Plato
STATESMAN
translated
by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the
Dialogue :
THEODORUS ; SOCRATES ; The ELEATIC
STRANGER ;
The younger SOCRATES.
Socrates. I owe you many
thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the
Stranger.
Theodorus. And in a little
while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as many, when they have completed
for you the delineation of the Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of
the Sophist.
Soc. Sophist,
statesman, philosopher ! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that
this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and
geometrician ?
Theod. What do you mean,
Socrates ?
Soc. I mean that you
rate them all at the same value, whereas they are really separated by an
interval, which no geometrical ratio can express.
Theod. By Ammon, the god
of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit ; and shows that you have not
forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must
now ask the Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to
proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he
prefers.
Stranger. That is my duty,
Theodorus ; having begun I must go on, and not leave the work unfinished.
But what shall be done with Theaetetus ?
Theod. In what
respect ?
Str. Shall we relieve
him, and take his companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him ? What do
you advise ?
Theod. Yes, give the
other a turn, as you propose. The young always do better when they have
intervals of rest.
Soc. I think, Stranger,
that both of them may be said to be in some way related to me ; for the
one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face, the other is called by my name.
And we should always be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of
his conversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have
just been listening to his answers ; my namesake I have not yet examined,
but I must. Another time will, do for me ; to-day let him answer
you.
Str. Very good. Young
Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates is
proposing ?
Young
Socrates. I do.
Str. And do you agree
to his proposal ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. As you do not
object, still less can I. After the Sophist, then, I think that the Statesman
naturally follows next in the order of enquiry. And please to say, whether he,
too, should be ranked among those who have science.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. Then the sciences
must be divided as before ?
Y.
Soc. I dare
say.
Str. But yet the
division will not be the same ?
Y.
Soc. How
then ?
Str. They will be
divided at some other point.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. Where shall we
discover the path of the Statesman ? We must find and separate off, and set
our seal upon this, and we will set the mark of another class upon all diverging
paths. Thus the soul will conceive of ail kinds of knowledge under two
classes.
Y.
Soc. To find the path is your
business, Stranger, and not mine.
Str. Yes, Socrates, but
the discovery, when once made, must be yours as well as
mine.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. Well, and are not
arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge, wholly
separated from action ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. But in the art of
carpentering and all other handicrafts, the knowledge of the workman is merged
in his work ; he not only knows, but he also makes things which previously
did not exist.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Then let us divide
sciences in general into those which are practical and those which are purely
intellectual.
Y.
Soc. Let us assume these two
divisions of science, which is one whole.
Str. And are
“statesman,” “king,” “master,” or “householder,” one and the same ; or is
there a science or art answering to each of these names ? Or rather, allow
me to put the matter in another way.
Y.
Soc. Let me
hear.
Str. If any one who is
in a private station has the skill to advise one of the public physicians, must
not he also be called a physician ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And if any one who
is in a private station is able to advise the ruler of a country, may not he be
said to have the knowledge which the ruler himself ought to
have ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. But, surely the
science of a true king is royal science ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And will not he
who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens to be a ruler or a private man,
when regarded only in reference to his art, be truly called
“royal” ?
Y.
Soc. He certainly ought to
be.
Str. And the
householder and master are the same ?
Y.
Soc. Of
course.
Str. Again, a large
household may be compared to a small state : — will they differ at all, as
far as government is concerned ?
Y.
Soc. They will
not.
Str. Then, returning to
the point which we were just now discussing, do we not clearly see that there is
one science of all of them ; and this science may be called either royal or
political or economical ; we will not quarrel with any one about the
name.
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. This too, is
evident, that the king cannot do much with his hands, or with his whole body,
towards the maintenance of his empire, compared with what he does by the
intelligence and strength of his mind.
Y.
Soc. Clearly
not.
Str. Then, shall we say
that the king has a greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts and to
practical life in general ?
Y.
Soc. Certainly he
has.
Str. Then we may put
all together as one and the same — statesmanship and the statesman — the kingly
science and the king.
Y.
Soc.
Clearly.
Str. And now we shall
only be proceeding in due order if we go on to divide the sphere of
knowledge ?
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. Think whether you
can find any joint or parting in knowledge.
Y.
Soc. Tell me of what
sort.
Str. Such as
this : You may remember that we made an art of
calculation ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. Which was,
unmistakably, one of the arts of knowledge ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And to this art of
calculation which discerns the differences of numbers shall we assign any other
function except to pass judgment on their
differences ?
Y.
Soc. How could
we ?
Str. You know that the
master-builder does not work himself, but is the ruler of
workmen ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. He contributes
knowledge, not manual labour ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And may therefore
be justly said to share in theoretical science ?
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. But he ought not,
like the calculator, to regard his functions as at and when he has formed a
judgment ; — he must assign to the individual workmen their appropriate
task until they have completed the work.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. Are not all such
sciences, no less than arithmetic and the like, subjects of pure
knowledge ; and is not the difference between the two classes, that the one
sort has the power of judging only, and the other of ruling as
well ?
Y.
Soc. That is
evident.
Str. May we not very
properly say, that of all knowledge, there are there are two divisions — one
which rules, and the other which judges ?
Y.
Soc. I should think
so.
Str. And when men have
anything to do in common, that they should be of one mind is surely a desirable
thing ?
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Then while we are
at unity among ourselves, we need not mind about the fancies of
others ?
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. And now, in which
of these divisions shall we place the king ? — Is he a judge and a kind of
spectator ? Or shall we assign to him the art of command — for he is a
ruler ?
Y.
Soc. The latter,
clearly.
Str. Then we must see
whether there is any mark of division in the art of command too. I am inclined
to think that there is a distinction similar to that of manufacturer and retail
dealer, which parts off the king from the herald.
Y.
Soc. How is
this ?
Str. Why, does not the
retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have been
sold before ?
Y.
Soc. Certainly he
does.
Str. And is not the
herald under command, and does he not receive orders, and in his turn give them
to others ?
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Then shall we
mingle the kingly art in the same class with the art of the herald, the
interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the numerous kindred arts which
exercise command ; or, as in the preceding comparison we spoke of
manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of retailers, — seeing, too, that
the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost nameless —
shall we make a word following the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or
ruling-for-self science, leaving the rest to receive a name from some one
else ? For we are seeking the ruler ; and our enquiry is not concerned
with him who is not a ruler.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. Thus a very fair
distinction has been attained between the man who gives his own commands, and
him who gives another’s. And now let us see if the supreme power allows of any
further division.
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. I think that it
does ; and please to assist me in making the
division.
Y.
Soc. At what
point ?
Str. May not all rulers
be supposed to command for the sake of producing
something ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Nor is there any
difficulty in dividing the things produced into two
classes.
Y.
Soc. How would you divide
them ?
Str. Of the whole class
some have life and some are without life.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And by the help of
this distinction we may make, if we please, a subdivision of the section of
knowledge which commands.
Y.
Soc. At what
point ?
Str. One part may be
set over the production of lifeless, the other of living objects ; and in
this way the whole will be divided.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. That division,
then, is complete ; and now we may leave one half, and take up the
other ; which may also be divided into two.
Y.
Soc. Which of the two halves do
you men ?
Str. Of course that
which exercises command about animals. For, surely, the royal science is not
like that of a master-workman, a science presiding over lifeless objects ;
— the king has a nobler function, which is the management and control of living
beings.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And the breeding
and tending of living beings may be observed to be sometimes a tending of the
individual ; in other cases, a common care of creatures in
flocks ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. But the statesman
is not a tender of individuals — not like the driver or groom of a single ox or
horse ; he is rather to be compared with the keeper of a drove of horses or
oxen.
Y.
Soc. Yes, I see, thanks to
you.
Str. Shall we call this
art of tending many animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of
collective management ?
Y.
Soc. No matter ; — Whichever
suggests itself to us in the course of conversation.
Str. Very good,
Socrates ; and, if you continue to be not too particular about names, you
will be all the richer in wisdom when you are an old man. And now, as you say,
leaving the discussion of the name, — can you see a way in which a person, by
showing the art of herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now
sought amongst twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that
number ?
Y.
Soc. I will try ; — there
appears to me to be one management of men and another of
beasts.
Str. You have certainly
divided them in a most straightforward and manly style ; but you have
fallen into an error which hereafter I think that we had better
avoid.
Y.
Soc. What is the
error ?
Str. I think that we
had better not cut off a single small portion which is not a species, from many
larger portions ; the part should be a species. To separate off at once the
subject of investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation be
rightly made ; and you were under the impression that you were right,
because you saw that you would come to man ; and this led you to hasten the
steps. But you should not chip off too small a piece, my friend ; the safer
way is to cut through the middle ; which is also the more likely way of
finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a
process of enquiry.
Y.
Soc. What do you mean,
Stranger ?
Str. I will endeavour
to speak more plainly out of love to your good parts, Socrates ; and,
although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, I will try, as we proceed,
to make my meaning a little clearer.
Y.
Soc. What was the error of which,
as you say, we were guilty in our recent division ?
Str. The error was just
as if some one who wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them after
the fashion which prevails in this part of the world ; here they cut off
the Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind, which are
innumerable, and have no ties or common language, they include under the single
name of “barbarians,” and because they have one name they are supposed to be of
one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten
thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the first
under another separate name, you might say that here too was a single class,
because you had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and
more equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd
and even ; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and
female ; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe,
and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a
division into parts which were also classes.
Y.
Soc. Very true ; but I wish
that this distinction between a part and a class could still be made somewhat
plainer.
Str. O Socrates, best
of men, you are imposing upon me a very difficult task. We have already
digressed further from our original intention than we ought, and you would have
us wander still further away. But we must now return to our subject ; and
hereafter, when there is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other
track ; at the same time I wish you to guard against imagining that you
ever heard me declare —
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. That a class and a
part are distinct.
Y.
Soc. What did I hear,
then ?
Str. That a class is
necessarily a part, but there is no similar necessity that a part should be a
dass ; that is the view which I should always wish you to attribute to me,
Socrates.
Y.
Soc. So be
it.
Str. There is another
thing which I should like to know.
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. The point at which
we digressed ; for, if I am not mistaken, the exact place was at the
question, Where you would divide the management of herds. To this you appeared
rather too ready to answer that them were two species of animals ; man
being one, and all brutes making up the other.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. I thought that in
taking away a part you imagined that the remainder formed a class, because you
were able to call them by the common name of brutes.
Y.
Soc. That again is
true.
Str. Suppose now, O
most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature,
such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar
division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special
glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man,
under the appellation of brutes, — here would be the sort of error which we must
try to avoid.
Y.
Soc. How can we be
safe ?
Str. If we do not
divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less likely to fall into that
error.
Y.
Soc. We had better not take the
whole ?
Str. Yes, there lay the
source of error in our former division.
Y.
Soc.
How ?
Str. You remember how
that part of the art of knowledge which was concerned with command, had to do
with the rearing of living creatures, — I mean, with animals in
herds ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. In that case,
there was already implied a division of all animals into tame and wild ;
those whose nature can be tamed are called tame, and those which cannot be tamed
are called wild.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And the political
science of which we are in search, is and ever was concerned with tame animals,
and is also confined to gregarious animals.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. But then ought not
to divide, as we did, taking the whole class at once. Neither let us be in too
great haste to arrive quickly at the political science ; for this mistake
has already brought upon us the misfortune of which the proverb
speaks.
Y.
Soc. What
misfortune ?
Str. The misfortune of
too much haste, which is too little speed.
Y.
Soc. And all the better,
Stranger ; — we got what we deserved.
Str. Very well :
Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide the collective rearing of
animals ; for probably the completion of the argument will best show what
you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then —
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. Have you ever
heard, as you very likely may — for I do not suppose that you ever actually
visited them — of the preserves of fishes in the Nile, and in the ponds of the
Great King ; or you may have seen similar preserves in wells at
home ?
Y.
Soc. Yes, to be sure, I have seen
them, and I have often heard the others described.
Str. And you may have
heard also, and may have been assured by report, although you have not travelled
in those regions, of nurseries of geese and cranes in the plains of
Thessaly ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. I asked you,
because here is a new division of the management of herds, into the management
of land and of water herds.
Y.
Soc. There
is.
Str. And do you agree
that we ought to divide the collective rearing of herds into two corresponding
parts, the one the rearing of water, and the other the rearing of land
herds ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. There is surely no
need to ask which of these two contains the royal art, for it is evident to
everybody.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Any one can divide
the herds which feed on dry land ?
Y.
Soc. How would you divide
them ?
Str. I should
distinguish between those which fly and those which walk.
Y.
Soc. Most
true.
Str. And where shall we
look for the political animal ? Might not an idiot, so to speak, know that
he is a pedestrian ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. The art of
managing the walking animal has to be further divided, just as you might have an
even number.
Y.
Soc.
Clearly.
Str. Let me note that
here appear in view two ways to that part or class which the argument aims at
reaching — the one is speedier way, which cuts off a small portion and leaves a
large ; the other agrees better with the principle which we were laying
down, that as far as we can we should divide in the middle ; but it is
longer. We can take either of them, whichever we please.
Y.
Soc. Cannot we have both
ways ?
Str. Together ?
What a thing to ask ! but, if you take them in turn, you clearly
may.
Y.
Soc. Then I should like to have
them in turn.
Str. There will be no
difficulty, as we are near the end ; if we had been at the beginning, or in
the middle, I should have demurred to your request ; but now, in accordance
with your desire, let us begin with the longer way ; while we are fresh, we
shall get on better. And now attend to the division.
Y.
Soc. Let me
hear.
Str. The tame walking
herding animals are distributed by nature into two
classes.
Y.
Soc. Upon what
principle ?
Str. The one grows
horns ; and the other is without horns.
Y.
Soc.
Clearly.
Str. Suppose that you
divide the science which manages pedestrian animals into two corresponding
parts, and define them ; for if you try to invent names for them, you will
find the intricacy too great.
Y.
Soc. How must I speak of them,
then ?
Str. In this way :
let the science of managing pedestrian animals be divided into two parts and one
part assigned to the horned herd and the other to the herd that has no
horns.
Y.
Soc. All that you say has been
abundantly proved, and may therefore, be assumed.
Str. The king is
clearly the shepherd a polled herd, who have no horns.
Y.
Soc. That is
evident.
Str. Shall we break up
this hornless herd into sections, and endeavour to assign to him what is
his ?
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. Shall we
distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing
or not mixing the breed ? You know what I mean.
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. I mean that horses
and asses naturally breed from one another.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. But the remainder
of the hornless herd of tame animals will not mix the
breed.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And of which has
the Statesman charge, — of the mixed or of the unmixed
race ?
Y.
Soc. Clearly of the
unmixed.
Str. I suppose that we
must divide this again as before.
Y.
Soc. We
must.
Str. Every tame and
herding animal has now been split up, with the exception of two species ;
for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned among gregarious
animals.
Y.
Soc. Certainly not ; but how
shall we divide the two remaining species ?
Str. There is a measure
of difference which may be appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus, who are
students of geometry.
Y.
Soc. What is
that ?
Str. The
diameter ; and, again, the diameter of a diameter.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. How does man walk,
but as a diameter whose power is two feet ?
Y.
Soc. Just
so.
Str. And the power of
the remaining kind, being the power of twice two feet, may be said to be the
diameter of our diameter.
Y.
Soc. Certainly ; and now I
think that I pretty nearly understand you.
Str. In these
divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another famous
jest.
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. Human beings have
come out in the same class with the freest and airiest of creation, and have
been running a race with them.
Y.
Soc. I remark that very singular
coincidence.
Str. And would you not
expect the slowest to arrive last ?
Y.
Soc. Indeed I
should.
Str. And there is a
still more ridiculous consequence, that the king is found running about with the
herd and in close competition with the bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most
of an adept at the airy life.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Then here,
Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the enquiry
about the Sophist ?
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. That the
dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does not set the great above
the small, but always arrives in her own way at the truest
result.
Y.
Soc.
Clearly.
Str. And now, I will
not wait for you to ask the, but will of my own accord take you by the shorter
road to the definition of a king.
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. I say that we
should have begun at first by dividing land animals into biped and
quadruped ; and since the winged herd, and that alone, comes out in the
same class with man, should divide bipeds into those which have feathers and
those which have not, and when they have been divided, and the art of the
management of mankind is brought to light, the time will have come to produce
our Statesman and ruler, and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand
over to him the reins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to
him.
Y.
Soc. Very good ; you have
paid me the debt — I mean, that you have completed the argument, and I suppose
that you added the digression by way of interest.
Str. Then now, let us
go back to the beginning, and join the links, which together make the definition
of the name of the Statesman’s art.
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. The science of
pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a part which was the science of rule
or command, and from this was derived another part, which was called
command-for-self, on the analogy of selling-for-self ; an important section
of this was the management of living animals, and this again was further limited
to the manage merit of them in herds ; and again in herds of pedestrian
animals. The chief division of the latter was the art of managing pedestrian
animals which are without horns ; this again has a part which can only be
comprehended under one term by joining together three names — shepherding
pure-bred animals. The only further subdivision is the art of man herding — this
has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now found,
being at once the royal and political.
Y.
Soc. To be
sure.
Str. And do you think,
Socrates, that we really have done as you say ?
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. Do you think, I
mean, that we have really fulfilled our intention ? — There has been a sort
of discussion, and yet the investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked
out : this is where the enquiry fails.
Y.
Soc. I do not
understand.
Str. I will try to make
the thought, which is at this moment present in my mind, clearer to us
both.
Y.
Soc. Let me
hear.
Str. There were many
arts of shepherding, and one of them was the political, which had the charge of
one particular herd ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And this the
argument defined to be the art of rearing, not horses or other brutes, but the
art of rearing man collectively ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. Note, however, a
difference which distinguishes the king from all other
shepherds.
Y.
Soc. To what do you
refer ?
Str. I want to ask,
whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival who professes and claims to
share with him in the management of the herd ?
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. I mean to say that
merchants husbandmen, providers of food, and also training-masters and
physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of humanity, whom we call
Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the care of rearing of managing
mankind, and that they rear not only the common herd, but also the rulers
themselves.
Y.
Soc. Are they not right in saying
so ?
Str. Very likely they
may be, and we will consider their claim. But we are certain of this, — that no
one will raise a similar claim as against the herdsman, who is allowed on all
hands to be the sole and only feeder and physician of his herd ; he is also
their matchmaker and accoucheur ; no one else knows that department of
science. And he is their merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is
susceptible of such influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd
better than he can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with
instruments. And the same may be said of tenders of animals in
general.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. But if this is as
you say, can our argument about the king be true and unimpeachable ? Were
we right in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd
and rearer of the human flock ?
Y.
Soc. Surely
not.
Str. Had we not reason
just to now apprehend, that although we may have described a sort of royal form,
we have not as yet accurately worked out the true image of the Statesman ?
and that we cannot reveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have
disengaged and separated him from those who bang about him and claim to share in
his prerogatives ?
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And that,
Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to bring disgrace upon the
argument at its close.
Y.
Soc. We must certainly avoid
that.
Str. Then let us make a
new beginning, and travel by a different road.
Y.
Soc. What
road ?
Str. I think that we
may have a little amusement ; there is a famous tale, of which a good
portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we may resume our series of
divisions, and proceed in the old path until we arrive at the desired summit.
Shall we do as I say ?
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. Listen, then, to a
tale which a child would love to hear ; and you are not too old for
childish amusement.
Y.
Soc. Let me
hear.
Str. There did really
happen, and will again happen, like many other events of which ancient tradition
has preserved the record, the portent which is traditionally said to have
occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You have heard no doubt, and
remember what they say happened at that time ?
Y.
Soc. I suppose you to mean the
token of the birth of the golden lamb.
Str. No, not
that ; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun and the stars
once rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the god reversed their
motion, and gave them that which they now have as a testimony to the right of
Atreus.
Y.
Soc. Yes ; there is that
legend also.
Str. Again, we have
been often told of the reign of Cronos.
Y.
Soc. Yes, very
often.
Str. Did you ever hear
that the men of former times were earthborn, and not begotten of one
another ?
Y.
Soc. Yes, that is another old
tradition.
Str. All these stories,
and ten thousand others which are still more wonderful, have a common
origin ; many of them have been lost in the lapse of ages, or are repeated
only in a disconnected form ; but the origin of them is what no one has
told, and may as well be told now ; for the tale is suited to throw light
on the nature of the king.
Y.
Soc. Very good ; and I hope
that you will give the whole story, and leave out nothing.
Str. Listen, then.
There is a time when God himself guides and helps to roll the world in its
course ; and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he
lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally received
intelligence from its author and creator turns about and by an inherent
necessity revolves in the opposite direction.
Y.
Soc. Why is
that ?
Str. Why, because only
the most divine things of all remain ever unchanged and the same, and body is
not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them,
although they have been endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a
bodily nature, and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But
their motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and of the
same kind ; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least
alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of
himself ; and to think that he moves them at one time in one direction and
at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must not say that the world is
either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two opposite
courses ; or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move round.
But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the
world is guided at one time by an external power which is divine and receives
fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of the Creator, and again,
when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free at such a time as to have,
during infinite cycles of years, a reverse movement : this is due to its
perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest
pivot.
Y.
Soc. Your account of the world
seems to be very reasonable indeed.
Str. Let us now reflect
and try to gather from what has been said the nature of the phenomenon which we
affirmed to be the cause of all these wonders. It is this.
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. The reversal which
takes place from time to time of the motion of the
universe.
Y.
Soc. How is that the
cause ?
Str. Of all changes of
the heavenly motions, we may consider this to be the greatest and most
complete.
Y.
Soc. I should imagine
so.
Str. And it may be
supposed to result in the greatest changes to the human beings who are the
inhabitants of the world at the time.
Y.
Soc. Such changes would naturally
occur.
Str. And animals, as we
know, survive with difficulty great and serious changes of many different kinds
when they come upon them at once.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Hence there
necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, which extends also to the life
of man ; few survivors of the race are left, and those who remain become
the subjects of several novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in
particular, which takes place at the time when the transition is made to the
cycle opposite to that in which we are now living.
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. The life of all
animals first came to a standstill, and the mortal nature ceased to be or look
older, and was then reversed and grew young and delicate ; the white locks
of the aged darkened again, and the cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and
recovered their former bloom ; the bodies of youths in their prime grew
softer and smaller, continually by day and night returning and becoming
assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in mind as well as body ;
in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies
of those who died by violence at that time quickly passed through the like
changes, and in a few days were no more seen.
Y.
Soc. Then how, Stranger, were the
animals created in those days ; and in what way were they begotten of one
another ?
Str. It is evident,
Socrates, that there was no such thing in the then order of nature as the
procreation of animals from one another ; the earth-born race, of which we
hear in story, was the one which existed in those days — they rose again from
the ground ; and of this tradition, which is now-a-days often unduly
discredited, our ancestors, who were nearest in point of time to the end of the
last period and came into being at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds.
And mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is ; after the return of age
to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to
life ; simultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their
generation has been turned back, and they are put together and rise and live in
the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot.
According to this tradition they of necessity sprang from the earth and have the
name of earth-born, and so the above legend clings to
them.
Y.
Soc. Certainly that is quite
consistent with what has preceded ; but tell me, was the life which you
said existed in the reign of Cronos in that cycle of the world, or in
this ? For the change in the course of the stars and the sun must have
occurred in both.
Str. I see that you
enter into my meaning ; — no, that blessed and spontaneous life does not
belong to the present cycle of the world, but to the previous one, in which God
superintended the whole revolution of the universe ; and the several parts
the universe were distributed under the rule. certain inferior deities, as is
the way in some places still There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the
various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects
sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd ; neither was there any
violence, or devouring of one another or war or quarrel among them ; and I
might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation.
The reason why the life of man was, as tradition says, spontaneous, is as
follows : In those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over
them, just as man, over them, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules
over the lower animals. Under him there were no forms of government or separate
possession of women and children ; for all men rose again from the earth,
having no memory, of the past. And although they had nothing of this sort, the
earth gave them fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden,
and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the
open air, for the temperature of their seasons, was mild ; and they had no
beds, but lay on Soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of : the
earth. Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates ; the
character of our present life which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your
own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the
happier ?
Y. Soc.
Impossible.
Str. Then shall I
determine for you as well as I can ?
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. Suppose that the
nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding
intercourse, not only with men, but with the brute creation, had used all these
advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with
one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special
power, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom
there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times
happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and
drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the animals —
such stories as are now attributed to them — in this case also, as I should
imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some satisfactory witness can be
found of the love of that age for knowledge and : discussion, we had better
let the matter drop, and give the reason why we have unearthed this tale, and
then we shall be able to get on.
In the fulness of
time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all
perished, and every soul had completed its proper cycle of births and been sown
in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe let the
helm go, and retired to his place of view ; and then Fate and innate desire
reversed the motion of the world. Then also all the inferior deities who share
the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the
parts of the world which were under their control. And the world turning round
with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite direction from beginning to
end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, which wrought a new destruction of all
manner of animals. Afterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and
confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace
attained to a calm, and settle down into his own orderly and accustomed course,
having the charge and rule of himself and of all the creatures which are
contained in him, and executing, as far as he remembered them, the instructions
of his Father and Creator, more precisely at first, but afterwords with less
exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in
him ; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder,
until attaining to the present order. From God, the constructor ; the world
received all that is good in him, but from a previous state came elements of
evil and unrighteousness, which, thence derived, first of all passed into the
world, and were then transmitted to the animals. While the world was aided by
the pilot in nurturing the animals, the evil was small, and great the good which
he produced, but after the separation, when the world was let go, at first all
proceeded well enough ; but, as time went there was more and more
forgetting, and the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full
glory ; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of
evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin to the world, and the things
contained in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing
that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in
the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated himself at the
helm ; and bringing back the elements which had fallen into dissolution and
disorder to the motion which had prevailed under his dispensation, he set them
in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and
immortal.
And this is the
whole tale, of which the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the
king. For when the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age
of man again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was the
result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in and stature,
and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the
earth again. All things changed, imitating and following the condition of the
universe, and of necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and
generation and nurture ; for no animal ; was any longer allowed to
come into being in the earth through the agency of other creative beings, but as
the world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the
parts were ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they
could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at
the real end of this discourse ; for although there might be much to tell
of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they changed and of the
causes of the change, about men there is not much, and that little is more to
the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them,
they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces by the beasts,
who were naturally fierce and had now grown wild. And in the first ages they
were still without skill or resource ; the food which once grew
spontaneously had failed, and as yet they knew not how to procure it, because
they had never felt the pressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were
in a great strait ; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition
were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching and education
as was indispensable ; fire was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by
Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants by others. From these
is derived all that has helped to frame human life ; since the care of the
Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of
life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal
creature whom they imitate and follow, ever changing, as he changes, and ever
living and growing, at one time in one manner, and at another time in another.
Enough of the story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in
the delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous
discourse.
Y.
Soc. What was this great error of
which you speak ?
Str. There were
two ; the first a lesser one, the other was an error on a much larger and
grander scale.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. I mean to say that
when we were asked about a king and statesman of the present ; and
generation, we told of a shepherd of a human flock who belonged to the other
cycle, and of one who was a god when he ought to have been a man ; and this
a great error. Again, we declared him to be, the ruler of the entire State,
without, explaining how : this was not the whole truth, nor very
intelligible ; but still it was true, and therefore the second error was
not so, great as the first.
Y Soc. Very
good.
Str. Before we can
expect to have a perfect description of the statesman we must define the nature
of his office.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And the myth was
introduced in order to show, not only that all others are rivals of true
shepherd who is the object of our search, but in order that we might have a
clearer view of him who is alone worthy to receive this appellation, because, he
alone of shepherds and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed,
has the care of human beings.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And I cannot help
thinking, Socrates, that the form of the divine shepherd is even higher than
that of a king ; whereas the statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much
more like their subjects in character, and which more nearly to partake of their
breeding and education.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Still they must be
investigated all the same, to see whether, like the divine shepherd, they are
above their subjects or on a level with them.
Y.
Soc. Of
course.
Str. To resume : —
Do you remember that we spoke of a command-for-self exercised over animals, not
singly but collectively, which we called the art of rearing a
herd ?
Y.
Soc. Yes, I
remember.
Str. There, somewhere,
lay our error ; for we never included or mentioned the Statesman ; and
we did not observe that he had no place in our
nomenclature.
Y.
Soc. How was
that ?
Str. All other herdsmen
“rear” their herds, but this is not a suitable term to apply to the
Statesman ; we should use a name which is common to them
all.
Y.
Soc. True, if there be such a
name.
Str. Why, is not “care”
of herds applicable to all ? For this implies no feeding, or any special
duty ; if we say either “tending” the herds, or “managing” the herds, or
“having the care” of them, the same word will include all, and then we may wrap
up the Statesman with the rest, as the argument seems to
require.
Y.
Soc. Quite right ; but how
shall we take the next step in the division ?
Str. As before we
divided the art of “rearing” herds accordingly as they were land or water herds,
winged and wingless, mixing or not mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we
may divide by these same differences the “teading” of herds, comprehending in
our definition the kingship of to-day and the rule of
Cronos.
Y.
Soc. That is clear ; but I
still ask, what is to follow.
Str. If the word had
been “managing” herds, instead of feeding or rearing them, no one would have
argued that there was no care of men in the case of the politician, although it
was justly contended, that there was no human art of feeding them which was
worthy of the name, or at least, if there were, many a man had a prior and
greater right to share in such an art than any king.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. But no other art
or science will have a prior or better right than the royal science to care for
human society and to rule over men in general.
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. In the next place,
Socrates, we must surely notice that a great error was committed at the end of
our analysis.
Y.
Soc. What was
it ?
Str. Why, supposing we
were ever so sure that there is such an art as the art of rearing or feeding
bipeds, there was no reason why we should call this the royal or political art,
as though there were no more to be said.
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. Our first duty, as
we were saying, was to remodel the name, so as to have the notion of care rather
than of feeding, and then to divide, for there may be still considerable
divisions.
Y.
Soc. How can they be
made ?
Str. First, by
separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian or
manager.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And the art of
management which is assigned to man would again have to be
subdivided.
Y.
Soc. On what
principle ?
Str. On the principle
of voluntary and compulsory.
Y.
Soc.
Why ?
Str. Because, if I am
not mistaken, there has been an error here ; for our simplicity led us to
rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are utterly distinct, like their
modes of government.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. Then, now, as I
said, let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts, on the
principle of voluntary and compulsory.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And if we call the
management of violent rulers tyranny, and the voluntary management of herds of
voluntary bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter
art of management is the true king and statesman ?
Y.
Soc. I think, Stranger, that we
have now completed the account of the Statesman.
Str. Would that we had
Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as well as you ; and in my judgment
the figure of the king is not yet perfected ; like statuaries who, in their
too great haste, having overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in
cutting them down, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of haste, partly
out of a magnanimous desire to expose our former error, and also because we
imagined that a king required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous
lump of fable, and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made
us discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And
our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being which had
been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness
which is given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living
being had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any painting or
work of art : to the duller sort by works of art.
Y.
Soc. Very true ; but what is
the imperfection which still remains ? I wish that you would tell
me.
Str. The higher ideas,
my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except through the medium of
examples ; every man seems to know all things in a dreamy sort of way, and
then again to wake up and to know nothing.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. I fear that I have
been unfortunate in raising a question about our experience of
knowledge.
Y.
Soc. Why
so ?
Str. Why, because my
“example” requires the assistance of another example.
Y.
Soc. Proceed ; you need not
fear that I shall tire.
Str. I will proceed,
finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you : when children are
beginning to know their letters —
Y.
Soc. What are you going to
say ?
Str. That they
distinguish the several letters well enough in very short and easy syllables,
and are able to tell them correctly.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Whereas in other
syllables they do not recognize them, and think and speak falsely of
them.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Will not the best
and easiest way of bringing them to a knowledge of what they do not as yet know
be —
Y.
Soc. Be
what ?
Str. To refer them
first of all to cases in which they judge correctly about the letters in
question, and then to compare these with the cases in which they do not as yet
know, and to show them that the letters are the same, and have the same
character in both combination, until all cases in which they are right have been
Placed side by side with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they
have examples, and are made to learn that each letter in every combination is
always the same and not another, and is always called by the same
name.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Are not examples
formed in this manner ? We take a thing and compare it with another
distinct instance of the same thing, of which we have a right conception, and
out of the comparison there arises one true notion, which includes both of
them.
Y.
Soc.
Exactly.
Str. Can we wonder,
then, that the soul has the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and
sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by the truth in each particular, and
then, again, in other cases is altogether at sea ; having somehow or other
a correction of combinations ; but when the elements are transferred into
the long and difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of
them ?
Y.
Soc. There is nothing wonderful in
that.
Str. Could any one, my
friend, who began with false opinion ever expect to arrive even at a small
portion of truth and to attain wisdom ?
Y.
Soc. Hardly.
Str. Then you and I
will not be far wrong in trying to see the nature of example in general in a
small and particular instance ; afterwards from lesser things we intend to
pass to the royal class, which is the highest form of the same nature, and
endeavour to discover by rules of art what the management of cities is ;
and then the dream will become a reality to us.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Then, once more,
let us resume the previous argument, and as there were innumerable rivals of the
royal race who claim to have the care of states, let us part them all off, and
leave him alone ; and, as I was saying, a model or example of this process
has first to be framed.
Y.
Soc.
Exactly.
Str. What model is
there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political
occupation ? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other example at hand,
we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool — this will be quite
enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our
meaning ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Why should we not
apply to weaving the same processes of division and subdivision which we have
already applied to other classes ; going once more as rapidly as we can
through all the steps until we come to that which is needed for our
purpose ?
Y.
Soc. How do you
mean ?
Str. I shall reply by
actually performing the process.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. All things which
we make or acquire are either creative or preventive ; of the preventive
class are antidotes, divine and human, and also defences ; and defences are
either military weapons or protections ; and protections are veils, and
also shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and cold are
shelters and coverings ; and coverings are blankets and garments ; and
garments are some of them in one piece, and others of them are made in several
parts ; and of these latter some are stitched, others are fastened and not
stitched ; and of the not stitched, some are made of the sinews of plants,
and some of hair ; and of these, again, some are cemented with water and
earth, and others are fastened together by themselves. And these last defences
and coverings which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and
the art which superintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation,
the art of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from
the State ; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that
largest portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes, differs
only in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous
case, the royal science differed from the political ?
Y.
Soc. Most
true.
Str. In the next place,
let us make the reflection, that the art of weaving clothes, which an
incompetent person might fancy to have been sufficiently described, has been
separated off from several others which are of the same family, but not from the
co-operative arts.
Y.
Soc. And which are the kindred
arts ?
Str. I see that I have
not taken you with me. So I think that we had better go backwards, starting from
the end. We just now parted off from the weaving of clothes, the making of
blankets, which differ from each other in that one is put under and the other is
put around ! and these are what I termed kindred
arts.
Y.
Soc. I
understand.
Str. And we have
subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of flax and cords, and all that
we just now metaphorically termed the sinews of plants, and we have also
separated off the process of felting and the putting together of materials by
stitching and sewing, of which the most important part is the cobbler’s
art.
Y.
Soc.
Precisely.
Str. Then we separated
off the currier’s art, which prepared coverings in entire pieces, and the art of
sheltering, and subtracted the various arts of making water-tight which are
employed in building, and in general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and
all such arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are
concerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions
of the art of joining ; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which
is a section of the great and manifold art of making defences ; and we
originally began by parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned
with antidoter, and have left, as would appear, the very art of which we were in
search, the art of protection against winter cold, which fabricates woollen
defences, and has the name of weaving.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Yes, my boy, but
that is not all ; for the first process to which the material is subjected
is the opposite of weaving.
Y.
Soc. How
so ?
Str. Weaving is a sort
of uniting ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. But the first
process is a separation of the clotted and matted
fibres ?
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. I mean the work of
the carder’s art ; for we cannot say that carding is weaving, or that the
carder is a weaver.
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. Again, if a person
were to say that the art of making the warp and the woof was the art of weaving,
he would say what was paradoxical and false.
Y.
Soc. To be
sure.
Str. Shall we say that
the whole art of the fuller or of the mender has nothing to do with the care and
treatment clotes, or are we to regard all these as arts of
weaving ?
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. And yet surely all
these arts will maintain that they are concerned with the treatment and
production of clothes ; they will dispute the exclusive prerogative of
weaving, and though assigning a larger sphere to that, will still reserve a
considerable field for themselves.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Besides these,
there are the arts which make tools and instruments of weaving, and which will
claim at least to be cooperative causes in every work of the
weaver.
Y.
Soc. Most
true.
Str. Well, then,
suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part of it which has been
selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of arts which are concerned with
woollen garments — shall we be right ? Is not the definition, although
true, wanting in clearness and completeness ; for do not all those other
arts require to be first cleared away ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. Then the next
thing will be to separate them, in order that the argument may proceed in a
regular manner ?
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. Let us consider,
in the first place, that there are two kinds of arts entering into everything
which we do.
Y.
Soc. What are
they ?
Str. The one kind is
the conditional or cooperative, the other the principal
cause.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. The arts which do
not manufacture the actual thing, but which furnish the necessary tools for the
manufacture, without which the several arts could not fulfil their appointed
work, are co-operative ; but those which make the things themselves are
causal.
Y.
Soc. A very reasonable
distinction.
Str. Thus the arts
which make spindles, combs, and other instruments of the production of clothes
may be called co-operative, and those which treat and fabricate the things
themselves, causal.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. The arts of
washing and mending, and the other preparatory arts which belong to the causal
class, and form a division of the great art of adornment, may be all
comprehended under what we call the fuller’s art.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. Carding and
spinning threads and all the parts of the process which are concerned with the
actual manufacture of a woollen garment form a single art, which is one of thow
universally acknowledged — the art of working in wool.
Y.
Soc. To be
sure.
Str. Of working in wool
again, there are two divisions, and both these are parts of two arts at
once.
Y.
Soc. How is
that ?
Str. Carding and one
half of the use of the comb, and the other processes of wool-working which
separate the composite, may be classed together as belonging both to the art of
woolworking, and also to one of the two great arts which are of universal
application — the art of composition and the art of
division.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. To the latter
belong carding and the other processes of which I was just now speaking the art
of discernment or division in wool and yarn, which is effected in one manner
with the comb and in another with the hands, is variously described under all
the names which I just now mentioned.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Again, let us take
some process of woolworking which is also a portion of the art of composition,
and, dismissing the elements of division which we found there, make two halves,
one on the principle of composition, and the other on the principle of
division.
Y.
Soc. Let that be
done.
Str. And once more,
Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs at once both to woolworking and
composition, if we are ever to discover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of
weaving.
Y.
Soc. We
must.
Str. Yes, certainly,
and let us call one part of the art the art of twisting threads, the other the
art of combining them.
Y.
Soc. Do I understand you, in
speaking of twisting, to be referring to manufacture of the
warp ?
Str. Yes, and of the
woof too ; how, if not by twisting, is the woof
made ?
Y.
Soc. There is no other
way.
Str. Then suppose that
you define the warp and the woof, for I think that the definition will be of use
to you.
Y.
Soc. How shall I define
them ?
Str. As thus : A
piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise and breadth-wise is said to
be pulled out.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And the wool thus
prepared when twisted by the spindle, and made into a firm thread, is called the
warp, And the art which regulates these operations the art of spinning the
warp.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And the threads
which are more loosely spun, having a softness proportioned to the intertexture
of the warp and to the degree of force used in dressing the cloth — the threads
which are thus spun are called the woof, and the art which is set over them may
be called the art of spinning the woof.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And, now, there
can be no mistake about the nature of the part of weaving which we have
undertaken to define. For when that part of the art of composition which is
employed in the working of wool forms a web by the regular intertexture of warp
and woof, the entire woven substance is called by us a woollen garment, and the
art which presides over this is the art of weaving.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. But why did we not
say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof, instead of
making a long and useless circuit ?
Y.
Soc. I thought, Stranger, that
there was nothing useless in what was said.
Str. Very likely, but
you may not always think so, my sweet friend ; and in case any feeling of
dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your mind, as it very well may, let me
lay down a principle which will apply to arguments in
general.
Y.
Soc.
Proceed.
Str. Let us begin by
considering the whole nature of excess and defect, and then we shall have a
rational ground on which we may praise or blame too much length or too much
shortness in discussions of this kind.
Y.
Soc. Let us do
so.
Str. The points on
which I think that we ought to dwell are the following :
—
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. Length and
shortness, excess and defect ; with all of these the art of measurement is
conversant.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And the art of
measurement has to be divided into two parts, with a view to our present
purpose.
Y.
Soc. Where would you make the
division ?
Str. As thus : I
would make two parts, one having regard to the relativity of greatness and
smallness to each other ; and there is another, without which the existence
of production would be impossible.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. Do you not think
that it is only natural for the greater to be called greater with reference to
the less alone, and the less reference to the greater
alone ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. Well, but is there
not also something exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean, both in
speech and action, and is not this a reality, and the chief mark of difference
between good and bad men ?
Y.
Soc.
Plainly.
Str. Then we must
suppose that the great and small exist and are discerned in both these ways, and
not, as we were saying before, only relatively to one another, but there must
also be another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard ; would
you like to hear the reason why ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. If we assume the
greater to exist only in relation to the less, there will never be any
comparison of either with the mean.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And would not this
doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations ; would not the
art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear ? For all
these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but
as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in action ; and the excellence
of beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of
measure.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. But if the science
of the Statesman disappears, the search for the royal science will be
impossible.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Well, then, as in
the case of the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an
existence, because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so
in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and, less are not only to be
measured with one another, but also have to do with the production of the
mean ; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man
of action can be an undisputed master of his science.
Y.
Soc. Yes, we must certainly do
again what we did then.
Str. But this,
Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which we only too well remember
the length. I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort
—
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. That we shall some
day require this notion of a mean with a view to the demonstration of absolute
truth ; meanwhile, the argument that the very existence of the arts must be
held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one
another, but also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a
grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are
maintaining ; for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if
there is a standard of measure, there are arts ; but if either is wanting,
there is neither.
Y.
Soc. True ; and what is the
next step ?
Str. The next step
clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts, all we have said
already, and to place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length,
depth, breadth, swiftness with their opposites ; and to have another part
in which they are measured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and
the due, and with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard
removed from the extremes.
Y.
Soc. Here are two vast divisions,
embracing two very different spheres.
Str. There are many
accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing themselves to speak wisely, that
the art of measurement is universal, and has to do with all things. And this
means what we are now saying ; for all things which come within the
province of art do certainly in some sense partake of measure. But these
persons, because they are not accustomed to distinguish classes according to
real forms, jumble together two widely different things, relation to one
another, and to a standard, under the idea that they are the same, and also fall
into the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real
parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to
go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences
contained in it which form distinct classes ; nor again should he be able
to rest contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of
things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within the
bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a single kind.
But we have said enough on this head, and also of excess and defect ; we
have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of measurement have been
discovered which are concerned with them, and not forget what they
are.
Y.
Soc. We will not
forget.
Str. And now that this
discussion is completed, let us go on to consider another question, which
concerns not this argument only but the conduct of such arguments in
general.
Y.
Soc. What is this new
question ?
Str. Take the case of a
child who is engaged in learning his letters : when he is asked what
letters make up a word, should we say that the question is intended to improve
his grammatical knowledge of that particular word, or of all
words ?
Y.
Soc. Clearly, in order that he may
have a better knowledge of all words.
Str. And is our enquiry
about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our
power of reasoning generally ?
Y.
Soc. Clearly, as in the former
example, the purpose is general.
Str. Still less would
any rational man seek to analyse the notion of weaving for its own sake. But
people seem to forget that some things have sensible images, which are readily
known, and can be easily pointed out when any one desires to answer an enquirer
without any trouble or argument ; whereas the greatest and highest truths
have no outward image of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to
satisfy the soul of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we
ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational account of them ;
for immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only in
thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are now saying is said
for the sake of them. Moreover, there is always less difficulty in fixing the
mind on small matters than on great.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. Let us call to
mind the bearing of all this.
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. I wanted to get
rid of any impression of tediousness which we may have experienced in the
discussion about weaving, and the reversal of the universe, and in the
discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of not-being. I know that they
were felt to be too long, and I reproached myself with this, fearing that they
might be not only tedious but irrelevant ; and all that I have now said is
only designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the
future.
Y.
Soc. Very good. Will you
proceed ?
Str. Then I would like
to observe that you and I, remembering what has been said, should praise or
blame the length or shortness of discussions, not by comparing them with one
another, but with what is fitting, having regard to the part of measurement,
which, as we said, was to be borne in mind.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And yet, not
everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting ; for we
should only want such a length as is suited to give pleasure, if at all, as a
secondary matter ; and reason tells us, that we should be contented to make
the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our first, but our second object ;
the first and highest of all being to assert the great method of division
according to species — whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the
point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to
be employed indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to
sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the
length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with their
circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them,
when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he should prove that if
they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better
dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things ; about
any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself — he should pretend not
to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me
in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid
example of weaving.
Y.
Soc. Very good ; — let us do
as you say.
Str. The art of the
king has been separated from the similar arts of shepherds, and, indeed, from
all those which have to do with herds at all. There still remain, however, of
the causal and co-operative arts those which are immediately concerned with
States, and which must first be distinguished from one
another.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. You know that
these arts cannot easily be divided into two halves ; the reason will be
very : evident as we proceed.
Y.
Soc. Then we had better do
so.
Str. We must carve them
like a victim into members or limbs, since we cannot bisect them. For we
certainly should divide everything into as few parts as
possible.
Y.
Soc. What is to be done in this
case ?
Str. What we did in the
example of weaving — all those arts which furnish the tools were regarded by us
as co-operative.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. So now, and with
still more reason, all arts which make any implement in a State, whether great
or small, may be regarded by us as co-operative, for without them neither State
nor Statesmanship would be possible ; and yet we are not inclined to say
that any of them is a product of the kingly art.
Y.
Soc. No,
indeed.
Str. The task of
separating this class from others is not an easy one ; for there is
plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the instrument of doing
something. But there is another dass of possessions in, a city, of which I have
a word to say.
Y.
Soc. What class do you
mean ?
Str. A class which may
be described as not having this power ; that is to say, not like an
instrument, framed for production, but designed for the preservation of that
which is produced.
Y.
Soc. To what do you
refer ?
Str. To the class of
vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, which are constructed for the
preservation of things moist and dry, of things prepared in the fire or out of
the fire ; this is a very large class, and has, if I am not mistaken,
literally nothing to do with the royal art of which we are in
search.
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. There is also a
third class of possessions to be noted, different from these and very extensive,
moving or resting on land or water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole
of this class has one name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always
a seat for something.
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. A vehicle, which
is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but of the carpenter, potter, and
coppersmith.
Y.
Soc. I
understand.
Str. And is there not a
fourth class which is again different, and in which most of the things formerly
mentioned are contained — every kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and
enclosures, whether of earth or stone, and ten thousand other thing ? all
of which being made for the sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and
are for the most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the
weaver, rather than of the Statesman.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Shall we add a
fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and of the imitations produced, by
drawing and music, which are designed for amusement only, and may be fairly
comprehended under one name ?
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. Plaything is the
name.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. That one name may
be fitly predicated of all of them, for none of these things have a serious
purpose — amusement is their sole aim.
Y.
Soc. That again I
understand.
Str. Then there is a
class which provides materials for all these, out of which and in which the arts
already mentioned fabricate their works ; — this manifold class, I say,
which is the creation and offspring of many other arts, may I not rank
sixth ?
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. I am referring to
gold, silver, and other metals, and all that wood-cutting and shearing of every
sort provides for the art of carpentry and plaiting ; and there is the
process of barking and stripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier’s art,
which strips off the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture
corks and papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species
out of simple kinds — the whole class may be termed the primitive and simple
possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no concern at
all.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. The provision of
food and of all other things which mingle their particles with the particles of
the human body ; and minister to the body, will form a seventh class, which
may be called by the general term of nourishment, unless you have any better
name to offer. This, however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman,
trainer, doctor, cook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman’s
art.
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. These seven
classes include nearly every description of property, with the exception of tame
animals. Consider ; — there was the original material, which ought to have
been placed first ; next come instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences,
playthings, nourishment ; small things, which may be included under one of
these — as for example, coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not
in them the character of any larger kind which includes them ; but some of
them may, with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be
made to harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has
been already divided into parts, will include all property in tame animals
except slaves.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. The class of
slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect that in this the real aspirants
for the throne, who are the rivals of the king in the formation of the political
web, will be discovered ; just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them,
were the rivals of the weaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators,
have been got rid of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from
the royal and political science.
Y.
Soc. I
agree.
Str. Let us go a little
nearer, in order that we may be more certain of the complexion of this remaining
class.
Y.
Soc. Let us do
so.
Str. We shall find from
our present point of view that the greatest servants are in a case and condition
which is the reverse of what we anticipated.
Y.
Soc. Who are
they ?
Str. Those who have
been purchased, and have so become possessions ; these are unmistakably
slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science.
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. Again, freemen who
of their own accord become the servants of the other classes in a State, and who
exchange and equalise the products of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting
in the market-place, others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving
money in exchange for money or for other productions — the money-changer, the
merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft
or politics ?
Y.
Soc. No ; unless, indeed, to
the politics of commerce.
Str. But surely men
whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and too happy to turn their hand to
anything, will not profess to share in royal
science ?
Y.
Soc. Certainly
not.
Str. But what would you
say of some other serviceable officials ?
Y.
Soc. Who are they, and what
services do they perform ?
Str. There are heralds,
and scribes perfected by practice, and divers others who have great skill in
various sorts of business connected with the government of states — what shall
we call them ?
Y.
Soc. They are the officials, and
servants of the rulers, as you just now called them, but not themselves
rulers.
Str. There may be
something strange in any servant pretending to be a ruler, and yet I do not
think that I could have been dreaming when I imagined that the principal
claimants to political science would be found somewhere in this
neighbourhood.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Well, let us draw
nearer, and try the claims of some who have not yet been tested ; in the
first place, there are diviners, who have a portion of servile or ministerial
science, and are thought to be the interpreters of the gods to
men.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. There is also the
priestly class, who, as the law declares, know how to give the gods gifts from
men in the form of sacrifices which are acceptable to them, and to ask on our
behalf blessings in return from them. Now both these are branches of the servile
or ministerial art.
Y.
Soc. Yes,
clearly.
Str. And here I think
that we seem to be getting on the right track ; for the priest and the
diviner are swollen with pride and prerogative, and they create an awful
impression of themselves by the magnitude of their enterprises ; in Egypt,
the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if
he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in
the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn
propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at
Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to
be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King
Archon.
Y.
Soc.
Precisely.
Str. But who are these
other kings and priests elected by lot who now come into view followed by their
retainers and a vast throng, as the former class disappears and the scene
changes ?
Y.
Soc. Whom can you
mean ?
Str. They are a strange
crew.
Y.
Soc. Why
strange ?
Str. A minute ago I
thought that they were animals of every tribe ; for many of them are like
lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs and such weak and shifty
creatures ; — Protean shapes quickly changing into one another’s forms and
natures ; and now, Socrates, I begin to see who they
are.
Y.
Soc. Who are they ? You seem
to be gazing on some strange vision.
Str. Yes ; every
one looks strange when you do not know him ; and just now I myself fell
into this mistake — at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not
recognize the politician and his troop.
Y.
Soc. Who is
he ?
Str. The chief of
Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must at any cost be separated
from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present
enquiry.
Y.
Soc. That is a hope not lightly to
be renounced.
Str. Never, if I can
help it ; and, first, let me ask you a question.
Y.
Soc.
What ?
Str. Is not monarchy a
recognized form of government ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And, after
monarchy, next in order comes the government of the
few ?
Y.
Soc. Of
course.
Str. Is not the third
form of government the rule of the multitude, which is called by the name of
democracy ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And do not these
three expand in a manner into five, producing out of themselves two other names
Y. Soc. What are they ?
Y.
Soc. What are
they ?
Str. There is a
criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and riches, law and the absence
of law, which men now-a-days apply to them ; the two first they subdivide
accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names,
royalty and tyranny.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And the government
of the few they distinguish by the names of aristocracy and
oligarchy.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Democracy alone,
whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and whether the multitude rule over
the men of property with their consent or against their consent, always in
ordinary language has the same name.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. But do you suppose
that any form of government which is defined by these characteristics of the
one, the few, or the many, of poverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory
submission, of written law or the absence of law, can be a right
one ?
Y.
Soc. Why
not ?
Str. Reflect ; and
follow me.
Y.
Soc. In what
direction ?
Str. Shall we abide by
what we said at first, or shall we retract our
words ?
Y.
Soc. To what do you
refer ?
Str. If I am not
mistaken, we said that royal power was a science ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And a science of a
peculiar kind, which was selected out of the rest as having a character which is
at once judicial and authoritative ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And there was one
kind of authority over lifeless things and another other living animals ;
and so we proceeded in the division step by step up to this point, not losing
the idea of science, but unable as yet to determine the nature of the particular
science ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. Hence we are led
to observe that the distinguishing principle of the State cannot be the few or
many, the voluntary or involuntary, poverty or riches ; but some notion of
science must enter into it, if we are to be consistent with what has
preceded.
Y.
Soc. And we must be
consistent.
Str. Well, then, in
which of these various forms of States may the science of government, which is
among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire, be supposed to
reside ? That we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false
politicians who pretend to be politicians but are not, although they persuade
many, and shall separate them from the wise king.
Y.
Soc. That, as the argument has
already intimated, will be our duty.
Str. Do you think that
the multitude in a State can attain political
science ?
Y. Soc.
Impossible.
Str. But, perhaps, in a
city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who
could ?
Y.
Soc. In that case political
science would certainly be the easiest of all sciences ; there could not be
found in a city of that number as many really first-rate draught-players, if
judged by the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be
as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science,
whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous
argument.
Str. Thank you for
reminding me ; and the consequence is that any true form of government can
only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a
few.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And these, whether
they rule with the will, or against the will of their subjects, with written
laws or. without written laws, and whether they are poor or rich, and whatever
be the nature of their rule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to
rule on some scientific principle ; just as the physician, whether he cures
us against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment —
incision, burning, or the infliction of some other pain — whether he practises
out of a book or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he
purges or reduces in some other way, or even fattens his patients, is a
physician all the same, so long as he exercises authority over them according to
rules of art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we
lay down to be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art
of command.
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. Then that can be
the only true form of government in which the governors are really found to
possess science, and are not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law
or without law, over-willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor
themselves — none of these things can with any propriety be included in the
notion of the ruler.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And whether with a
view to the public good they purge the State by killing some, or exiling
some ; whether they reduce the size of the body corporate by sending out
from the hive swarms of citizens, or, by introducing persons from without,
increase it ; while they act according to the rules of wisdom and justice,
and use their power with a view to the general security and improvement, the
city over which they rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described
as the only true State. All other governments are not genuine or real ; but
only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are
worse ; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere
imitations like the others.
Y.
Soc. I agree, Stranger, in the
greater part of what you say ; but as to their ruling without laws — the
expression has a harsh sound.
Str. You have been too
quick for me, Socrates ; I was just going to ask you whether you objected
to any of my statements. And now I see that we shall have to consider this
notion of there being good government without laws.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. There can be no
doubt that legislation is in a manner the business of a king, and yet the best
thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule,
supposing him to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this
is ?
Y.
Soc.
Why ?
Str. Because the law
does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all and
therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of men and actions, and
the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal
and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for
all time.
Y.
Soc. Of course
not.
Str. But the law is
always striving to make one ; — like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who
will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question
to be asked — not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something
happens to be better than what he commanded for some one.
Y.
Soc. Certainly ; the law
treats us all precisely in the manner which you describe.
Str. A perfectly simple
principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of
simple.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. Then if the law is
not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all ? The
reason of this has next to be investigated.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Let me ask,
whether you have not meetings for gymnastic contests in your city, such as there
are in other cities, at which men compete in running, wrestling, and the
like ?
Y.
Soc. Yes ; they are very
common among us.
Str. And what are the
rules which are enforced on their pupils by professional trainers or by others
having similar authority ? Can you remember ?
Y.
Soc. To what do you
refer ?
Str. The
training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, or give every
individual what is exactly suited to his constitution ; they think that
they ought to go more roughly to work, and to prescribe generally the regimen,
which will benefit the majority.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And therefore they
assign equal amounts of exercise to them all ; they send them forth
together, and let them rest together from their running, wrestling, or whatever
the form of bodily exercise may be.
Y. So
True.
Str. And now observe
that the legislator who has to preside over the herd, and to enforce justice in
their dealings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the general
good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular
case.
Y.
Soc. He cannot be expected to do
so.
Str. He will lay down
laws in a general form for the majority, roughly meeting the cases of
individuals ; and some of them he will deliver in writing, and others will
be unwritten ; and these last will be traditional customs of the
country.
Y.
Soc. He will be
right.
Str. Yes, quite
right ; for how can he sit at every man’s side all through his life,
prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty ? Who, Socrates,
would be equal to such a task ? No one who really had the royal science, if
he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the restriction of
a written law.
Y.
Soc. So I should infer from what
has now been said.
Str. Or rather, my good
friend, from what is going to be said.
Y.
Soc. And what is
that ?
Str. Let us put to
ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, who is about to go into a far
country, and is expecting to be a long time away from his patients — thinking
that his instructions will not be remembered unless they are written down, he
will leave notes of them for the use of his pupils or
patients.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. But what would you
say, if he came back sooner than he had intended, and, owing to an unexpected
change of the winds or other celestial influences, something else happened to be
better for them — would he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not
contemplated in his former prescription ? Would he persist in observing the
original law, neither himself giving any few commandments, nor the patient
daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only
was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox ? Viewed in the
light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly
ridiculous ?
Y.
Soc.
Utterly.
Str. And if he who gave
laws, written or unwritten, determining what was good or bad, honourable or
dishonourable, just or unjust, to the tribes of men who flock together in their
several cities, and are governed accordance with them ; if, I say, the wise
legislator were suddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be
prohibited from changing them ? — would not this prohibition be in reality
quite as ridiculous as the other ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Do you know a
plausible saying of the common people which is in
point ?
Y.
Soc. I do not recall what you mean
at the moment.
Str. They say that if
any one knows how the ancient laws may be improved, he must first persuade his
own State of the improvement, and then he may legislate, but not
otherwise.
Y.
Soc. And are they not
right ?
Str. I dare say. But
supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this
violence to be called ? Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same
question in reference to our previous instances.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. Suppose that a
skilful physician has a patient, of whatever sex or age, whom he compels against
his will to do something for his good which is contrary to the written
rules ; what is this compulsion to be called ? Would you ever dream of
calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of the laws of health ?
Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such violence is
applied, to charge the physician who practises the violence with wanting skill
or aggravating his disease.
Y.
Soc. Most
true.
Str. In the political
art error is not called disease, but evil, or disgrace, or
injustice.
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. And when the
citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled to do what is juster and
better and nobler than he did before, the last and most absurd thing which he
could say about such violence is that he has incurred disgrace or evil or
injustice at the hands of those who compelled him.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. And shall we say
that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man,
unjust ? May not any man, rich or poor, with or without laws, with the will
of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their
interest ? Is not this the true principle of government, according to which
the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects ? As the
pilot, by watching continually over the interests of the ship and of the crew —
not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law — preserves the lives of
his fellow-sailors, even and in the self-same way, may there not be a true form
of polity created by those who are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who
show a strength of art which is superior to the law ? Nor can wise rulers
ever err while they, observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the
citizens with intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as
may be, to make them better from being worse.
Y.
Soc. No one can deny what has been
now said.
Str. Neither, if you
consider, can any one deny the other statement.
Y.
Soc. What was
it ?
Str. We said that no
great number of persons, whoever they may be, can attain political knowledge, or
order a State wisely, but that the true government is to be found in a small
body, or in an individual, and that other States are but imitations of this, as
we said a little while ago, some for the better and some for the
worse.
Y.
Soc. What do you mean ? I
cannot have understood your previous remark about
imitations.
Str. And yet the mere
suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly important, even if we leave the
question where it is, and do not seek by the discussion of it to expose the
error which prevails in this matter.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. The idea which has
to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar ; but we may attempt to express
it thus : — Supposing the government of which I have been speaking to be
the only true model, then the others must use the written laws of this — in no
other can they be saved ; they will have to do what is now generally
approved, although not the best thing in the world.
Y.
Soc. What is
this ?
Str. No citizen should
do anything contrary to the laws, and any infringement of them should be
punished with death and the most extreme penalties ; and this is very right
and good when regarded as the second best thing, if you set aside the first, of
which I was just now speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what call the
second best ?
Y.
Soc. By all
means.
Str. I must again have
recourse to my favourite images ; through them, and them alone, can I
describe kings and rulers.
Y.
Soc. What
images ?
Str. The noble pilot
and the wise physician, who “is worth many another man” — in the similitude of
these let us endeavour to discover some image of the king.
Y.
Soc. What sort of
image ?
Str. Well, such as
this : — Every man will reflect that he suffers strange things at the hands
of both of them ; the physician ; saves any whom he wishes to save,
and any whom he wishes to maltreat he maltreats — cutting or burning them ;
and at the same time requiring them to bring him patients, which are a sort of
tribute, of which little or nothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater
part is consumed by him and his domestics ; and the finale is that he
receives money from the relations of the sick man or from some enemy of
his ; and puts him out of the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty, of
numberless evil deeds of the same kind ; they intentionally play false and
leave you ashore when the hour of sailing arrives ; or they cause mishaps
at sea and cast away their freight ; and are guilty of other rogueries. Now
suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after
consideration, that neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to
exercise absolute control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will
summon an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, that anybody
who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may offer
an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases — whether as to the manner
in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or
again about the vessels and the nautical implements which are required in
navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental
to the voyage, how to behave when encountering pirates, and what is to be done
with the old fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar
build — and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points,
upon the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on
triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be national
customs ; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated and
remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.
Y.
Soc. What a strange
notion !
Str. Suppose further,
that the pilots and physicians are appointed annually, either out of the rich,
or out of the whole people, and that they are elected by lot ; and that
after their election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to the
written rules.
Y.
Soc. Worse and
worse.
Str. But hear what
follows : — When the year of office has expired, the pilot or physician has
to come before a court of review, in which the judges are either selected from
the wealthy classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people ; and anybody
who pleases may be their accuser, and may lay to their charge, that during the
past year they have not navigated their vessels or healed their patients
according to the letter of the law and the ancient customs of their
ancestors ; and if either of them is condemned, some of the judges must fix
what he is to suffer or pay.
Y.
Soc. He who is willing to take a
command under such conditions, deserves to suffer any
penalty.
Str. Yet once more, we
shall have to enact that if any one is detected enquiring into piloting and
navigation, or into health and the true nature of medicine, or about the winds,
or other conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has
any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or
physician, but a cloudy prating sophist ; — further, on the ground that he
is a corrupter of the young, who would persuade them. to follow the art of
medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule
over their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform against
him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be persuading any,
whether young or old, to act contrary to the written law, he is to be punished
with the utmost rigour ; for no one should presume to be wiser than the
laws ; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, the
nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws and the
national customs. If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these
sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or
imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or
planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending herds, or
divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or any science
conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising motion —
I say, if all these things were done in this way according to written
regulations, and not according to art, what would be the
result ?
Y.
Soc. All the arts would utterly
perish, and could never be recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And
human life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly
unendurable.
Str. But what, if while
compelling all these operations to be regulated by written law, we were to
appoint as the guardian of the laws some one elected by a show of hands, or by
lot, and he caring nothing about the laws, were to act contrary to them from
motives of interest or favour, and without knowledge — would not this be a still
worse evil than the former ?
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. To go against the
laws, which are based upon long experience, and the wisdom of counsellors who
have graciously recommended them and persuaded the multitude to pass them, would
be a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written
law ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. Therefore, as
there is a danger of this, the next best thing in legislating is not to allow
either the individual or the multitude to break the law in any respect
whatever.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. The laws would be
copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written
down from the lips of those who have knowledge ?
Y.
Soc. Certainly they
would.
Str. And, as we were
saying, he who has knowledge and is a true Statesman, will do many things within
his own sphere of action by his art without regard to the laws, when he is of
opinion that something other than that which he has written down and enjoined to
be observed during his absence would be better.
Y.
Soc. Yes, we said
so.
Str. And any individual
or any number of men, having fixed laws, in acting contrary to them with a view
to something better, would only be acting, as far as they are able, like the
true Statesman ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. If they had no
knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth, and they would
always imitate ill ; but if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the
perfect truth, and an imitation no longer.
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. And the principle
that no great number of men are able to acquire a knowledge of any art has been
already admitted by us.
Y.
Soc. Yes, it
has.
Str. Then the royal or
political art, if there be such an art, will never be attained either by the
wealthy or by the other mob.
Y. Soc.
Impossible.
Str. Then the nearest
approach which these lower forms of government can ever make to the true
government of the one scientific ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own
written laws and national customs.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. When the rich
imitate the true form, such a government is called aristocracy ; and when
they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.
Y Soc. True.
Str. Or again, when an
individual rules according to law in imitation of him who knows, we call him a
king ; and if he rules according to law, we give him the same name, whether
he rules with opinion or with knowledge.
Y.
Soc. To be
sure.
Str. And when an
individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his name will surely be the same —
he will be called a king ; and thus the five names of governments, as they
are now reckoned, become one.
Y.
Soc. That is
true.
Str. And when an
individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but following in the
steps of the true man of science pretends that he can only act for the best by
violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of
the imitation, may not such an one be called a
tyrant ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And this we
believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, of oligarchies, and
aristocracies, and democracies — because men are offended at the one monarch,
and can never be made to believe that any one can be worthy of such authority,
or is able and willing in the spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and
holily to all ; they fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm
and slay whom he pleases of us ; for if there could be such a despot as we
describe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and
that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect
State.
Y.
Soc. To be
sure.
Str. But then, as the
State is not like a beehive, and has no natural head who is at once recognized
to be the superior both in body and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and
make laws, and endeavour to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of
government.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And when the
foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is
divorced from action, can we wonder Socrates, at the miseries which there are,
and always will be, in States ? Any other art, built on such a foundation
and thus conducted, would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to
wonder at the natural strength of the political bond ? For States have
endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are
not overthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea, founder from time to
time, and perish, and have perished and will hire after perish, through the
badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the
highest truths — I mean to say, that they are wholly unaquainted with politics,
of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the
most perfect knowledge.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Then the question
arises : — which of these untrue forms of government is the least
oppressive to their subjects, though they are all oppressive ; and which is
the worst of them ? Here is a consideration which is beside our present
purpose, and yet having regard to the whole it seems to influence all our
actions : we must examine it.
Y.
Soc. Yes, we
must.
Str. You may say that
of the three forms, the same is at once the hardest and the
easiest.
Y.
Soc. What do you
mean ?
Str. I am speaking of
the three forms of government, which I mentioned at the beginning of this
discussion — monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the
many.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. If we divide each
of these we shall have six, from which the true one may be distinguished as a
seventh.
Y.
Soc. How would you make the
division ?
Str. Monarchy divides
into royalty and tyranny ; the rule of the few into aristocracy, which has
an auspicious name, and oligarchy ; and democracy or the rule of the many,
which before was one, must now be divided.
Y.
Soc. On what principle of
division ?
Str. On the same
principle as before, although the name is now discovered to have a twofold
meaning ; — For the distinction of ruling with law or without applies to
this as well as to the rest.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. The division made
no difference when we were looking for the perfect State, as we showed before.
But now that this has been separated off, and, as we said, the others alone are
left for us, the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them
all.
Y.
Soc. That would seem follow, from
what has been said.
Str. Then monarchy,
when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the best of all the six, and when
lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to the subject.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. The government of
the few which is intermediate between that of the one and many ; is also
intermediate in good and evil ; but the government of the many is in every
respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil, when
compared with the others, because the offices are too minutely subdivided and
too many hold them. And this therefore is the worst of all lawful governments,
and the best of all lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law,
democracy is the form in which to live is best ; if they are well ordered
then this is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is
the best, with the exception of the seventh for that excels them all, and is
among States what God is among men.
Y.
Soc. You are quite right, and we
should choose that above all.
Str. The members of all
these States, with the exception of the one which has knowledge may be set aside
as being not Statesmen but partisans — upholders of the most monstrous idols,
and themselves idols ; and, being the greatest imitators and magicians,
they are also the greatest of Sophists.
Y.
Soc. The name of Sophist after
many windings in the argument appears to have been most justly fixed upon the
politicians, as they are termed.
Str. And so our satyric
drama has been played out ; and the troop of Centaurs and Satyrs, however
unwilling to leave the stage, have at last been separated from the political
science.
Y.
Soc. So I
perceive.
Str. There remain,
however, natures still more troublesome, because they are more nearly akin to
the king, and more difficult to discern ; the examination of them may be
compared to the process of refining gold.
Y.
Soc. What is your
meaning ?
Str. The workmen begin
by sifting away the earth and stones and the like ; there remain in a
confused mass the valuable clements akin to gold, which can only be separated by
fire-copper, silver, and other precious metals ; these are at last refined
away by the use of tests, until the gold is left quite
pure.
Y.
Soc. Yes, that is the way in which
these things are said to be done.
Str. In like manner,
all alien and uncongenial matter has been separated from political science, and
what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left ; there remain the
nobler arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which
is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in
guiding the helm of States : — How can we best clear away all these,
leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed ?
Y.
Soc. That is obviously what has in
some way to be attempted.
Str. If the attempt is
all that is wanting, he shall certainly be brought to light ; and I think
that the illustration of music may assist in exhibiting him. Please to answer me
a question.
Y.
Soc. What
question ?
Str. There is such a
thing as learning music or handicraft arts in
general ?
Y.
Soc. There
is.
Str. And is there any
higher art or science, having power to decide which of these arts are and are
not to be learned ; — what do you say ?
Y.
Soc. I should answer that there
is.
Str. And do we
acknowledge this science to be different from the
others ?
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. And ought the
other sciences to be superior to this, or no single science to any other ?
Or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the
others ?
Y.
Soc. The
latter.
Str. You mean to say
that the science which judges whether we ought to learn or not, must be superior
to the science which is learned or which teaches ?
Y.
Soc. Far
superior.
Str. And the science
which determines whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the
science which is able to persuade ?
Y.
Soc. Of
course.
Str. Very good ;
and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a
pleasing tale and not by teaching ?
Y.
Soc. That power, I think, must
clearly be assigned to rhetoric.
Str. And to what
science do we give the power of determining whether we are to employ persuasion
or force towards any one, or to refrain altogether ?
Y.
Soc. To that science which governs
the arts of speech and persuasion.
Str. Which, if I am not
mistaken, will be politics ?
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. Rhetoric seems to
be quickly distinguished from politics, being a different species, yet
ministering to it.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. But what would you
think of another sort of power or science ?
Y.
Soc. What
science ?
Str. The science which
has to do with military operations against our enemies — is that to be regarded
as a science or not ?
Y.
Soc. How can generalship and
military tactics be regarded as other than a
science ?
Str. And is the art
which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war, or to make
peace, the same as this or different ?
Y.
Soc. If we are to be consistent,
we must say different.
Str. And we must also
suppose that this rules the other, if we are not to give up our former
notion ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And, considering
how great and terrible the whole art of war is, can we imagine any which is
superior to it but the truly royal ?
Y.
Soc. No
other.
Str. The art of the
general is only ministerial, and therefore not
political ?
Y.
Soc.
Exactly.
Str. Once more let us
consider the nature of the righteous judge.
Y.
Soc. Very
good.
Str. Does he do
anything but decide the dealings of men with one another to be just or unjust in
accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legislator —
showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts,
or fears, or pity, or by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits
of men with one another contrary to the appointment of the
legislator ?
Y.
Soc. No ; his office is such
as you describe.
Str. Then the inference
is that the power of the judge is not royal, but only the power of a guardian of
the law which ministers to the royal power ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. The review of all
these sciences shows that none of them is political or royal. For the truly
royal ought not itself to act, but to rule over those who are able to act ;
the king ought to know what is and what is not a fitting opportunity for taking
the initiative in matters of the greatest importance, whilst others, should
execute his orders.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And, therefore,
the arts which we have described, as they have no authority over themselves or
one another, but are each of them concerned with some special action of their
own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their several
actions.
Y.
Soc. I
agree.
Str. And the science
which is over them all, and has charge of the laws, and of all matters affecting
the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name
characteristic of their common nature, most truly we may call
politics.
Y.
Soc. Exactly
so.
Str. Then, now that we
have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyse politics after
the pattern which weaving supplied ?
Y.
Soc. I greatly wish that you
would.
Str. Then I must
describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are woven
into one piece.
Y.
Soc.
Clearly.
Str. A task has to be
accomplished, which although difficult, appears to be
necessary.
Y.
Soc. Certainly the attempt must be
made.
Str. To assume that one
part of virtue differs in kind from another, is a position easily assailable by
contentious disputants, who appeal to popular opinion.
Y.
Soc. I do not
understand.
Str. Let me put the
matter in another way : I suppose that you would consider courage to be a
part of virtue ?
Y.
Soc. Certainly I
should.
Str. And you would
think temperance to be different from courage ; and likewise to be a part
of virtue ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. I shall venture to
put forward a strange theory about them.
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. That they are two
principles which thoroughly hate one another and are antagonistic throughout a
great part of nature.
Y.
Soc. How
singular !
Str. Yes very — for all
the parts of virtue are commonly said to be friendly to one
another.
Y.
Soc. Yes.
Str. Then let us
carefully investigate whether this is universally true, or whether there are not
parts of virtue which are at war with their kindred in some
respect.
Y.
Soc. Tell me how we shall consider
that question.
Str. We must extend our
enquiry to all those things which we consider beautiful and at the same time
place in two opposite classes.
Y.
Soc. Explain ; what are
they ?
Str. Acuteness and
quickness, whether in body or soul or in the movement of sound, and the
imitations of them which painting and music supply, you must have praised
yourself before now, or been present when others praised
them.
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And do you
remember the terms in which they are praised ?
Y.
Soc. I do
not.
Str. I wonder whether I
can explain to you in words the thought which is passing in my
mind.
Y.
Soc. Why
not ?
Str. You fancy that
this is all so easy : Well, let us consider these notions with reference to
the opposite classes of action under which they fall. When we praise quickness
and energy and acuteness, whether of mind or body or sound, we express our
praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is
manliness or courage.
Y.
Soc.
How ?
Str. We speak of an
action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, and vigorous too ; and when
we apply the name of which I speak as the common attribute of all these natures,
we certainly praise them.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. And do we not
often praise the quiet strain of action also ?
Y.
Soc. To be
sure.
Str. And do we not then
say the opposite of what we said of the other ?
Y.
Soc. How do you
mean ?
Str. We exclaim How
calm ! How temperate ! in admiration of the slow and quiet working of
the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in action, of smoothness and
depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general, when
these have a proper solemnity. Of all such actions we predicate not courage, but
a name indicative of order.
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. But when, on the
other hand, either of these is out of place, the names of either are changed
into terms of censure.
Y.
Soc. How
so ?
Str. Too great
sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence or madness ; too
great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness ; and we
may observe, that for the most part these qualities, and the temperance and
manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides,
and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions ; and if we
pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of
mind differ from one another.
Y.
Soc. In what
respect ?
Str. In respect of all
the qualities which I mentioned, and very likely of many others. According to
their respective affinities to either class of actions they distribute praise
and blame — praise to the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of
the opposite party — and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel
arise among them.
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. The difference
between the two classes is often a trivial concern ; but in a state, and
when affecting really important matters, becomes of all disorders the most
hateful.
Y.
Soc. To what do you
refer ?
Str. To nothing short
of the whole regulation of human life. For the orderly class are always ready to
lead a peaceful life, quietly doing their own business ; this is their
manner of behaving with all men at home, and they are equally ready to find some
way of keeping the peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of
theirs for peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails,
they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like
themselves ; they are at the mercy of their enemies ; whence in a few
years they and their children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from
the condition of freemen into that of slaves.
Y.
Soc. What a cruel
fate !
Str. And now think of
what happens with the more courageous natures. Are they not always inciting
their country to go to war, owing to their excessive love of the military
life ? they raise up enemies against themselves many and mighty, and either
utterly ruin their native land or enslave and subject it to its
foes ?
Y.
Soc. That, again, is
true.
Str. Must we not admit,
then, that where these two classes exist. they always feel the greatest
antipathy and antagonism towards one another ?
Y.
Soc. We cannot deny
it.
Str. And returning to
the enquiry with which we began, have we not found that considerable portions of
virtue are at variance with one another, and give rise to a similar opposition
in the characters who are endowed with them ?
Y.
Soc. True.
Str. Let us consider a
further point.
Y.
Soc. What is
it ?
Str. I want to know,
whether any constructive art will make any, even the most trivial thing, out of
bad and good materials indifferently, if this can be helped ? does not all
art rather reject the bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit
materials, and from these elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all
into one, work out some nature or idea ?
Y.
Soc. To, be
sure.
Str. Then the true and
natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be formed by a
combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided ; but will begin by
testing human natures in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to
proper teachers who are the ministers of her purposes — she will herself give
orders, and maintain authority ; just as the art of weaving continually
gives orders and maintains authority over the carders and all the others who
prepare the material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the
works which she deems necessary for making the web.
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. In like manner,
the royal science appears to me to be the mistress of all lawful educators and
instructors, and having this queenly power, will not permit them to train men in
what will produce characters unsuited to the political constitution which she
desires to create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those
which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous
inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried
away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and
exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.
Y.
Soc. That is commonly
said.
Str. But those who are
wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows under the yoke of
slavery.
Y.
Soc. Quite
right.
Str. The rest of the
citizens, out of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and
who are capable of being united by the Statesman, the kingly art blends and
weaves together ; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to
courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on
the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are
represented in the figure as spun thick and soft after the manner of the woof —
these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the
following manner :
Y.
Soc. In what
manner ?
Str. First of all, she
takes the eternal element of the soul and binds it with a divine cord, to which
it is akin, and then the animal nature, and binds that with human
cords.
Y.
Soc. I do not understand what you
mean.
Str. The meaning is,
that the opinion about the honourable and the just and good and their opposites,
which is true and confirmed by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted
in the soul, is implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly
birth.
Y.
Soc. Yes ; what else should
it be ?
Str. Only the Statesman
and the good legislator, having the inspiration of the royal muse, can implant
this opinion, and he, only in the rightly educated, whom we were just now
describing.
Y.
Soc. Likely
enough.
Str. But him who
cannot, we will not designate by any of the names which are the subject of the
present which are the subject of the present enquiry.
Y.
Soc. Very
right.
Str. The courageous
soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of
partaking of justice ; but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is
not that true ?
Y.
Soc.
Certainly.
Str. And again, the
peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these opinions, becomes temperate and
wise, as far as this may be in a State, but if not, deservedly obtains the
ignominious name of silliness.
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. Can we say that
such a connection as this will lastingly unite the evil with one another or with
the good, or that any science would seriously think of using a bond of this kind
to join such materials ?
Y. Soc.
Impossible.
Str. But in those who
were originally of a noble nature, and who have been nurtured in noble ways, and
in those only, may we not say that union is implanted by law, and that this is
the medicine which art prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the
dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the
divinest ?
Y.
Soc. Very
true.
Str. Where this divine
bond exists there is no difficulty in imagining, or when you have imagined, in
creating the other bonds, which are human only.
Y.
Soc. How is that, and what bonds
do you mean ?
Str. Rights of
intermarriage, and ties which are formed between States by giving and taking
children in marriage, or between individuals by private betrothals and
espousals. For most persons form ; marriage connection without due regard
to what is best for the procreation of children.
Y.
Soc. In what
way ?
Str. They seek after
wealth and power, which, in matrimony are objects not worthy — even of a serious
censure.
Y.
Soc. There is no need to consider
them at all.
Str. More reason is
there to consider the practice of those who make family their chief aim, and to
indicate their error.
Y.
Soc. Quite
true.
Str. They act on no
true principle at all ; they seek their ease and receive with open arms
those are like themselves, and hate those who are unlike them, being too much
influenced by feelings of dislike.
Y.
Soc. How
so ?
Str. The quiet orderly
class seek for natures like their own, and as far as they can they marry and
give in marriage exclusively in this class, and the courageous do the
same ; they seek natures like their own, whereas they should both do
precisely the opposite.
Y.
Soc. How and why is
that ?
Str. Because courage,
when untempered by the gentler nature during many generations, may at first
bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts forth into downright
madness.
Y.
Soc. Like
enough.
Str. And then, again,
the soul which is over-full of modesty and has no element of courage in many
successive generations, is apt to grow too indolent, and at last to become
utterly paralyzed and useless.
Y.
Soc. That, again, is quite
likely.
Str. It was of these
bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both
classes originally held the same opinion about the honourable and good ; —
indeed, in this single work, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised —
never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave
them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and
reputation, and by the giving of pledges to one another ; and out of them
forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of
State.
Y.
Soc. How do you
mean ?
Str. Where one officer
only is needed, you must choose a ruler who has both these qualities — when
many, you must mingle some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful and
just and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go.
Y.
Soc. Certainly, that is very
true.
Str. The character of
the courageous, on the other hand, falls short of the former in justice and
caution, but has the power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of
these two qualities is wanting, there cities. cannot altogether prosper either
in their public or private life.
Y.
Soc. Certainly they
cannot.
Str. This then we
declare to be the completion of the web of political Action, which is created by
a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal
science has drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and
friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which
political life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities,
whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides
over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no
particular fails to secure their happiness.
Y.
Soc. Your picture, Stranger, of
the king and statesman, no less than of the Sophist, is quite
perfect.