc. An object may be
often seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer may want to determine
what it is which he sees.
Pro. Very
likely.
Soc. Soon he begins to
interrogate himself.
Pro. In what
manner ?
Soc. He asks himself
What is that which appears to be standing by the rock under the tree ?
This is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees
such an appearance.
Pro.
True.
Soc. To which he may
guess the right answer, saying as if in a whisper to himself It is a
man.
Pro. Very
good.
Soc. Or again, he may
be misled, and then he will say No, it is a figure made by the
shepherds.
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And if he has a
companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was
before an opinion, has now become a proposition.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. But if he be
walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he may not unfrequently keep
them in his mind for a considerable time.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. Well, now, I
wonder whether, you would agree in my explanation of this
phenomenon.
Pro. What is your
explanation ?
Soc. I think that the
soul at such times is like a book.
Pro. How
so ?
Soc. Memory and
perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to almost to write
down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true
opinion and true propositions which are the expressions of opinion come into our
souls but when the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is
false.
Pro. I quite assent and
agree to your statement their
Soc. I must bespeak
your favour also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the
chambers of the soul.
Pro. Who is
he ?
Soc. The painter, who,
after the scribe has done his work, draws images in the soul of the things which
he has described.
Pro. But when and how
does he do this ?
Soc. When a man,
besides receiving from sight or some other sense certain opinions or statements,
sees in his mind the images of the subjects of them ; is not this a very
common mental phenomenom ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And the images
answering to true opinions and words are true, and to false opinions and words
false ; are they not ?
Pro. They
are.
Soc. If we are right so
far, there arises a further question.
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. Whether we
experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present
and the past, or in relation to the future also ?
Pro. I should say in
relation to all times alike.
Soc. Have not purely
mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations
of the bodily ones ; from which we may infer that anticipatory pleasures
and pains have to do with the future ?
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. And do all those
writings and paintings which, as we were saying a little while ago, are produced
in us, relate to the past and present only, and not to the
future ?
Pro. To the future,
very much.
Soc. When you say,
Very much, you mean to imply that all these representations are hopes about
the future, and that mankind are filled with, hopes in every stage of
existence ?
Pro.
Exactly.
Soc. Answer me another
question.
Pro. What
question ?
Soc. A just and pious
and good man is the friend of the gods ; is he
not ?
Pro. Certainly he
is.
Soc. And the unjust and
utterly bad man is the reverse ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And all men, as we
were saying just now, are always filled with hopes ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And these hopes,
as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of
us ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And the fancies of
hope are also pictured in us ; a man may often have a vision of a heap of
gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of
himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And may we not say
that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented
to them, and the bad false pictures ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. The bad, too, have
pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good ; but I presume that
they are false pleasures.
Pro. They
are.
Soc. The bad then
commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true
pleasures ?
Pro.
Doubtless.
Soc. Then upon this
view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous
imitation of the true, and there are pains of a similar
character ?
Pro. There
are.
Soc. And did we not
allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about
things which had no existence either in the past, present, or
future ?
Pro. Quite
true.
Soc. And this was the
source of false opinion and opining ; am I not
right ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And must we not
attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory
character ?
Pro. How do you
mean ?
Soc. I mean to say that
a man must be admitted to have real pleasure ; who is pleased with anything
or anyhow ; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor have
ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to
exist.
Pro. Yes, Socrates,
that again is undeniable.
Soc. And may not the
same be said about fear and anger and the like ; are they not often
false ?
Pro. Quite
so.
Soc. And can opinions
be good or bad except in as far as they are true or
false ?
Pro. In no other
way.
Soc. Nor can pleasures
be conceived to be bad except in so far as they are false.
Pro. Nay, Socrates,
that is the very opposite of truth ; for no one would call pleasures and
pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other great corruption
to which they are liable.
Soc. Well, of pleasures
which are and caused by corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to
continue the enquiry ; for the present I would rather show by another
argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence
in us, because this may assist our final decision.
Pro. Very true ;
that is to say, if there are such pleasures.
Soc. I think that there
are, Protarchus ; but this is an opinion which should be well assured, and
not rest upon a mere assertion.
Pro. Very
good.
Soc. Then now, like
wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument.
Pro.
Proceed.
Soc. We were
maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist
in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul do you
remember ?
Pro. Yes, I remember
that you said so.
Soc. And the soul was
supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the
source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.
Pro.
True.
Soc. Then now you may
infer what happens in such cases.
Pro. What am I to
infer ?
Soc. That in such cases
pleasure and pains come simultaneously ; and there is a juxtaposition of
the opposite sensations which correspond to them, as has been already
shown.
Pro.
Clearly.
Soc. And there is
another point to which we have agreed.
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. That pleasure and
pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of
infinites.
Pro. Certainly, we said
so.
Soc. But how can we
rightly judge of them ?
Pro. How can
we ?
Soc. It is our
intention to judge of their comparative importance and intensity, measuring
pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and pleasure against
pleasure ?
Pro. Yes, such is our
intention, and we shall judge of them accordingly.
Soc. Well, take the
case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance of magnitudes obscure their
true proportions, and make us opine falsely ; and do we not find the same
illusion happening in the case of pleasures and
pains ?
Pro. Yes, Socrates, and
in a degree far greater.
Soc. Then what we are
now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.
Pro. What was
that ?
Soc. Then the opinions
were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own
falsity.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. But now it is the
pleasures which are said to be true and false because they are seen at various
distances, and subjected to comparison ; the pleasures appear to be greater
and more vehement when placed side by side with the pains, and the pains when
placed side by side with the pleasures.
Pro. Certainly, and for
the reason which you mention.
Soc. And suppose you
part off from pleasures and pains the element which makes them appear to be
greater or less than they really are : you will acknowledge that this
element is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or
defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. Next let us see
whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and
appearing in living beings, which are still more false than
these.
Pro. What are they, and
how shall we find them ?
Soc. If I am not
mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches and suffering and
uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by
concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by
growth and decay ?
Pro. Yes, that has been
often said.
Soc. And we have also
agreed that the restoration of the natural state is
pleasure ?
Pro.
Right.
Soc. But now let us
suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these
changes.
Pro. When can that be,
Socrates ?
Soc. Your question,
Protarchus, does not help the argument.
Pro. Why not,
Socrates ?
Soc. Because it does
not prevent me from repeating mine.
Pro. And what was
that ?
Soc. Why, Protarchus,
admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary
consequence if there were ?
Pro. You mean, what
would happen if the body were not changed either for good or
bad ?
Soc.
Yes.
Pro. Why then,
Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor
pain.
Soc. Very good ;
but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that we must always be
experiencing one of them ; that is what the wise tell us ; for, say
they, all things are ever flowing up and down.
Pro. Yes, and their
words are of no mean authority.
Soc. Of course, for
they are no mean authorities themselves ; and I should like to avoid the
brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them ?
And you shall be the partner of my flight.
Pro.
How ?
Soc. To them we will
say : Good ; but are we, or living things in general, always
conscious of what happens to us for example, of our growth, or the like ?
Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar
phenomena ? You must answer for them.
Pro. The latter
alternative is the true one.
Soc. Then we were not
right in saying, just now, that motions going up and down cause pleasures and
pains ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. A better and more
unexceptionable way of speaking will be
Pro.
What ?
Soc. If we say that the
great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones
do neither.
Pro. That, Socrates, is
the more correct mode of speaking.
Soc. But if this be
true, the life to which I was just now referring again
appears.
Pro. What
life ?
Soc. The life which we
affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of joy.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. We may assume then
that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is
neither ; what say you ?
Pro. I should say as
you do that there are three of them.
Soc. But if so, the
negation of pain will not be the same with pleasure.
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. Then when you hear
a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all
things, what would you understand him to mean by that
statement ?
Pro. I think that by
pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.
Soc. Let us take any
three things ; or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first
gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third which is
neither.
Pro. Very
good.
Soc. Now, can that
which is neither be either gold or silver ?
Pro.
Impossible.
Soc. No more can that
neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant
or painful.
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. And yet, my
friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and think
so.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And do they think
that they have pleasure when they are free from
pain ?
Pro. They say
so.
Soc. And they must
think or they would not say that they have pleasure.
Pro. I suppose
not.
Soc. And yet if
pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are
wrong.
Pro. But they are
undoubtedly of distinct natures.
Soc. Then shall we take
the view that they are three, as we were just now saying, or that they are two
only the one being a state of pain, which is an evil, and the other a
cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, and is called
pleasant ?
Pro. But why, Socrates,
do we ask the question at all ? I do not see the
reason.
Soc. You, Protarchus,
have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend
Philebus.
Pro. And who may they
be ?
Soc. Certain persons
who are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy, who deny the very existence
of pleasure.
Pro.
Indeed.
Soc. They say that what
the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of
pain.
Pro. And would you,
Socrates, have us agree with them ?
Soc. Why, no, I would
rather use them as a sort of diviners, who divine the truth, not by rules of
art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble
nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing
sound, and her seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not
pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when you have
considered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I
deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both
points of view, we will bring her up for judgment.
Pro. Well
said.
Soc. Then let us enter
into an alliance with these philosophers and follow in the track of their
dislike. I imagine that they would say something of this sort ; they would
begin at the beginning, and ask whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any
quality, such as hardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at
the hardest things, rather than at the least hard ? You, Protarchus, shall
answer these severe gentlemen as you answer me.
Pro. By all means, and
I reply to them, that you should look at the greatest
instances.
Soc. Then if we want to
see the true nature of pleasures as a class, we should not look at the most
diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme and most
vehement ?
Pro. In that every one
will agree.
Soc. And the obvious
instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have often said, are the pleasures of
the body ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And are they felt
by us to be or become greater, when we are sick or when we are in health ?
And here we must be careful in our answer, or we shall come to
grief.
Pro. How will that
be ?
Soc. Why, because we
might be tempted to answer, When we are in health.
Pro. Yes, that is the
natural answer.
Soc. Well, but are not
those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest
desires ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And do not people
who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily
affections more intensely ? Am I not right in saying that they have a
deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their
want ?
Pro. That is obvious as
soon as it is said.
Soc. Well, then, shall
we not be right in saying, that if a person would wish to see the greatest
pleasures he ought to go and look, not at health, but at discase ? And here
you must distinguish : do not imagine that I mean to ask whether those
who are very ill have more pleasures than those who are well, but understand
that I am speaking of the magnitude of pleasure ; I want to know where
pleasures are found to be most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what
is pleasure, and what they mean by pleasure who deny her very
existence.
Pro. I think I follow
you.
Soc. You will soon have
a better opportunity of showing whether you do or not, Protarchus. Answer now,
and tell me whether you see, I will not say more, but more intense and excessive
pleasures in wantonness than in temperance ? Reflect before you
speak.
Pro. I understand you,
and see that there is a great difference between them ; the temperate are
restrained by the wise mans aphorism of Never too much, which is their rule,
but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness
and makes them shout with delight.
Soc. Very good, and if
this be true, then the greatest pleasures and pains will clearly be found in
some vicious state of soul and body, and not in a virtuous
state.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see
what makes them the greatest ?
Pro. To be sure we
ought.
Soc. Take the case of
the pleasures which arise out of certain disorders.
Pro. What
disorders ?
Soc. The pleasures of
unseemly disorders, which our severe friends utterly
detest.
Pro. What
pleasures ?
Soc. Such, for example,
as the relief of itching and other ailments by scratching, which is the only
remedy required. For what in Heavens name is the feeling to be called which is
thus produced in us ? Pleasure or pain ?
Pro. A villainous
mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say.
Soc. I did not
introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any personal reference to Philebus,
but because, without the consideration of these and similar pleasures, we shall
not be able to determine the point at issue.
Pro. Then we had better
proceed to analyze this family of pleasures.
Soe. You mean the
pleasures which are mingled with pain ?
Pro.
Exactly.
Soc. There are some
mixtures which are of the body, and only in the body, and others which are of
the soul, and only in the soul ; while there are other mixtures of
pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite
state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.
Pro. How is
that ?
Soc. Whenever, in the
restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man experiences two opposite
feelings ; for example, when he is cold and is growing warm, or
again ; when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants to have the one
and be rid of the other ; the sweet has a bitter, as the common saying
is, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive
him to distraction.
Pro. That description
is very true to nature.
Soc. And in these sorts
of mixtures the pleasures and pains are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or
other of them predominates ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. Of cases in which
the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is afforded by itching, of which we
were just now speaking, and by the tingling which we feel when the boiling and
fiery element is within, and the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface,
and does not reach the parts affected ; then if you put them to the fire,
and as a last resort apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense
pleasure or pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain
or pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts ; and this is due to
the forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is separated,
and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.
Pro. Quite
so.
Soc. Sometimes the
element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight undercurrent of pain makes
him tingle, and causes a gentle irritation ; or again, the excessive
infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him, he even leaps for joy, he
assumes all sorts of attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for
breath, and is quite amazed, and utters the most irrational
exclamations.
Pro. Yes,
indeed.
Soc. He will say of
himself, and others will of him, that he is dying with these delights ; and
the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues
them in every way ; of all pleasures he declares them to be the
greatest ; and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of
them to be the happiest of mankind.
Pro. That, Socrates, is
a very true description of the opinions of the majority about
pleasures.
Soc. Yes, Protarchus,
quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise out of the communion of external
and internal sensations in the body ; there are also cases in which the
mind contributes an, opposite element to the body, whether of pleasure or pain,
and the two unite and form one mixture. Concerning these I have already
remarked, that when a man is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in
hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that
in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they
are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.
Pro. I believe that to
be quite true.
Soc. There still
remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and
pains.
Pro. What is
that ?
Soc. The union which,
as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental
feelings.
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. Why, do we not
speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as
pains which belong to the soul only ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And shall we not
find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures ? need I remind you of
the anger
Which stirs even a
wise man to violence,
And is sweeter than
honey and the honeycomb ? And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains
in lamentation and bereavement ?
Pro. Yes, there is a
natural connection between them.
Soc. And you remember
also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their
tear ?
Pro. Certainly I
do.
Soc. And are you aware
that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and
pleasure ?
Pro. I do not quite
understand you.
Soc. I admit,
Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in recognizing this mixture of
feelings at a comedy.
Pro. There is, I
think.
Soc. And the greater
the obscurity of the case the more desirable the examination of it because the
difficulty in detecting other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be
less.
Pro.
Proceed.
Soc. I have just
mentioned envy ; would you not call that a pain of the
soul ?
Pro.
Yes
Soc. And yet the
envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is
pleased ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And ignorance, and
what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil ?
Pro. To be
sure.
Soc. From these
considerations learn to know the nature of the ridiculous.
Pro.
Explain.
Soc. The ridiculous is
in short the specific name which is used to describe the vicious form of a
certain habit ; and of vice in general it is that kind which is most at
variance with the inscription at DelPhi.
Pro. You mean,
Socrates, Know thyself.
Soc. I do ; and
the opposite would be, Know not thyself.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And now, O
Protarchus, try to divide this into three.
Pro. Indeed I am afraid
that I cannot.
Soc. Do you mean to say
that I must make the division for you ?
Pro. Yes, and what is
more, I beg that you will.
Soc. Are there not
three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown ?
Pro. What are
they ?
Soc. In the first
place, about money ; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he
is.
Pro. Yes, that is a
very common error.
Soc. And still more
often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some
other advantage of person which he really has not.
Pro. Of
course.
Soc. And yet surely by
far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind ; they imagine
themselves to be much better men than they are.
Pro. Yes, that is by
far the commonest delusion.
Soc. And of all the
virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming,
and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of
wisdom ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And may not all
this be truly called an evil condition ?
Pro. Very
evil.
Soc But we must
pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if we would see in envy of the
childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure and pain.
Pro. How can we make
the further division which you suggest ?
Soc. All who are silly
enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may of course be divided,
like the rest of mankind, into two classes one having power and might ;
and the other the reverse.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Let this, then, be
the principle of division ; those of them who are weak and unable to
revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous,
but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and
formidable ; for ignorance in the powerul is hateful and horrible, because
hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be
reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.
Pro. That is very true,
but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and
pains.
Soc. Well, then, let us
examine the nature of envy.
Pro.
Proceed.
Soc. Is not envy an
unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous pain ?
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. There is nothing
envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of
enemies ?
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. But to feel joy
instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends misfortunes is not that
wrong ?
Pro.
Undoubtedly.
Soc. Did we not say
that ignorance was always an evil ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And the three
kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we enumerated the vain conceit of
beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are ridiculous if they are weak, and
detestable when they are powerful : May we not say, as I was saying before,
that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are
simply ridiculous ?
Pro. They are
ridiculous.
Soc. And do we not
acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a
misfortune ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And do we feel
pain or pleasure in laughing at it ?
Pro. Clearly we feel
pleasure.
Soc. And was not envy
the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of
friends ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Then the argument
shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with
envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain,
and laughter is pleasant ; and so we envy and laugh at the same
instant.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And the argument
implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in
tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human
life ; and so in endless other cases.
Pro. I do not see how
any one can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the
opposite opinion.
Soc. I mentioned anger,
desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, as examples
in which we should find a mixture of the two elements so often named ; did
I not ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. We may observe
that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and
anger.
Pro. I
see.
Soc. Then many other
cases still remain ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And why do you
suppose me to have pointed out to you the admixture which takes place in
comedy ? Why but to convince you that there was no difficulty in showing
the mixed nature of fear and love and similar affections ; and I thought
that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and have
acknowledged as a general truth that the body without the soul, and the soul
without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of
admixtures of pleasures and pains ; and so further discussion would have
been unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart ; or will you
keep me here until midnight ? I fancy that I may obtain my release without
many words ; if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of
all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go
to other matters which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given
which Philebus demands.
Pro. Very good,
Socrates ; in what remains take your own course.
Soc. Then after the
mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn ; this is the natural
and necessary order.
Pro.
Excellent.
Soc. These, in turn,
then, I will now endeavour to indicate ; for with the maintainers of the
opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I
was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only
and are not, and there are others again which have great power and appear in
many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of
agony and distress, both of body and mind.
Pro. Then what
pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in conceiving to be
true ?
Soc. True pleasures are
those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of of those which
arise from smells ; those of sound, again, and in general those of which
the want is painless and unconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to
sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.
Pro. Once more,
Socrates, I must ask what you mean.
Soc. My meaning is
certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by
beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would
suppose to be my meaning ; but, says the argument, understand me to mean
straight lines and circles, and the plane solid figures which are formed out of
them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles ; for these I
affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are
eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite
unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same
character, and have similar pleasures ; now do you understand my
meaning ?
Pro. I am trying to
understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make your meaning
dearer.
Soc. When sounds are
smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are
not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have natural pleasures associated
with them.
Pro. Yes, there are
such pleasures.
Soc. The pleasures of
smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they have no necessary admixture of
pain ; and all pleasures, however and wherever experienced, which are
unattended by pains, I assign to an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of
pleasures.
Pro. I
understand.
Soc. To these may be
added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger of knowledge and no pain caused
by such hunger precede them.
Pro. And this is the
case.
Soc. Well, but if a man
who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, are there not pains of
forgetting ?
Pro. Not necessarily,
but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his
knowledge.
Soc. Yes, my friend,
but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing
to do with reflection.
Pro. In that case you
are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with
pain.
Soc. These pleasures of
knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain ; and they are not the pleasures of
the many but of a very few.
Pro. Quite
true.
Soc. And now, having
fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed
impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which
are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have
measure ; the great, the excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall
be right in referring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less,
which pours through body and soul alike ; and the others we shall refer to
the class which has measure.
Pro. Quite right,
Socrates.
Soc. Still there is
something more to be considered about pleasures.
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. When you speak of
purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, greatness and sufficiency, in
what relation do these terms stand to truth ?
Pro. Why do you ask,
Socrates ?
Soc. Because,
Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way,
in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may
present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged
of by you and by me and by all of us.
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. Let us investigate
all the pure kinds ; first selecting for consideration a single
instance.
Pro. What instance
shall we select ?
Soc. Suppose that we
first of all take whiteness.
Pro. Very
good.
Soc. How can there be
purity in whiteness, and what purity ? Is that purest which is greatest or
most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any
admixture of other colours ?
Pro. Clearly that which
is most unadulterated.
Soc. True,
Protarchus ; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in
quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful ?
Pro.
Right.
Soc. And we shall be
quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer
than a great deal that is mixed.
Pro. Perfectly
right.
Soc. There is no need
of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about
pleasures ; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure or
a small amount of pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with pain. is always pleasanter
and truer and fairer than a great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of
another kind.
Pro. Assuredly ;
and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.
Soc. But what do you
say of another question : have we not heard that pleasure is always a
generation, and has no true being ? Do not certain ingenious philosophers
teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be grateful to
them ?
Pro. What do they
mean ?
Soc. I will explain to
you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by putting a
question.
Pro. Ask, and I will
answer.
Soc. I assume that
there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of
something.
Pro. What manner of
natures are they ?
Soc. The one majestic
ever, the other inferior.
Pro. You speak
riddles.
Soc. You have seen
loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of them.
Pro. I should think
so.
Soc. Search the
universe for two terms which are like these two and are present
everywhere.
Pro. Yet a third time I
must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates.
Soc. There is no
difficulty, Protarchus ; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that
some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other
things are the ends to which the former class subserve
(absolutes).
Pro. Your many
repetitions make me slow to understand.
Soc. As the argument
proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning will become
clearer.
Pro. Very
likely.
Soc. Here are two new
principles.
Pro. What are
they ?
Soc. One is the
generation of all things, and the other is essence.
Pro. I readily accept
from you both generation and essence.
Soc. Very right ;
and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the
sake of generation ?
Pro. You want to know
whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of
generation ?
Soc.
Yes.
Pro. By the gods, I
wish that you would repeat your question.
Soc. I mean, O my
Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that ship-building is for the sake
of ships, or ships for the sake of ship-building ? and in all similar cases
I should ask the same question.
Pro. Why do you not
answer yourself, Socrates ?
Soc. I have no
objection, but you must take your part.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. My answer is, that
all things instrumental, remedial, material, are given to us with a view to
generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some
being or essence, and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of
essence.
Pro.
Assuredly.
Soc. Then pleasure,
being a generation, must surely be for the sake of some
essence ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And that for the
sake of which something else is done must be placed in the class of good, and
that which is done for the sake of something else, in some other class, my good
friend.
Pro. Most
certainly.
Soc. Then pleasure,
being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of
good ?
Pro. Quite
right.
Soc. Then, as I said at
first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure
was a generation only, and had no true being at all ; for he is clearly one
who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.
Pro.
Assuredly.
Soc. And he would
surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest
end.
Pro. Of whom are you
speaking, and what do they mean ?
Soc. I am speaking of
those who when they are cured of hunger or thirst or any other defect by some
process of generation are delighted at the process as if it were pleasure ;
and they say that they would not wish to live without these and other feelings
of a like kind which might be mentioned.
Pro. That is certainly
what they appear to think.
Soc. And is not
destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of
generation ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Then he who
chooses thus, would choose generation and destruction rather than that third
sort of life, in which, as we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but
only the purest possible thought.
Pro. He who would make
us believe pleasure to be a good is involved in great absurdities,
Socrates.
Soc. Great,
indeed ; and there is yet another of them.
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. Is there not an
absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in
anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only good of the
soul is pleasure ; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any
other good of the soul, is not really a good ? and is there not yet a
further absurdity in our being compelled to say that he who has a feeling of
pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even
though he be the best of men ; and again, that he who has a feeling of
pleasure, in so far as he is pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that
degree excels in virtue ?
Pro. Nothing, Socrates,
can be more irrational than all this.
Soc. And now, having
subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us not appear to be too sparing of
mind and knowledge : let us ring their metal bravely, and see if there be
unsoundness in any part, until we have found out what in them is of the purest
nature ; and then the truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be
brought up for judgment.
Pro.
Right.
Soc. Knowledge has two
parts the one productive, and the other
educational ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. And in the
productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more akin to knowledge, and the
other less ; and may not the one part be regarded as the pure, and the
other as the impure ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Let us separate
the superior or dominant elements in each of them.
Pro. What are they, and
how do you separate them ?
Soc. I mean to say,
that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be taken away from any art, that
which remains will not be much.
Pro. Not much,
certainly.
Soc. The rest will be
only conjecture, and the better use of the senses which is given by experience
and practice, in addition to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly
called art, and is perfected by attention and pains.
Pro. Nothing more,
assuredly.
Soc. Music, for
instance, is full of this empiricism ; for sounds are harmonized, not by
measure, but by skilful conjecture ; the music of the flute is always
trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with
much that is doubtful and has little which is certain.
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. And the same will
be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry and piloting and
generalship.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. The art of the
builder, on the other hand, which uses a number of measures and instruments,
attains by their help to a greater degree of accuracy than the other
arts.
Pro. How is
that ?
Soc. In ship-building
and house-building, and in other branches of the art of carpentering, the
builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, and a most ingenious machine for
straightening wood.
Pro. Very true,
Socrates.
Soc. Then now let us
divide the arts of which we were speaking into two kinds the arts which, like
music, are less exact in their results, and those which, like carpentering, are
more exact.
Pro. Let us make that
division.
Soc. Of the latter
class, the most exact of all are those which we just now spoke of as
primary.
Pro. I see that you
mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of weighing and
measuring.
Soc. Certainly,
Protarchus ; but are not these also distinguishable into two
kinds ?
Pro. What are the two
kinds ?
Soc. In the first
place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is popular, and the other
philosophical.
Pro. How would you
distinguish them ?
Soc. There is a wide
difference between them, Protarchus ; some arithmeticians reckon unequal
units ; as for example, two armies, two oxen, two very large things or two
very small things. The party who are opposed to them insist that every unit in
ten thousand must be the same as every other unit.
Pro. Undoubtedly there
is, as you say, a great difference among the votaries of the science ; and
there may be reasonably supposed to be two sorts of
arithmetic.
Soc. And when we
compare the art of mensuration which is used in building with philosophical
geometry, or the art of computation which is used in trading with exact
calculation, shall we say of either of the pairs that it is one or
two ?
Pro. On the analogy of
what has preceded, I should be of opinion that they were severally
two.
Soc. Right ; but
do you understand why I have discussed the subject ?
Pro. I think so, but I
should like to be told by you.
Soc. The argument has
all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original design,
has gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one
pleasure is purer than another.
Pro. Clearly ;
that was the intention.
Soc. And has not the
argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different
provinces, and vary in their degrees of certainty ?
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And just now did
not the argument first designate a particular art by a common term, thus making
us believe in the unity of that art ; and then again, as if speaking of two
different things, proceed to enquire whether the art as pursed by philosophers,
or as pursued by non philosophers, has more of certainty and
purity ?
Pro. That is the very
question which the argument is asking.
Soc. And how,
Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry ?
Pro. O Socrates, we
have reached a point at which the difference of clearness in different kinds of
knowledge is enormous.
Soc. Then the answer
will be the easier.
Pro. Certainly ;
and let us say in reply, that those arts into which arithmetic and mensuration
enter, far surpass all others ; and that of these the arts or sciences
which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are infinitely superior in
accuracy and truth.
Soc. Then this is your
judgment ; and this is the answer which, upon your authority, we will give
to all masters of the art of misinterpretation ?
Pro. What
answer ?
Soc. That there are two
arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration ; and also several other arts
which in like manner have this double nature, and yet only one
name.
Pro. Let us boldly
return this answer to the masters of whom you speak, Socrates, and hope for good
luck.
Soc. We have explained
what we term the most exact arts or sciences.
Pro. Very
good.
Soc. And yet,
Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if we do not award to her
the first place.
Pro. And pray, what is
dialectic ?
Soc. Clearly the
science which has to do with all that knowledge of which we are now
speaking ; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence will
admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and reality, and sameness
and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. But how would you decide this
question, Protarchus ?
Pro. I have often heard
Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion far surpassed every
other ; this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all
things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Now, I should not
like to quarrel either with you or with him.
Soc. You mean to say
that you would like to desert, if you were not
ashamed ?
Pro. As you
please.
Soc. May I not have led
you into a misapprehension ?
Pro.
How ?
Soc. Dear Protarchus, I
never asked which was the greatest or best or usefullest of arts or sciences,
but which had clearness and accuracy, and the greatest amount of truth, however
humble and little useful an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his
art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for
saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of
essential truth ; as in the comparison of white colours, a little
whiteness, if that little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a
great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider
well, not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or
faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing
all things for the sake of it ; let us search into the pure element of mind
and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science of which
I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be
some other which has higher claims.
Pro. Well, I have been
considering, and I can hardly think that any other science or art has a firmer
grasp of the truth than this.
Soc. Do you say so
because you observe that the arts in general and those engaged in them make use
of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in the investigation of matters of
opinion ? Even he who supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really
occupied with the things of this world, how created, how acting or acted upon.
Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is
spent ?
Pro.
True.
Soc. He is labouring,
not after eternal being, but about things which are becoming, or which will or
have become.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And can we say
that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be
unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth, ever become
certain ?
Pro.
Impossible.
Soc. How can anything
fixed be concerned with that which has no fixedness ?
Pro. How
indeed ?
Soc. Then mind and
science when employed about such changing things do not attain the highest
truth ?
Pro. I should imagine
not.
Soc. And now let us bid
farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on
behalf of the argument a single point.
Pro. What
point ?
Soc. Let us say that
the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has to do with the things which are
eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if not, at any rate what is most akin
to them has ; and that all other things are to be placed in a second or
inferior class.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. And of the names
expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest
things ?
Pro. That is
natural.
Soc. And are not mind
and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most ?
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And these names
may be said to have their truest, and most exact application when the mind is
engaged in the contemplation of true being ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And these were the
names which I adduced of the rivals of pleasure ?
Pro. Very true,
Socrates.
Soc. In the next place,
as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be
compared to artists who have their materials ready to their
hands.
Pro.
Yes.
Soc. And now we must
begin to mix them ?
Pro. By all
means.
Soc. But had we not
better have a preliminary word and refresh our
memories ?
Pro. Of
what ?
Soc. Of that which I
have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, that we ought to repeat twice and
even thrice that which is good.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Well then, by
Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the
argument.
Pro. Let me
hear.
Soc. Philebus says that
pleasure is the true end of all living beings, at which all ought to aim, and
moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two names good and
pleasant are correctly given to one thing and one nature ; Socrates, on
the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in
name they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is
not and was not this what we were saying,
Protarchus ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And is there not
and was there not a further point which was conceded between
us ?
Pro. What was
it ?
Soc. That the good
differs from all other things.
Pro. In what
respect ?
Soc. In that the being
who possesses good always everywhere and in all things has the most perfect
sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else.
Pro.
Exactly.
Soc. And did we not
endeavour to make an imaginary separation of wisdom and pleasure, assigning to
each a distinct life, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and
wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in
pleasure ?
Pro. We
did.
Soc. And did we think
that either of them alone would be sufficient ?
Pro. Certainly
not.
Soc. And if we erred in
any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again and set us
right ; and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to
belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or
acquire I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no
real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor
any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling, but would he desire to
have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him ? And about
wisdom I ask the same question ; can you conceive that any one would choose
to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a certain
degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than with a certain
degree of wisdom ?
Pro. Certainly not,
Socrates ; but why repeat such questions any
more ?
Soc. Then the perfect
and universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either of
them ?
Pro.
Impossible.
Soc. Then now we must
ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were
saying, that the second place may be duly assigned.
Pro.
Right.
Soc. Have we not found
a road which leads towards the good ?
Pro. What
road ?
Soc. Supposing that a
man had to be found, and you could discover in what house he lived, would not
that be a great step towards the discovery of the man
himself ?
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And now reason
intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that we should seek the good, not in
the unmixed life but in the mixed.
Pro.
True.
Soc. There is greater
hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than
in that which is not ?
Pro. Far
greater.
Soc. Then now let us
mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or
Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of
mingling.
Pro. By all
means.
Soc. Are not we the
cup-bearers ? and here are two fountains which are flowing at our
side : one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain of honey ;
the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is of water
unpleasant but healthful ; out of these we must seek to make the fairest of
all possible mixtures.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Tell me
first ; should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of
pleasure with every sort of wisdom ?
Pro. Perhaps we
might.
Soc. But I should be
afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show a safer
plan.
Pro. What is
it ?
Soc. One pleasure was
supposed by us to be truer than another, and one art to be more exact than
another.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. There was also
supposed to be a difference in sciences ; some of them regarding only the
transient and perishing, and others the permanent and imperishable and
everlasting and immutable ; and when judged by the standard of truth, the
latter, as we thought, were truer than the former.
Pro. Very good and
right.
Soc. If, then, we were
to begin by mingling the sections of each class which have the most of truth,
will not the union suffice to give us the loveliest of lives, or shall we still
want some elements of another kind ?
Pro. I think that we
ought to do what you suggest.
Soc. Let us suppose a
man who understands justice, and has reason as well as understanding about the
true nature of this and of all other things.
Pro. We will suppose
such a man.
Soc. Will he have
enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere,
and knows nothing of our human spheres and circles, but uses only divine circles
and measures in the building of a house ?
Pro. The knowledge
which is only superhuman, Socrates, is ridiculous in man.
Soc. What do you
mean ? Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup and mingle the impure
and uncertain art which uses the false measure and the false
circle ?
Pro. Yes, we must, if
any of us is ever to find his way home.
Soc. And am I to
include music, which, as, I was saying just now, is full of guesswork and
imitation, and is wanting in purity ?
Pro. Yes, I think that
you must, if human life is to be a life at all.
Soc. Well, then,
suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who is pushed and overborne by
the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge of every sort stream in, and
the pure mingle with the impure ?
Pro. I do not know,
Socrates, that any great harm would come of having them all, if only you have
the first sort.
Soc. Well, then, shall
I let them all flow into what Homer poetically terms a meeting of the
waters ?
Pro. By all
means.
Soc. There I have let
him in, and now I must return to the fountain of pleasure. For we were not
permitted to begin by mingling in a single stream the true portions of both
according to our original intention ; but the love of all knowledge
constrained us to let all the sciences flow in together before the
pleasures.
Pro. Quite
true.
Soc. And now the time
has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, whether we shall in like
manner let them go all at once, or at first only the true
ones.
Pro. It will be by far
the safer course to let flow the true ones first.
Soc. Let them flow,
then ; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts
and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them ?
Pro. Yes, the necessary
pleasures should certainly be allowed to mingle.
Soc. The knowledge of
the arts has been admitted to be innocent and useful always ; and if we say
of pleasures in like manner that all of them are good and innocent for all of us
at all times, we must let them all mingle ?
Pro. What shall we say
about them, and what course shall we take ?
Soc. Do not ask me,
Protarchus ; but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom to answer for
themselves.
Pro.
How ?
Soc. Tell us, O beloved
shall we call you pleasures or by some other name ? would you rather
live with or without wisdom ? I am of opinion that they would certainly
answer as follows :
Pro.
How ?
Soc. They would answer,
as we said before, that for any single class to be left by itself pure and
isolated is not good, nor altogether possible ; and that if we are to make
comparisons of one class with another and choose, there is no better companion
than knowledge of things in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that
may be, of ourselves in every respect.
Pro. And our answer
will be : In that ye have spoken well.
Soc. Very true. And now
let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind : Would you like to have any
pleasures in the mixture ? And they will reply : What pleasures do
you mean ?
Pro. Likely
enough.
Soc. And we shall take
up our parable and say : Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement
pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones ? Why,
Socrates, they will say, how can we ? seeing that they are the source of
ten thousand hindrances to us ; they trouble the souls of men, which are
our habitation, with their madness ; they prevent us from coming to the
birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children which are born to us, causing
them to be forgotten and unheeded ; but the true and pure pleasures, of
which you spoke, know to be of our family, and also those pleasures which
accompany health and temperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess has in
her train to follow her about wherever she goes, mingle these and not the
others ; there would be great want of sense in any one who desires to see a
fair and perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and
in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good there would be
great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the
company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup. Is not this a very
rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as
well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion ?
Pro. Most
certainly.
Soc. And still there
must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every
mixture.
Pro. What is
that ?
Soc. Unless truth enter
into the composition, nothing can truly be created or
subsist.
Pro.
Impossible.
Soc. Quite
impossible ; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether anything is
still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the argument is now
completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold
fair rule over a living body.
Pro. I agree with you,
Socrates.
Soc. And may we not say
with reason that we are now at the vestibule of the habitation of the
good ?
Pro. I think that we
are.
Soc. What, then, is
there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause
why such a state is universally beloved by all ? When we have discovered
it, we will proceed to ask whether this omnipresent nature is more akin to
pleasure or to mind.
Pro. Quite right ;
in that way we shall be better able to judge.
Soc. And there is no
difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest
value or of none at all.
Pro. What do you
mean ?
Soc. Every man knows
it.
Pro.
What ?
Soc. He knows that any
want of measure and symmetry in any mixture whatever must always of necessity be
fatal, both to the elements and to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but
only a confused medley which brings confusion on the possessor of
it.
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. And now the power
of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful ; for measure and
symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world over.
Pro.
True.
Soc. Also we said that
truth was to form an element in the mixture.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. Then, if we are
not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may catch our
prey ; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these taken together we
may regard as the single cause of the mixture, and the mixture as being good by
reason of the infusion of them.
Pro. Quite
right.
Soc. And now,
Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether pleasure or wisdom is more
akin to the highest good, and more honourable among gods and
men.
Pro. Clearly, and yet
perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end.
Soc. We must take each
of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon
them ; for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most
akin.
Pro. You are speaking
of beauty, truth, and measure ?
Soc. Yes, Protarchus,
take truth first, and, after passing in review mind, truth, pleasure, pause
awhile and make answer to yourself as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin
to truth.
Pro. There is no need
to pause, for the difference between them is palpable ; pleasure is the
veriest impostor in the world ; and it is said that in the pleasures of
love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is excused by the gods ; for
pleasures, like children, have not the least particle of reason in them ;
whereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most like truth, and the
truest.
Soc. Shall we next
consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than
wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure ?
Pro. Here is another
question which may be easily answered ; for I imagine that nothing can ever
be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with
measure than mind and knowledge.
Soc. Very good ;
but there still remains the third test : Has mind a greater share of beauty
than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the
two ?
Pro. No one, Socrates,
either awake or dreaming, ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught
unseemly, at any time, past, present, or future.
Soc.
Right.
Pro. But when we see
some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in the greatest of pleasures, the
ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the action makes us ashamed ; and so we
put them out of sight, and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they
ought not to meet the eye of day.
Soc. Then, Protarchus,
you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth to this company, and by
messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of
possessions, nor yet the second, but that in measure, and the mean, and the
suitable, and the like, the eternal nature has been found.
Pro. Yes, that seems to
be the result of what has been now said.
Soc. In the second
class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and
all which are of that family.
Pro.
True.
Soc. And if you reckon
in the third dass mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine
aright.
Pro. I dare
say.
Soc. And would you not
put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially
to the soul sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them ? These
come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin
to good than pleasure is.
Pro.
Surely.
Soc. The fifth class
are the pleasures which were defined by us as painless, being the pure pleasures
of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, some the sciences, and
some the senses.
Pro.
Perhaps.
Soc. And now, as
Orpheus says,
With the sixth generation cease the
glory of my song.
Here, at the sixth
award, let us make an end ; all that remains is to set the crown on our
discourse.
Pro.
True.
Soc. Then let us sum up
and reassert what has been said, thus offering the third libation to the saviour
Zeus.
Pro.
How ?
Soc. Philebus affirmed
that pleasure was always and absolutely the good.
Pro. I
understand ; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant a
recapitulation.
Soc. Yes, but listen to
the sequel ; convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling
indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, not by Philebus only, but by
thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent,
as an element of human life, than pleasure.
Pro.
True.
Soc. But, suspecting
that there were other things which were also better, I went on to say that if
there was anything better than either, then I would claim the second place for
mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the
first.
Pro. You
did.
Soc. Nothing could be
more satisfactorily shown than the unsatisfactory nature of both of
them.
Pro. Very
true.
Soc. The claims both of
pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this
argument, because they are both wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy
and perfection.
Pro. Most
true.
Soc. But, though they
must both resign in favour of another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and
more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure.
Pro.
Certainly.
Soc. And, according to
the judgment which has now been given, pleasure will rank
fifth.
Pro.
True.
Soc. But not
first ; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world by
their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so ; although the many
trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures make up
the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better witnesses than the
inspirations of divine philosophy.
Pro. And now, Socrates,
we tell you that the truth of what you have been saying is approved by the
judgment of all of us.
Soc. And will you let
me go ?
Pro. There is a little
which yet remains, and I will remind you of it, for I am sure that you will not
be the first to go away from an
argument.